A puzzle about weak belief

IF 1.1 1区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY ANALYSIS Pub Date : 2024-08-22 DOI:10.1093/analys/anae018

Joshua Edward Pearson

引用次数: 0

Abstract

I present an intractable puzzle for the currently popular view that belief is weak – the view that expressions like ‘S believes p’ ascribe to S a doxastic attitude towards p that is rationally compatible with low credence that p. The puzzle concerns issues that arise on considering beliefs in conditionals. I show that proponents of weak belief either cannot consistently apply their preferred methodology when accommodating beliefs in conditionals, or must deny that beliefs in conditionals can be used in reasoning.

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关于信念薄弱的谜题

对于目前流行的弱信念观点，即 "S 相信 p "这样的表达方式赋予了 S 对 p 的逻各斯态度，这种态度在理性上与对 p 的低可信度相容。我的研究表明，弱信念的支持者要么在考虑条件式信念时无法始终如一地运用他们所偏好的方法，要么就必须否认条件式信念可以用于推理。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

ANALYSIS PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

1.30

自引率

12.50%

发文量

期刊介绍： Analysis is the most established and esteemed forum in which to publish short discussions of topics in philosophy. Articles published in Analysis lend themselves to the presentation of cogent but brief arguments for substantive conclusions, and often give rise to discussions which continue over several interchanges. A wide range of topics are covered including: philosophical logic and philosophy of language, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and moral philosophy.

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