In recent years, China has sought to modify its traditional low‐key approach to the Middle East by adopting a “constructive intervention” strategy. Our research examines what China's self‐described constructive intervention entails and how it intends to implement its novel approach. Combining quantitative and qualitative research, we analyze the discourse of Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokespeople at press conferences and telephone call‐ins. Our findings indicate that the narratives of spokespeople are rich in nuance and employ various strategies to obscure their positions, including oscillatory statements, no statements, indirect statements, and responses of “no idea.” The constructive intervention is essentially a selective intervention strategy, and it provides Beijing with greater latitude and flexibility to adjust its decisions and maneuvers in order to achieve “two‐goods” foreign policy: (i) changing the undesirable elements and (ii) preserving the favorable elements of the status quo.
{"title":"Navigating Middle Eastern Disputes: The “Two‐Goods” Approach of China's Constructive Intervention*","authors":"Chuchu Zhang, Sujata Ashwarya","doi":"10.1111/pafo.12241","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pafo.12241","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years, China has sought to modify its traditional low‐key approach to the Middle East by adopting a “constructive intervention” strategy. Our research examines what China's self‐described constructive intervention entails and how it intends to implement its novel approach. Combining quantitative and qualitative research, we analyze the discourse of Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokespeople at press conferences and telephone call‐ins. Our findings indicate that the narratives of spokespeople are rich in nuance and employ various strategies to obscure their positions, including oscillatory statements, no statements, indirect statements, and responses of “no idea.” The constructive intervention is essentially a selective intervention strategy, and it provides Beijing with greater latitude and flexibility to adjust its decisions and maneuvers in order to achieve “two‐goods” foreign policy: (i) changing the undesirable elements and (ii) preserving the favorable elements of the status quo.","PeriodicalId":19923,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Focus","volume":"2007 16","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-12-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139001719","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The North Korean authorities have the responsibility to protect (R2P) their people from starvation. Yet, reports of death from starvation in North Korea have been consistent since the widespread famine during the so‐called “Arduous March.” According to Amartya Sen, in a society with massive starvation and food refugees, famine crises are not merely due to food availability decline (FAD). Instead, the dominant variable in such crises is the food entitlement decline (FED) of vulnerable social groups. Therefore, since the repeated failure of the North Korean government to fulfill its responsibility justifies and obliges the international community to act, the “food entitlement” of the North Korean people needs to be further explored from social, economic, and political perspectives to help clarify and validate such international responsibility. Focusing on Kim Jong‐un's leadership since 2012, this paper explores the substance and causes of FAD and FED in North Korea and monitors any changes. To seek effective commitments from the international community, including South Korea, the current research also analyzes the impact of the persistent violation of the people's right to food on the North Korean economic‐social system and political regime, and the ensuing influence on the human rights situation with reference to the cases of Vietnam, China, and Mongolia in terms of the dichotomic social differentiation, beginnings of the civil society, and political change in the late‐communist stage.
{"title":"The Right to Food and Responsibility to Protect in North Korea: In the Face of Food Availability Decline and Food Entitlement Decline*","authors":"Man‐ho Heo","doi":"10.1111/pafo.12240","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pafo.12240","url":null,"abstract":"The North Korean authorities have the responsibility to protect (R2P) their people from starvation. Yet, reports of death from starvation in North Korea have been consistent since the widespread famine during the so‐called “Arduous March.” According to Amartya Sen, in a society with massive starvation and food refugees, famine crises are not merely due to food availability decline (FAD). Instead, the dominant variable in such crises is the food entitlement decline (FED) of vulnerable social groups. Therefore, since the repeated failure of the North Korean government to fulfill its responsibility justifies and obliges the international community to act, the “food entitlement” of the North Korean people needs to be further explored from social, economic, and political perspectives to help clarify and validate such international responsibility. Focusing on Kim Jong‐un's leadership since 2012, this paper explores the substance and causes of FAD and FED in North Korea and monitors any changes. To seek effective commitments from the international community, including South Korea, the current research also analyzes the impact of the persistent violation of the people's right to food on the North Korean economic‐social system and political regime, and the ensuing influence on the human rights situation with reference to the cases of Vietnam, China, and Mongolia in terms of the dichotomic social differentiation, beginnings of the civil society, and political change in the late‐communist stage.","PeriodicalId":19923,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Focus","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-11-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139231246","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article examines the intricate dynamics of US‐China and US–North Korea relations, focusing on the strategic competition between the United States and China. Drawing upon the realist theories of Kissinger and Mearsheimer, the study delves into how various intensities of US‐China conflict might influence North Korea's strategic value and the prospects for improved US–North Korea relations. The research underscores that escalating US‐China competition could reshape the geopolitical landscape in Northeast Asia, paving the way for new strategic alignments and partnerships. Four distinct scenarios are presented, each reflecting a different intensity of US‐China conflict and the ensuing reactions from both North Korea and the USA. The analysis suggests that the most probable scenario entails an intensifying US‐China rivalry, which correspondingly elevates North Korea's strategic significance. Such a turn of events would necessitate a shift in US strategy – from isolating North Korea to forging more favorable geopolitical conditions. Potential strategies might include reducing North Korea's reliance on China, disrupting the alignment between China, Russia, and North Korea, or even contemplating the integration of Pyongyang into the US security framework. These strategic adjustments could reshape the power dynamics and address regional challenges in Northeast Asia, promoting peace and stability and safeguarding the nation's core interests.
