Instruction on the Scientific Method Provides (Some) Protection Against Illusions of Causality.

Abstract

People tend to overestimate the efficacy of an ineffective treatment when they experience the treatment and its supposed outcome co-occurring frequently. This is referred to as the outcome density effect. Here, we attempted to improve the accuracy of participants' assessments of an ineffective treatment by instructing them about the scientific practice of comparing treatment effects against a relevant base-rate, i.e., when no treatment is delivered. The effect of these instructions was assessed in both a trial-by-trial contingency learning task, where cue administration was either decided by the participant (Experiments 1 & 2) or pre-determined by the experimenter (Experiment 3), as well as in summary format where all information was presented on a single screen (Experiment 4). Overall, we found two means by which base-rate instructions influence efficacy ratings for the ineffective treatment: 1) When information was presented sequentially, the benefit of base-rate instructions on illusory belief was mediated by reduced sampling of cue-present trials, and 2) When information was presented in summary format, we found a direct effect of base-rate instruction on reducing causal illusion. Together, these findings suggest that simple instructions on the scientific method were able to decrease participants' (over-)weighting of cue-outcome coincidences when making causal judgements, as well as decrease their tendency to over-sample cue-present events. However, the effect of base-rate instructions on correcting illusory beliefs was incomplete, and participants still showed illusory causal judgements when the probability of the outcome occurring was high. Thus, simple textual information about assessing causal relationships is partially effective in influencing people's judgements of treatment efficacy, suggesting an important role of scientific instruction in debiasing cognitive errors.