Revisiting the moral forecasting error – A preregistered replication and extension of “Are we more moral than we think?”

IF 3.2 2区 心理学 Q1 PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIAL Journal of Experimental Social Psychology Pub Date : 2024-09-02 DOI:10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104662
Simen Bø, Hallgeir Sjåstad
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Abstract

Predictions are often inaccurate. Still, the direction of prediction errors may vary. Contrary to research on the intention-behavior gap, where people fail to live up to their ambitions, a study on “moral forecasting” found that people behaved more honestly than they predicted. In this registered report, we present two close replication attempts and one conceptual replication attempt of this moral forecasting error across two experiments. In Experiment 1 (N = 1839), we recruited a general population sample from the same country as the original study (Canada) to an online experiment. We successfully replicated the moral forecasting error using a math-based cheating task from the original study: Predicted cheating was much higher in a moral forecasting condition than actual cheating in a moral action condition (d = 0.69). In Experiment 2 (N = 1381) we replicated the forecasting error again, using the same task in a general population sample from the U.S. (d = 0.72). However, we were unable to conceptually replicate the effect using a different dishonesty measure, the “mind game”, in Experiment 1 (φ = 0.03). We also could not reduce the forecasting error through a debiasing intervention in Experiment 2 (d = 0.01). Across both experiments, participants predicted that others would cheat much more than they would themselves. In this registered report, we conclude that the moral forecasting error is robust for the original cheating task. We also show that it can generalize contextually (from a lab to an online setting), but not to a different task. Future research may show exactly when predictions about one's own honesty are pessimistic rather than optimistic.

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重新审视道德预测错误--"我们比我们想象的更有道德吗?"的预登记复制和扩展
预测往往是不准确的。不过,预测错误的方向可能会有所不同。与人们未能实现其抱负的 "意图-行为差距 "研究相反,一项关于 "道德预测 "的研究发现,人们的行为比他们预测的更诚实。在本注册报告中,我们介绍了在两个实验中对这一道德预测误差进行的两次近似复制尝试和一次概念复制尝试。在实验 1(N = 1839)中,我们从与原始研究相同的国家(加拿大)招募了一个普通人群样本进行在线实验。我们使用原始研究中基于数学的作弊任务,成功地复制了道德预测误差:道德预测条件下的预测作弊率远远高于道德行动条件下的实际作弊率(d = 0.69)。在实验 2(N = 1381)中,我们在美国的普通人群样本中使用相同的任务再次重复了预测误差(d = 0.72)。然而,在实验 1 中,我们使用不同的不诚实测量方法 "智力游戏"(φ = 0.03),却无法在概念上复制这种效应。在实验 2 中,我们也无法通过去伪存真干预来减少预测误差(d = 0.01)。在这两个实验中,参与者对他人作弊的预测都远远高于对自己作弊的预测。在这份注册报告中,我们得出结论,道德预测误差对于最初的作弊任务来说是稳健的。我们还表明,它可以在情境中(从实验室到网络环境)泛化,但不能泛化到不同的任务中。未来的研究可能会准确地表明,什么时候对自己诚实的预测是悲观的,而不是乐观的。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.30
自引率
2.90%
发文量
134
期刊介绍: The Journal of Experimental Social Psychology publishes original research and theory on human social behavior and related phenomena. The journal emphasizes empirical, conceptually based research that advances an understanding of important social psychological processes. The journal also publishes literature reviews, theoretical analyses, and methodological comments.
期刊最新文献
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