In ‘The logic of partial supposition’, Eva and Hartmann present a dilemma for a normative account of partial subjunctive supposition: the natural subjunctive analogue of Jeffrey conditionalization is Jeffrey imaging, but this rule violates a natural monotonicity constraint. This paper offers a partial defence of Jeffrey imaging against Eva and Hartmann’s objection. I show that, although Jeffrey imaging is non-monotonic in Eva and Hartmann’s sense, it is what I call status quo monotonic. A status quo monotonic credal revision rule is monotonic in Eva and Hartmann’s sense if it is conservative in the sense of Meehan and Zhang (‘Jeffrey meets Kolmogorov’), but Jeffrey imaging is in general non-conservative. On the other hand, Jeffrey imaging satisfies a different constraint that I call convexity, and the only rule that is both convex and conservative is Jeffrey conditionalization. To this extent, the real dilemma for a normative account of partial subjunctive supposition is not between monotonicity (broadly construed) and Jeffrey imaging, but between convexity and conservativeness.
{"title":"On the dilemma for partial subjunctive supposition","authors":"Snow Zhang","doi":"10.1093/analys/anae020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anae020","url":null,"abstract":"In ‘The logic of partial supposition’, Eva and Hartmann present a dilemma for a normative account of partial subjunctive supposition: the natural subjunctive analogue of Jeffrey conditionalization is Jeffrey imaging, but this rule violates a natural monotonicity constraint. This paper offers a partial defence of Jeffrey imaging against Eva and Hartmann’s objection. I show that, although Jeffrey imaging is non-monotonic in Eva and Hartmann’s sense, it is what I call status quo monotonic. A status quo monotonic credal revision rule is monotonic in Eva and Hartmann’s sense if it is conservative in the sense of Meehan and Zhang (‘Jeffrey meets Kolmogorov’), but Jeffrey imaging is in general non-conservative. On the other hand, Jeffrey imaging satisfies a different constraint that I call convexity, and the only rule that is both convex and conservative is Jeffrey conditionalization. To this extent, the real dilemma for a normative account of partial subjunctive supposition is not between monotonicity (broadly construed) and Jeffrey imaging, but between convexity and conservativeness.","PeriodicalId":47773,"journal":{"name":"ANALYSIS","volume":"40 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142201570","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I present an intractable puzzle for the currently popular view that belief is weak – the view that expressions like ‘S believes p’ ascribe to S a doxastic attitude towards p that is rationally compatible with low credence that p. The puzzle concerns issues that arise on considering beliefs in conditionals. I show that proponents of weak belief either cannot consistently apply their preferred methodology when accommodating beliefs in conditionals, or must deny that beliefs in conditionals can be used in reasoning.
对于目前流行的弱信念观点，即 "S 相信 p "这样的表达方式赋予了 S 对 p 的逻各斯态度，这种态度在理性上与对 p 的低可信度相容。我的研究表明，弱信念的支持者要么在考虑条件式信念时无法始终如一地运用他们所偏好的方法，要么就必须否认条件式信念可以用于推理。
{"title":"A puzzle about weak belief","authors":"Joshua Edward Pearson","doi":"10.1093/analys/anae018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anae018","url":null,"abstract":"I present an intractable puzzle for the currently popular view that belief is weak – the view that expressions like ‘S believes p’ ascribe to S a doxastic attitude towards p that is rationally compatible with low credence that p. The puzzle concerns issues that arise on considering beliefs in conditionals. I show that proponents of weak belief either cannot consistently apply their preferred methodology when accommodating beliefs in conditionals, or must deny that beliefs in conditionals can be used in reasoning.","PeriodicalId":47773,"journal":{"name":"ANALYSIS","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142201569","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It is customarily assumed that paracomplete and paraconsistent solutions to liar paradoxes require a logical system weaker than classical logic. That is, if a logic is not fragile to liar paradoxes, it must be logically weaker than classical logic. Defenders of classical logic argue that the losses of weakening it outweigh the gains. Advocates of paracomplete and paraconsistent solutions disagree. We articulate the notion of fragility with respect to the liar paradox and show that it can be disentangled from logical strength. Strength and resilience to paradox do not force a trade-off with respect to liars: there can be logics which are not weaker than classical logic and are solid to the liar.
