{"title":"Internal governance and investment efficiency: The role of non-CEO executives","authors":"Yifan Zhang , Dongmin Kong , Hening Liu","doi":"10.1016/j.irfa.2024.103764","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>In this paper, we reveal an overlooked but important role of corporate governance on investment efficiency: non-CEO executives. Internal governance, measured as the fraction of independent executives appointed before the current CEO, leads to a better investment efficiency. The governance effect is pronounced when executives have stronger incentives, such as a longer horizon or a higher shareholding ratio. To explain the promotion of investment efficiency, we find that independent executives help constrain CEO power. They also contribute to better quality of accounting information. Moreover, internal governance by non-CEO executives is hardly affected by external supervisors, and other internal governance mechanisms fail to enhance firms' investment efficiency, indicating the unique monitoring role of independent non-CEO executives. Our study demonstrates the significance of a democratic management team and the necessity to limit the power of CEOs to appoint new executives.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48226,"journal":{"name":"International Review of Financial Analysis","volume":"96 ","pages":"Article 103764"},"PeriodicalIF":7.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Review of Financial Analysis","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1057521924006963","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In this paper, we reveal an overlooked but important role of corporate governance on investment efficiency: non-CEO executives. Internal governance, measured as the fraction of independent executives appointed before the current CEO, leads to a better investment efficiency. The governance effect is pronounced when executives have stronger incentives, such as a longer horizon or a higher shareholding ratio. To explain the promotion of investment efficiency, we find that independent executives help constrain CEO power. They also contribute to better quality of accounting information. Moreover, internal governance by non-CEO executives is hardly affected by external supervisors, and other internal governance mechanisms fail to enhance firms' investment efficiency, indicating the unique monitoring role of independent non-CEO executives. Our study demonstrates the significance of a democratic management team and the necessity to limit the power of CEOs to appoint new executives.
在本文中，我们揭示了公司治理对投资效率的一个被忽视但却很重要的作用：非首席执行官高管。内部治理（以在现任首席执行官之前任命的独立高管比例来衡量）会提高投资效率。当高管具有更强的激励机制（如更长的任期或更高的持股比例）时，治理效应会更加明显。为了解释投资效率的提升，我们发现独立高管有助于约束首席执行官的权力。他们还有助于提高会计信息的质量。此外，非 CEO 高管的内部治理几乎不受外部监督者的影响，其他内部治理机制也无法提高公司的投资效率，这表明独立的非 CEO 高管具有独特的监督作用。我们的研究表明了民主管理团队的重要性以及限制首席执行官任命新高管权力的必要性。
期刊介绍：
The International Review of Financial Analysis (IRFA) is an impartial refereed journal designed to serve as a platform for high-quality financial research. It welcomes a diverse range of financial research topics and maintains an unbiased selection process. While not limited to U.S.-centric subjects, IRFA, as its title suggests, is open to valuable research contributions from around the world.
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
分享
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
扫码关注我们
