In the digital trenches: Mapping the structure and evolution of the Islamic State’s information ecosystem (2023–2024)

Miron Lakomy
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Abstract

Based on open-source intelligence, social network analysis and comparative analysis, this study discusses the structure, evolution and most important features of the pro-Islamic State (IS) information ecosystem on the surface web between July 2023 and March 2024. It proves that the core of its propaganda distribution network is surprisingly centralized around three stand-alone domains, including one link directory – Fahras – and two propaganda repositories: I’lam and al-Raud. These webpages constitute the core of the ecosystem, densely interconnected with a broad range of secondary channels designed to lure online audiences to these hotspots of pro-IS communication. This centrality manifests a previously unnoticed shift in IS’s methods of designing and maintaining propaganda distribution networks. The study also shows that, despite frequent claims from stakeholders, IS has not abandoned exploiting mainstream social networks, although only some of them were preferred. On top of this, it proves that the pro-IS media bureaus continued to rely on a broad range of file-sharing services, including the Internet Archive, although the latter proved quite efficient in taking down its productions. Last but not least, IS confirms the continued interest of Daesh in exploiting several types of encrypted communication apps, such as Telegram and Rocket Chat.
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数字战壕:绘制伊斯兰国信息生态系统的结构和演变图(2023-2024 年)
本研究以公开来源情报、社交网络分析和比较分析为基础,讨论了 2023 年 7 月至 2024 年 3 月期间地表网络上亲伊斯兰国(IS)信息生态系统的结构、演变和最重要的特征。研究证明,其宣传传播网络的核心出人意料地集中在三个独立域名上,包括一个链接目录--Fahras 和两个宣传资料库:I'lam 和 al-Raud。这些网页构成了生态系统的核心,并与各种次级渠道紧密相连,旨在吸引在线受众访问这些支持伊斯兰国的传播热点。这种中心地位表明 IS 设计和维护宣传传播网络的方法发生了以前未曾注意到的变化。研究还表明,尽管利益相关者经常声称,IS 并未放弃利用主流社交网络,尽管其中只有部分社交网络受到青睐。此外,研究还证明,亲 IS 的媒体局继续依赖广泛的文件共享服务,包括互联网档案馆,尽管后者在删除其作品方面被证明是相当有效的。最后但并非最不重要的一点是,IS 证实达伊什继续有兴趣利用几类加密通信应用程序,如 Telegram 和 Rocket Chat。
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