{"title":"Self-Threatening Extortionists Constitute a Problem for Utilitarians, Not Contractualists","authors":"Robert Huseby, Sigurd Lindstad","doi":"10.1007/s10677-024-10457-w","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Johann Frick has claimed that morality requires that we (in many cases) should give in to the demands of rational agents who attempt to extort us by threatening to harm themselves (self-threatening extortionists). He has further argued that since contractualism implies that there is no such moral requirement, such cases represent a problem for this brand of moral theory. In this paper, we argue that things are quite the other way around: Morality does not require that we give in to the demands of self-threatening extortionists. Such cases, therefore, represent a problem for (act) utilitarianism, rather than contractualism. Our argument appeals to a particular understanding of the idea that rational agents have a special responsibility to take care of their own interests or welfare.</p>","PeriodicalId":47052,"journal":{"name":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice","volume":"36 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Ethical Theory and Moral Practice","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-024-10457-w","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Johann Frick has claimed that morality requires that we (in many cases) should give in to the demands of rational agents who attempt to extort us by threatening to harm themselves (self-threatening extortionists). He has further argued that since contractualism implies that there is no such moral requirement, such cases represent a problem for this brand of moral theory. In this paper, we argue that things are quite the other way around: Morality does not require that we give in to the demands of self-threatening extortionists. Such cases, therefore, represent a problem for (act) utilitarianism, rather than contractualism. Our argument appeals to a particular understanding of the idea that rational agents have a special responsibility to take care of their own interests or welfare.
期刊介绍：
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice is a double-anonymous peer-reviewed philosophical journal which aims to publish the best work produced in all fields of practical philosophy. It welcomes high-quality, rigorous and original, submissions regardless of the traditions or schools of thought from which they derive. As an editorial priority, however, published papers should be accessible to the philosophical community at large and as free as possible of unnecessary jargon.
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice publishes work on ethical theories that address practical problems, as well as work that presents or examines empirical findings regarding moral practices relevant for ethical theorizing. The journal therefore actively seeks to promote cross-fertilization across areas of practical philosophy—such as moral, political, legal, and social philosophy—and more empirical disciplines, such as medicine, economics, sociology, political science, and psychology. It welcomes work in applied ethics provided that it can offer theoretical or normative contributions to larger philosophical debates. The journal also considers historically-oriented contributions provided they are not mainly exegetical and can offer insights for current debates in practical philosophy.
The journal endorses the BPA/ SWIP-UK Good Practice for Journals. Further details are available in our Review Policy document.
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