Do politicians’ career concerns affect firms’ environmental information disclosure? Evidence from Chinese publicly listed firms

Abstract

Research has recognized the role of the government in shaping corporate environmental information disclosure (CEID), while neglecting the influence of government officials. This study introduces a political lens on officials’ incentives and contends that their risk aversion to political turnover—due to career concerns—promotes corporate environmental information disclosure. Based on a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2008 to 2020, we found that firms disclose environmental information in response to increasing pressure before an impending political turnover, and this disclosure tends to be symbolic. These two effects are moderated by government subsidies which reflect politicians’ ability to influence firms, and by firms’ negative news coverage which relates to politicians’ attention to firms. This study contributes to the CEID literature by highlighting the role of politicians’ career concerns, enhances political turnover research by combining officials’ risk aversion with political uncertainty, and adds to CSR decoupling research.