{"title":"Fragility and strength","authors":"Teodor-Tiberiu Călinoiu, Daniele Bruno Garancini","doi":"10.1093/analys/anad106","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anad106","url":null,"abstract":"It is customarily assumed that paracomplete and paraconsistent solutions to liar paradoxes require a logical system weaker than classical logic. That is, if a logic is not fragile to liar paradoxes, it must be logically weaker than classical logic. Defenders of classical logic argue that the losses of weakening it outweigh the gains. Advocates of paracomplete and paraconsistent solutions disagree. We articulate the notion of fragility with respect to the liar paradox and show that it can be disentangled from logical strength. Strength and resilience to paradox do not force a trade-off with respect to liars: there can be logics which are not weaker than classical logic and are solid to the liar.","PeriodicalId":47773,"journal":{"name":"ANALYSIS","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142201571","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Consequence Argument for incompatibilism is beset by two rival interpretations: the counterfactual sufficiency interpretation and the counterfactual might interpretation. In a 2023 paper Waldrop argued that the counterfactual sufficiency interpretation conflicts with certain principles governing the logic of counterfactuals. In this paper, I show that Waldrop’s argument can be adapted to prove that the counterfactual might interpretation also conflicts with the same principles. So the problem Waldrop pointed out is not peculiar to the counterfactual sufficiency interpretation.
{"title":"A problem not peculiar to counterfactual sufficiency","authors":"Chaoan He","doi":"10.1093/analys/anae004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anae004","url":null,"abstract":"The Consequence Argument for incompatibilism is beset by two rival interpretations: the counterfactual sufficiency interpretation and the counterfactual might interpretation. In a 2023 paper Waldrop argued that the counterfactual sufficiency interpretation conflicts with certain principles governing the logic of counterfactuals. In this paper, I show that Waldrop’s argument can be adapted to prove that the counterfactual might interpretation also conflicts with the same principles. So the problem Waldrop pointed out is not peculiar to the counterfactual sufficiency interpretation.","PeriodicalId":47773,"journal":{"name":"ANALYSIS","volume":"32 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141948063","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It is generally said that dreams are experienced as real. But the notion of reality is often used, in the philosophical literature, along with that of presence. A big problem, in this respect, is that both these terms may assume different meanings. So understanding the nature of presence and reality in dreams depends on the way we conceive these two notions. This paper contributes to the literature on dreaming by describing the experience of presence and reality in dreams in a very specific sense. I consider the experience of presence as related to the experience of possibility of motoric interaction, and the experience of reality as related to the experience of mind-independence. Then, endorsing that dream experiences are different from perception, and similar to imagery, I suggest that the dreamer can experience reality but not presence, with three lines of argument, concerning visual determinacy, stereopsis and peripersonal localization.
{"title":"Understanding reality and presence in dreams through imagery","authors":"Gabriele Ferretti","doi":"10.1093/analys/anae025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anae025","url":null,"abstract":"It is generally said that dreams are experienced as real. But the notion of reality is often used, in the philosophical literature, along with that of presence. A big problem, in this respect, is that both these terms may assume different meanings. So understanding the nature of presence and reality in dreams depends on the way we conceive these two notions. This paper contributes to the literature on dreaming by describing the experience of presence and reality in dreams in a very specific sense. I consider the experience of presence as related to the experience of possibility of motoric interaction, and the experience of reality as related to the experience of mind-independence. Then, endorsing that dream experiences are different from perception, and similar to imagery, I suggest that the dreamer can experience reality but not presence, with three lines of argument, concerning visual determinacy, stereopsis and peripersonal localization.","PeriodicalId":47773,"journal":{"name":"ANALYSIS","volume":"229 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141862672","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
According to sentimental perceptualism, affect grounds evaluative or normative knowledge in a similar way to the way perception grounds much of descriptive knowledge. In this paper, we present a novel challenge to sentimental perceptualism. At the centre of the challenge is the assumption that if affect is to ground knowledge in the same way as perception does, it should have a function to accurately represent evaluative properties, and if it has that function, it should also have it in its future-directed imaginative use. As the data on affective forecasting errors indicates, however, the affect system does not have that function. As a result, it is doubtful if affect can do the kind of knowledge-grounding work that sentimental perceptualism assumes it does.
