Erik Figueiredo, João Ricardo Faria, Jaime Orrillo, Rodrigo Pereira
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引用次数: 0
Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between annual disbursements of Brazil’s largest development bank, BNDES, and mayors political affiliation. We explore a set of Difference-in-Difference (DiD) designs to evaluate causal effects of policy interventions. Using data of Brazilian municipalities, we find that municipalities with mayors belonging to the coalition that supports the Federal government get higher disbursements than the ones with mayors that are out of the coalition. There is strong evidence that firms located in allied municipalities receive average higher loans. Our findings support the view that political bias may distort the credit allocation of state-owned banks.
期刊介绍：
Empirical Economics publishes high quality papers using econometric or statistical methods to fill the gap between economic theory and observed data. Papers explore such topics as estimation of established relationships between economic variables, testing of hypotheses derived from economic theory, treatment effect estimation, policy evaluation, simulation, forecasting, as well as econometric methods and measurement. Empirical Economics emphasizes the replicability of empirical results. Replication studies of important results in the literature - both positive and negative results - may be published as short papers in Empirical Economics. Authors of all accepted papers and replications are required to submit all data and codes prior to publication (for more details, see: Instructions for Authors).The journal follows a single blind review procedure. In order to ensure the high quality of the journal and an efficient editorial process, a substantial number of submissions that have very poor chances of receiving positive reviews are routinely rejected without sending the papers for review.Officially cited as: Empir Econ
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