Partisan Prejudice: The Role of Beliefs About the Unchanging Nature of Ideology and Partisans.

Abstract

Although there is a tendency to think all forms of essentialism-the belief that characteristics are inherent and unchangeable-are similar, some theories suggest different foundations and outcomes. We investigated if belief systems about the stability of political ideology (trait essentialism) and the fundamental nature of partisans (social essentialism) predict prejudice in opposite ways and if they do so via differential relations with blame. Across six studies (N = 2,231), we found that the more people believe the trait of political ideology is fixed (trait essentialism), the more they think that Republicans and Democrats are inherently different (social essentialism). Crucially, despite this positive correlation, trait essentialism was negatively linked to partisan prejudice and social essentialism was positively linked. The essentialism to prejudice links were driven, in part, by differential associations with blame attributions. Media messaging robustly influenced both types of essentialist thinking, with implications for prejudice.