{"title":"Using committee amendments to improve estimates of state foreign policy preferences","authors":"Courtenay R Monroe, Nathan W Monroe, Shengkuo Hu","doi":"10.1177/07388942241267961","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Ideal point estimates, used as measures of state foreign policy preference, are typically constructed from country votes cast on resolutions in the plenary of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). In this article, we argue that revealed preferences on UNGA votes are dependent on the procedural context in which they are cast. We develop a theory of measurement and show empirically that constructing estimates using committee amendment votes yields more precise scores for countries with preferences that do not fall in the center of the policy space. Scholars should consider using both plenary and committee votes when operationalizing foreign policy preferences.","PeriodicalId":51488,"journal":{"name":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Conflict Management and Peace Science","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942241267961","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Ideal point estimates, used as measures of state foreign policy preference, are typically constructed from country votes cast on resolutions in the plenary of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). In this article, we argue that revealed preferences on UNGA votes are dependent on the procedural context in which they are cast. We develop a theory of measurement and show empirically that constructing estimates using committee amendment votes yields more precise scores for countries with preferences that do not fall in the center of the policy space. Scholars should consider using both plenary and committee votes when operationalizing foreign policy preferences.
期刊介绍：
Conflict Management and Peace Science is a peer-reviewed journal published five times a year from 2009. It contains scientific papers on topics such as: - international conflict; - arms races; - the effect of international trade on political interactions; - foreign policy decision making; - international mediation; - and game theoretic approaches to conflict and cooperation. Affiliated with the Peace Science Society (International), Conflict Management and Peace Science features original and review articles focused on news and events related to the scientific study of conflict and peace. Members of the Peace Science Society (International) receive an annual subscription to Conflict Management and Peace Science as a benefit of membership.
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