{"title":"Information Collection and Personalized Service Strategy of Monopoly under Consumer Misrepresentation","authors":"Mingyue Zhong, Yan Cheng, Shu-e Mei, Weijun Zhong","doi":"10.3390/jtaer19020067","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"To decrease privacy risks, consumers may choose to misrepresent themselves when they are asked to offer personal information. Using a game theoretic model, this study examines the impact of consumer misrepresentation on both a monopolistic firm and consumers. The results show that consumer misrepresentation may benefit the firm, but hurt consumers under certain conditions. In addition, we find that when the unit cost of personalized service is low, consumer misrepresentation may encourage the firm to provide a higher personalized service level. Moreover, when consumers misrepresent themselves and the firm only covers part of the market, a greater unit value of consumer private information will reduce the firm’s profit, while a greater unit cost of personalized service will increase the firm’s profit. The analysis reported here provides important insights regarding the application of consumer information in online personalized marketing and consumer privacy protection.","PeriodicalId":46198,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.1000,"publicationDate":"2024-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3390/jtaer19020067","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
To decrease privacy risks, consumers may choose to misrepresent themselves when they are asked to offer personal information. Using a game theoretic model, this study examines the impact of consumer misrepresentation on both a monopolistic firm and consumers. The results show that consumer misrepresentation may benefit the firm, but hurt consumers under certain conditions. In addition, we find that when the unit cost of personalized service is low, consumer misrepresentation may encourage the firm to provide a higher personalized service level. Moreover, when consumers misrepresent themselves and the firm only covers part of the market, a greater unit value of consumer private information will reduce the firm’s profit, while a greater unit cost of personalized service will increase the firm’s profit. The analysis reported here provides important insights regarding the application of consumer information in online personalized marketing and consumer privacy protection.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research (JTAER) has been created to allow researchers, academicians and other professionals an agile and flexible channel of communication in which to share and debate new ideas and emerging technologies concerned with this rapidly evolving field. Business practices, social, cultural and legal concerns, personal privacy and security, communications technologies, mobile connectivity are among the important elements of electronic commerce and are becoming ever more relevant in everyday life. JTAER will assist in extending and improving the use of electronic commerce for the benefit of our society.