{"title":"Sentimental perceptualism and affective imagination","authors":"Uku Tooming","doi":"10.1093/analys/anae011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anae011","url":null,"abstract":"According to sentimental perceptualism, affect grounds evaluative or normative knowledge in a similar way to the way perception grounds much of descriptive knowledge. In this paper, we present a novel challenge to sentimental perceptualism. At the centre of the challenge is the assumption that if affect is to ground knowledge in the same way as perception does, it should have a function to accurately represent evaluative properties, and if it has that function, it should also have it in its future-directed imaginative use. As the data on affective forecasting errors indicates, however, the affect system does not have that function. As a result, it is doubtful if affect can do the kind of knowledge-grounding work that sentimental perceptualism assumes it does.","PeriodicalId":47773,"journal":{"name":"ANALYSIS","volume":"76 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141740483","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Rational agents seem more confident in any possible event than in an impossible event. But if rational credences are real-valued, then there are some possible events that are assigned 0 credence nonetheless. How do we differentiate these events from impossible events when we order events? De Finetti (1975), Hájek (2012) and Easwaran (2014) suggest that, when ordering events, conditional credences and subset relations are as relevant as unconditional credences. I present a counterexample to all their proposals in this paper. While their proposals order possible and impossible events correctly, they deliver the wrong verdict for disjoint possible events assigned equal positive credence.
{"title":"Primitive conditional probabilities, subset relations and comparative regularity","authors":"Joshua Thong","doi":"10.1093/analys/anad099","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anad099","url":null,"abstract":"Rational agents seem more confident in any possible event than in an impossible event. But if rational credences are real-valued, then there are some possible events that are assigned 0 credence nonetheless. How do we differentiate these events from impossible events when we order events? De Finetti (1975), Hájek (2012) and Easwaran (2014) suggest that, when ordering events, conditional credences and subset relations are as relevant as unconditional credences. I present a counterexample to all their proposals in this paper. While their proposals order possible and impossible events correctly, they deliver the wrong verdict for disjoint possible events assigned equal positive credence.","PeriodicalId":47773,"journal":{"name":"ANALYSIS","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141571664","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Some considerations are urgent and others are not. Sometimes we invite criticism if we neglect the urgency of our situation, even if our action seems adequate to respond to it. Despite this significance, the literature does not offer a satisfactory analysis of the normative structure of urgency. I examine three views of urgency, drawn from philosophical and adjacent literature, which fail to explain the distinctive criticism we face when we neglect the urgency of our reasons. Instead I argue that urgent considerations pre-empt our deliberation about less urgent considerations. Urgency, then, is a meta-normative phenomenon, setting standards for how we handle and respond to first-order considerations, requiring that we close deliberation. In the face of urgency, appropriate action is not enough: commitment is called for. This is how we enact appreciation of our practical reasons, independently of our carrying out the action they call for.