{"title":"Navigating Geopolitical Change in Northeast Asia: A Realist Approach to Analyze the Matrix Scenario of <scp>US‐China</scp> Conflict and <scp>US–North</scp> Korea Relations","authors":"Kyung‐tae Min","doi":"10.1111/pafo.12236","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pafo.12236","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the intricate dynamics of US‐China and US–North Korea relations, focusing on the strategic competition between the United States and China. Drawing upon the realist theories of Kissinger and Mearsheimer, the study delves into how various intensities of US‐China conflict might influence North Korea's strategic value and the prospects for improved US–North Korea relations. The research underscores that escalating US‐China competition could reshape the geopolitical landscape in Northeast Asia, paving the way for new strategic alignments and partnerships. Four distinct scenarios are presented, each reflecting a different intensity of US‐China conflict and the ensuing reactions from both North Korea and the USA. The analysis suggests that the most probable scenario entails an intensifying US‐China rivalry, which correspondingly elevates North Korea's strategic significance. Such a turn of events would necessitate a shift in US strategy – from isolating North Korea to forging more favorable geopolitical conditions. Potential strategies might include reducing North Korea's reliance on China, disrupting the alignment between China, Russia, and North Korea, or even contemplating the integration of Pyongyang into the US security framework. These strategic adjustments could reshape the power dynamics and address regional challenges in Northeast Asia, promoting peace and stability and safeguarding the nation's core interests.","PeriodicalId":19923,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Focus","volume":" 10","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135192168","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
During the Duterte presidency from June 2016 to June 2022, the government of the Philippines limited its affinity with the United States and pursued an ostensibly pro‐China policy. This bold move took place amid the ongoing US–China rivalry. This paper carries out a retrospective examination of Duterte's China policy from the perspective of Philippine domestic politics. Specifically, we assess the international relations literature on hedging as a foreign policy strategy and argue that domestic factors play a major role in filtering systemic influences and leaving state leaders with sufficient room for strategic discretion and maneuvering. This is particularly the case with the Philippines, where strong presidentialism gives clout to the president in foreign policy development. We argue that much of the “audacious” behavior in the foreign policy of the Duterte government can simultaneously be understood as pragmatic, as it was believed to better serve the regime's short‐term goals. While the alliance with the United States remained largely intact, the Duterte government emphasized its success in stabilizing Sino–Philippine relations.
