The Over-Politicization of Russian Battlefield Strategy in Ukraine

Abstract

The extant literature lavishes its focus on understanding Russia’s motivation for starting a war against Ukraine and on the broader question of the role of technology in determining the outcome of war. This article, however, undertakes a comprehensive examination of the relatively ignored yet important aspect of adapting military strategy during the war through Russian experience. It demonstrates that the Russian strategists have shown adequate appreciation for the principle of adaptation in formulating military strategy. To this effect, it identifies and explains three distinct sequential adaptations in the Russian military strategy during the ongoing Ukrainian war. The analysis, conducted with thoroughness and rigor, demonstrates that the Russian armed forces made a relatively quicker transition from the show of force to offense to defense. It also delves into the factors that drove these adaptations. This research has implications for both theory and policy. On the theoretical side, it reinforces the organic relationship between strategy and war. On the policy side, it highlights the importance of adapting military strategy to contain and limit the scope of war.