Elevating the corporate social responsibility level: A media supervision mechanism based on the Stackelberg-Evolutionary game model

IF 6.7 2区 管理学 Q1 MANAGEMENT Omega-international Journal of Management Science Pub Date : 2024-10-28 DOI:10.1016/j.omega.2024.103215
Yanru Sun, Hao Sun, Panfei Sun, Xuanzhu Jin, Yimei Yang
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Abstract

Environmental taxes alone may not solve the social dilemma posed by the conflict between the myopic pursuit of profit and the cost of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Designing a reasonable supervision mechanism is crucial to correcting market failures. We develop a media supervision mechanism through a Stackelberg-Evolutionary game model to study the impact of media supervision on the evolutionary behavior of the manufacturer population. Assuming the media is leader, manufacturers’ demands are heterogeneous under different strategy profiles after the media determines the effort level of supervision. The best response of the manufacturer population is the evolutionarily stable strategy under supervision, where the percentage of CSR strategies is defined as CSR level. It is proved that the CSR level elevates with the increase of effort level. We analyze the existence and uniqueness of Stackelberg-Evolutionary equilibrium and a numerical algorithm to compute it. The results show that CSR level under Stackelberg-Evolutionary equilibrium is higher than that without supervision. Our research not only illustrates the effectiveness of media supervision in reducing environmental pollution but also provides suggestions for governments to formulate environmental policies and improve regulatory mechanisms.
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提升企业社会责任水平:基于斯塔克伯格-进化博弈模型的媒体监督机制
单纯的环境税可能无法解决近视的利润追求与企业社会责任(CSR)成本之间的冲突所带来的社会困境。设计合理的监督机制是纠正市场失灵的关键。我们通过斯塔克伯格-进化博弈模型建立了媒体监督机制,研究媒体监督对制造商群体进化行为的影响。假定媒体是领导者,在媒体决定监督力度后,制造商的需求在不同策略配置下是异质的。制造商群体的最佳反应是监督下的进化稳定策略,其中 CSR 策略的百分比被定义为 CSR 水平。事实证明,企业社会责任水平会随着努力程度的增加而提高。我们分析了 Stackelberg-演化均衡的存在性和唯一性,以及计算它的数值算法。结果表明,Stackelberg-进化均衡下的企业社会责任水平高于无监督下的企业社会责任水平。我们的研究不仅说明了媒体监督在减少环境污染方面的有效性,也为政府制定环境政策和完善监管机制提供了建议。
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来源期刊
Omega-international Journal of Management Science
Omega-international Journal of Management Science 管理科学-运筹学与管理科学
CiteScore
13.80
自引率
11.60%
发文量
130
审稿时长
56 days
期刊介绍: Omega reports on developments in management, including the latest research results and applications. Original contributions and review articles describe the state of the art in specific fields or functions of management, while there are shorter critical assessments of particular management techniques. Other features of the journal are the "Memoranda" section for short communications and "Feedback", a correspondence column. Omega is both stimulating reading and an important source for practising managers, specialists in management services, operational research workers and management scientists, management consultants, academics, students and research personnel throughout the world. The material published is of high quality and relevance, written in a manner which makes it accessible to all of this wide-ranging readership. Preference will be given to papers with implications to the practice of management. Submissions of purely theoretical papers are discouraged. The review of material for publication in the journal reflects this aim.
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