{"title":"Enacted appreciation and the meta-normative structure of urgency","authors":"Elliot Porter","doi":"10.1093/analys/anad096","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anad096","url":null,"abstract":"Some considerations are urgent and others are not. Sometimes we invite criticism if we neglect the urgency of our situation, even if our action seems adequate to respond to it. Despite this significance, the literature does not offer a satisfactory analysis of the normative structure of urgency. I examine three views of urgency, drawn from philosophical and adjacent literature, which fail to explain the distinctive criticism we face when we neglect the urgency of our reasons. Instead I argue that urgent considerations pre-empt our deliberation about less urgent considerations. Urgency, then, is a meta-normative phenomenon, setting standards for how we handle and respond to first-order considerations, requiring that we close deliberation. In the face of urgency, appropriate action is not enough: commitment is called for. This is how we enact appreciation of our practical reasons, independently of our carrying out the action they call for.","PeriodicalId":47773,"journal":{"name":"ANALYSIS","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-05-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140939245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
For philosophers, rights against the world are equivalent to rights in rem. Contrary to what Hart thought, however, this does not make them equivalent to general rights. Rights in rem contrast with rights in personam, whereas general rights contrast with special rights. As I explain, rights against the world can be either general rights or special rights. My explanation follows Waldron’s strategy of exhibiting property rights as justified by Locke’s theory of property as a case of rights in rem that are also special rights. Moreover, despite what ‘in rem’ means in Latin, rights against the world include more than property rights. For example, they also include moral human rights. With moral human rights and property rights alike, the correlative duties are borne by ‘everyone’, understood in a dynamic sense I undertake to specify.
对哲学家来说，针对世界的权利等同于物权。然而，与哈特的想法相反，这并没有使它们等同于一般权利。物权与对人权相对应，而一般权利与特殊权利相对应。正如我所解释的，对世权利既可以是一般权利，也可以是特殊权利。我的解释遵循了沃尔德伦的策略，即洛克的财产理论所证明的财产权是物权的一种情况，同时也是特殊权利。此外，尽管 "物权 "在拉丁语中的意思是 "in rem"，但对世界的权利不仅仅包括财产权。例如，它们还包括道德人权。无论是道德人权还是财产权，"每个人 "都要承担相应的义务，我将从动态的角度对其进行阐述。
{"title":"Rights against the world","authors":"Gopal Sreenivasan","doi":"10.1093/analys/anad067","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anad067","url":null,"abstract":"For philosophers, rights against the world are equivalent to rights in rem. Contrary to what Hart thought, however, this does not make them equivalent to general rights. Rights in rem contrast with rights in personam, whereas general rights contrast with special rights. As I explain, rights against the world can be either general rights or special rights. My explanation follows Waldron’s strategy of exhibiting property rights as justified by Locke’s theory of property as a case of rights in rem that are also special rights. Moreover, despite what ‘in rem’ means in Latin, rights against the world include more than property rights. For example, they also include moral human rights. With moral human rights and property rights alike, the correlative duties are borne by ‘everyone’, understood in a dynamic sense I undertake to specify.","PeriodicalId":47773,"journal":{"name":"ANALYSIS","volume":"150 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140037236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
According to the grounding theory of powers, fundamental physical properties should be thought of as qualities that ground dispositions. Although this view has recently been defended by many different philosophers, there is no consensus for how the view should be developed within a broader metaphysics of properties. Recently, Tugby has argued that the view should be developed in the context of a Platonic theory of properties, where properties are abstract universals. I will argue that the view should not be developed within such a framework. Either the view should be developed with an ontology of Aristotelian properties, or it should be developed in a Nominalist framework that contains no properties at all.
{"title":"How to ground powers","authors":"David Builes","doi":"10.1093/analys/anad058","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anad058","url":null,"abstract":"According to the grounding theory of powers, fundamental physical properties should be thought of as qualities that ground dispositions. Although this view has recently been defended by many different philosophers, there is no consensus for how the view should be developed within a broader metaphysics of properties. Recently, Tugby has argued that the view should be developed in the context of a Platonic theory of properties, where properties are abstract universals. I will argue that the view should not be developed within such a framework. Either the view should be developed with an ontology of Aristotelian properties, or it should be developed in a Nominalist framework that contains no properties at all.","PeriodicalId":47773,"journal":{"name":"ANALYSIS","volume":"36 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2024-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139677908","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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