{"title":"Nexus of Strong Presidentialism and Philippine Foreign Policy: The Case of the Duterte Presidency's Hedging toward China*","authors":"Joseph Ching Velasco, Weiqing Song","doi":"10.1111/pafo.12239","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pafo.12239","url":null,"abstract":"During the Duterte presidency from June 2016 to June 2022, the government of the Philippines limited its affinity with the United States and pursued an ostensibly pro‐China policy. This bold move took place amid the ongoing US–China rivalry. This paper carries out a retrospective examination of Duterte's China policy from the perspective of Philippine domestic politics. Specifically, we assess the international relations literature on hedging as a foreign policy strategy and argue that domestic factors play a major role in filtering systemic influences and leaving state leaders with sufficient room for strategic discretion and maneuvering. This is particularly the case with the Philippines, where strong presidentialism gives clout to the president in foreign policy development. We argue that much of the “audacious” behavior in the foreign policy of the Duterte government can simultaneously be understood as pragmatic, as it was believed to better serve the regime's short‐term goals. While the alliance with the United States remained largely intact, the Duterte government emphasized its success in stabilizing Sino–Philippine relations.","PeriodicalId":19923,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Focus","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135679621","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The main goal of this article is to analyze the conditions under which South Korea would decide to go nuclear. It seeks to examine the key factors that would trigger Seoul's decision for nuclear‐arming. The article contends that South Korea is likely to go nuclear under the following conditions: where South Koreans' demands for nuclear weapons continue to rise despite US security assurances; where Pyongyang's threats of its nuclear weapons attacks are increasingly directed towards Seoul as opposed to Washington; where US security assurances for South Korea become highly questionable; and where potential nearby proliferators (Japan and Taiwan, in particular) go nuclear. Any single one of these conditions might not be enough for Seoul's decision to nuclearize, but when at least any two of them are fulfilled at the same time, South Korea is highly likely to go nuclear.
{"title":"Under What Conditions Would South Korea Go Nuclear? Seoul's Strategic Choice on Nuclear Weapons","authors":"Min‐hyung Kim","doi":"10.1111/pafo.12238","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pafo.12238","url":null,"abstract":"The main goal of this article is to analyze the conditions under which South Korea would decide to go nuclear. It seeks to examine the key factors that would trigger Seoul's decision for nuclear‐arming. The article contends that South Korea is likely to go nuclear under the following conditions: where South Koreans' demands for nuclear weapons continue to rise despite US security assurances; where Pyongyang's threats of its nuclear weapons attacks are increasingly directed towards Seoul as opposed to Washington; where US security assurances for South Korea become highly questionable; and where potential nearby proliferators (Japan and Taiwan, in particular) go nuclear. Any single one of these conditions might not be enough for Seoul's decision to nuclearize, but when at least any two of them are fulfilled at the same time, South Korea is highly likely to go nuclear.","PeriodicalId":19923,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Focus","volume":"16 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135679318","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Is North Korea a failed state? Through a case study of North Korea, this study tackles the meaning of defining a state as “failed” and highlights the theoretical and conceptual limitations of the failed state approach. This study presents a thorough literature review on the subject and aims to bridge a theoretical gap between academic discussions of failed states in the field of international development and the study of North Korea. By doing so, this study highlights the conceptual limitations of viewing North Korea as a failed state and suggests that that misconception has been one of the reasons for the failure to solve various puzzles about the country. In particular, this study underlines the conceptual problems and the Western‐dominant perspective in defining North Korea as a failed state for having weak political legitimacy and a lack of in‐depth understanding of contextual/historical factors and recent political‐economic changes that have affected state‐society relations in North Korea.
{"title":"Is North Korea a Failed State?","authors":"Jiyoung Kim","doi":"10.1111/pafo.12237","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pafo.12237","url":null,"abstract":"Is North Korea a failed state? Through a case study of North Korea, this study tackles the meaning of defining a state as “failed” and highlights the theoretical and conceptual limitations of the failed state approach. This study presents a thorough literature review on the subject and aims to bridge a theoretical gap between academic discussions of failed states in the field of international development and the study of North Korea. By doing so, this study highlights the conceptual limitations of viewing North Korea as a failed state and suggests that that misconception has been one of the reasons for the failure to solve various puzzles about the country. In particular, this study underlines the conceptual problems and the Western‐dominant perspective in defining North Korea as a failed state for having weak political legitimacy and a lack of in‐depth understanding of contextual/historical factors and recent political‐economic changes that have affected state‐society relations in North Korea.","PeriodicalId":19923,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Focus","volume":"172 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135974587","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article examines the security and defense discourse in the United States on China's ambitious naval development in the Asia‐Pacific region. American scholars and experts highlight four motivations for Chinese naval development: (1) the consolidation of China's territorial sovereignty; (2) the feasibility of A2/AD strategy; (3) the protection of China's overseas interests; and (4) leadership endorsement. Xi Jinping has increased the quality and quantity of China's naval capabilities and attempted to enhance his prestige by portraying himself as the driving force behind the development of China's powerful navy. Since then, the United States has not merely watched China's naval development but has considered China's navy a rival force. There are multiple ongoing debates regarding the purpose of China's naval development, including whether China aims to challenge US maritime supremacy. Some scholars are focused on China's territorial and strategic motivation, inferring the aim of posing a direct threat to US national security, but China posits that its purpose for naval development is not to confront US maritime hegemony. Some believe that the Chinese navy is not capable of doing so, and others explain that China is not aiming for a military crusade capable of causing a power transition, but rather focusing on the expansion of maritime interests.
