Avoidance of altruistic punishment: Testing with a situation-selective third-party punishment game

IF 3.2 2区 心理学 Q1 PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIAL Journal of Experimental Social Psychology Pub Date : 2024-11-02 DOI:10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104695
Kodai Mitsuishi, Yuta Kawamura
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Abstract

Third-party punishment games have consistently shown that people are willing to bear personal costs to punish others who act selfishly, even as uninvolved observers. However, the traditional third-party punishment game places participants in contrived situations that mandate direct punishment decisions, potentially inflating the prevalence of such actions compared to those observed in more naturalistic settings. In light of this obligatory nature, one might speculate that if given the autonomy to step aside, people could be inclined to forgo punishment rather than penalize unfairness. The present study developed the Situation-Selective Third-Party Punishment Game (SS-TPPG), an experimental paradigm, to investigate whether avoidance of witnessing unfairness stems from a reluctance to make punitive decisions or a desire to avoid observing unfairness altogether. Three studies (total N = 810) consistently revealed that avoidance was driven by both a reluctance to witness unfair treatment and an aversion to administering punishments. Notably, participants who typically avoided observing unfair treatment were inclined to punish when forced to observe it. Furthermore, when given the opportunity to punish indirectly, participants were less likely to avoid observing unfair distributions. These results suggest that the elevated instances of direct punishment noted in the traditional third-party punishment game might be reflective of the game's structure, which constrains participants' ability to avoid witnessing unfair distributions.
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避免利他主义惩罚:用情境选择性第三方惩罚游戏进行测试
第三方惩罚游戏一直表明,人们愿意承担个人代价来惩罚他人的自私行为,即使是作为无关的观察者。然而,传统的第三方惩罚游戏将参与者置于人为设计的情境中,强制要求他们做出直接的惩罚决定,与在更自然的环境中观察到的行为相比,可能会夸大此类行为的普遍性。鉴于这种强制性质,人们可能会推测,如果给人们让位的自主权,人们可能会倾向于放弃惩罚,而不是惩罚不公平。本研究开发了 "情境-选择性第三方惩罚游戏"(SS-TPPG)这一实验范式,以探究回避目睹不公平现象究竟是源于不愿做出惩罚性决定,还是希望完全避免目睹不公平现象。三项研究(总人数 = 810)一致显示,回避的原因既有不愿目睹不公平待遇,也有对实施惩罚的厌恶。值得注意的是,通常回避观察不公平待遇的参与者在被迫观察不公平待遇时会倾向于惩罚。此外,当有机会进行间接惩罚时,参与者不太可能避免观察不公平的分配。这些结果表明,在传统的第三方惩罚游戏中,直接惩罚的情况较多,这可能反映了游戏的结构限制了参与者避免观察不公平分配的能力。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.30
自引率
2.90%
发文量
134
期刊介绍: The Journal of Experimental Social Psychology publishes original research and theory on human social behavior and related phenomena. The journal emphasizes empirical, conceptually based research that advances an understanding of important social psychological processes. The journal also publishes literature reviews, theoretical analyses, and methodological comments.
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