Has the Operational Control Transfer of the ROK‐US Alliance Come to the Cul‐de‐sac? International and Domestic Factors That Explain Delays in an Alliance Policy

Abstract

Strategic effects of military alliances notwithstanding, to assume that their policy will proceed without difficulties is problematic. The ROK‐US alliance began transferring the wartime operational control (OPCON) to the ROK in early 2003. However, the transfer did not proceed as planned, experiencing two delays in June 2010 and October 2014 with a significant format change to the Condition‐based OPCON Transition Plan (COT‐P), meaning the addition of prerequisites for the transfer and the death of the original parallel command structure. What have been the causes of these phenomena and resulting stagnation? This article argues that the allies' strategic consensus over the transfer and the policy coordination in the initiating ally are the main causes of the lethargy. Additionally, this study finds that the impact of the strategic consensus is greater than that of the ROK's policy coordination, as the former is demonstrated in all three indicators of the progress: timeliness, post‐transfer command structure, and the certification assessment through exercises.