{"title":"American Discourses on China's Motivations for Naval Development under Xi Jinping","authors":"Youngduk Jang, Yongjon Han","doi":"10.1111/pafo.12232","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pafo.12232","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the security and defense discourse in the United States on China's ambitious naval development in the Asia‐Pacific region. American scholars and experts highlight four motivations for Chinese naval development: (1) the consolidation of China's territorial sovereignty; (2) the feasibility of A2/AD strategy; (3) the protection of China's overseas interests; and (4) leadership endorsement. Xi Jinping has increased the quality and quantity of China's naval capabilities and attempted to enhance his prestige by portraying himself as the driving force behind the development of China's powerful navy. Since then, the United States has not merely watched China's naval development but has considered China's navy a rival force. There are multiple ongoing debates regarding the purpose of China's naval development, including whether China aims to challenge US maritime supremacy. Some scholars are focused on China's territorial and strategic motivation, inferring the aim of posing a direct threat to US national security, but China posits that its purpose for naval development is not to confront US maritime hegemony. Some believe that the Chinese navy is not capable of doing so, and others explain that China is not aiming for a military crusade capable of causing a power transition, but rather focusing on the expansion of maritime interests.","PeriodicalId":19923,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Focus","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47106536","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Europe's worst political disaster since the Cold War was Ukraine's crisis from 2013 to Russia's full‐scale war on 24 February 2022. War? The choice of a national development model, cultural conflicts, and regional identities in Ukraine are internal causes. At the same time, competition for influence between great powers such as Russia, the USA, and the EU in Ukraine are external. Vietnam is similar to Ukraine, but it has taken a neutral stance in this crisis and called for peace talks. Why does Vietnam not choose a party but rather remain neutral with significant actors? This analysis answers those questions using qualitative methods, content analysis, and quantitative comparison. Balancing superpower strategic competition is a small lesson for an average country like Vietnam living next to a great power. However, this strategic balance is necessary to preserve national sovereignty and interests.
{"title":"Perspectives on Russia, the USA, and the EU's Power Struggle in the Ukraine Crisis and Vietnam's Neutrality","authors":"Nguyễn Anh Cường","doi":"10.1111/pafo.12234","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pafo.12234","url":null,"abstract":"Europe's worst political disaster since the Cold War was Ukraine's crisis from 2013 to Russia's full‐scale war on 24 February 2022. War? The choice of a national development model, cultural conflicts, and regional identities in Ukraine are internal causes. At the same time, competition for influence between great powers such as Russia, the USA, and the EU in Ukraine are external. Vietnam is similar to Ukraine, but it has taken a neutral stance in this crisis and called for peace talks. Why does Vietnam not choose a party but rather remain neutral with significant actors? This analysis answers those questions using qualitative methods, content analysis, and quantitative comparison. Balancing superpower strategic competition is a small lesson for an average country like Vietnam living next to a great power. However, this strategic balance is necessary to preserve national sovereignty and interests.","PeriodicalId":19923,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Focus","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49234269","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Cyberwarfare and the Weaponization of Information in US–China 21st‐Century Geostrategic Rivalry","authors":"E. Tan, Sofiya Sayankina","doi":"10.1111/pafo.12233","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pafo.12233","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":19923,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Focus","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42399701","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Immigrant Entrepreneurship and the Rising Popularity of Korean Cuisine: Korean Restaurant Businesses in Frankfurt*","authors":"Jihye Kim","doi":"10.1111/pafo.12235","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/pafo.12235","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":19923,"journal":{"name":"Pacific Focus","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47558328","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：