Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin最新文献

We conducted two reverse-correlation studies, as well as two pilot studies reported in the online supplement (total N = 1,411), on the topics of (a) whether liberals and conservatives differ in the types of dehumanization that they cognitively emphasize when mentally representing one another, and if so, (b) whether liberals and conservatives are sensitive to how they are represented in the minds of political outgroup members. Results suggest that partisans indeed differ in the types of dehumanization that they cognitively emphasize when mentally representing one another: whereas conservatives' dehumanization of liberals emphasizes immaturity (vs. savagery), liberals' dehumanization of conservatives more strongly emphasizes savagery (vs. immaturity). In addition, results suggest that partisans may be sensitive to how they are represented. That is, partisans' meta-representations-their representations of how the outgroup represents the ingroup-appear to accurately index the relative emphases of these two dimensions in the minds of political outgroup members.

People tend to evaluate themselves as better than they actually are. Such enhanced positive evaluation occurs not only for the self but also for close others. We extend the exploration of enhanced evaluation of close others to that of strangers. We predict that when individuals consider becoming friends with a stranger, their preference for a pleasant physical experience will drive an enhanced evaluation of that person. In two experiments, participants who considered friendship with a stranger evaluated the stranger as looking, sounding, and smelling better than how control participants evaluated them. The amount of time participants expected to spend with the stranger predicted their evaluation (Studies 1-2). In a large-scale third study, using various target stimuli, we found that when participants have an interest in a friendship but then are unable to physically spend time together, the enhanced-evaluation effect is weaker compared with when they could spend time together.

Radicalization-as a complex process of adopting extremist attitudes-includes maladaptive responses to the transformative power of globalization. Globalization contains sociocultural disruptive and acculturative processes, initiating exclusionary and integrative reactions. These reactions have dissimilarly been associated with aspects of extremism. In seven preregistered studies (N = 2,161), we draw on various methods combining naturalistic circumstances, cross-sectional, longitudinal, experimental, and representative data to scrutinize the complex globalization-radicalization nexus within the contexts of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Pakistan. Our results provide empirical support for the hypothesis that insecure life attachment (i.e., experience of contextual safety, inclusiveness, reliability, fairness, and facilitating well-being) and globalization perceived as a threat can lead to extremism through defensive reactions to globalization. Specifically, we found ethnic protection to be a central mechanism connecting sociocultural disruption and threats with extremism. Globalized radicalization ascends as a contemporary phenomenon reflecting the dark side of global interconnectivity.

Although two people could both enact similar forms of hypocrisy, one person might be judged as more hypocritical than the other. The present research advances a novel, theoretical explanation for a paradigmatic instance of this: the increased hypocrisy ascribed to contradicting a morally (vs. nonmorally) based attitude. In contrast to prior explanations, the present research shows that people infer targets holding morally (vs. nonmorally) based attitudes are more difficult to change. Consequently, when people are hypocritical on these stances, it elicits greater surprise, which amplifies the perceived hypocrisy. Through both statistical mediation and experimental moderation, we provide evidence for this process and show how our explanation generalizes to understanding heightened hypocrisy in other contexts, too (i.e., violating nonmoral attitudes held with certainty vs. uncertainty). Altogether, we provide an integrative, theoretical lens for predicting when moral and nonmoral acts of hypocrisy will be perceived as particularly hypocritical.

Humans have long pondered the distinction between action and inaction. Classic work in social sciences provides evidence that most people believe that others experience higher levels of affect when they obtain the same outcome through action as opposed to inaction. In this paper, we theorize that people's attributions of affect to identical outcomes resulting from action versus inaction are largely constructive in nature, such that they heavily depend on the elicitation procedure. Seven preregistered studies demonstrate that most individuals cease to attribute greater affect to identical outcomes resulting from action as opposed to inaction when it is made possible-or salient-that they can state that action and inaction are associated with equal levels of affect. Consequently, the present studies suggest that researchers can reach different conclusions about participants' general proclivity to attribute greater affect to identical outcomes resulting from action (vs. inaction) depending on how participants' beliefs are measured.

When people consider what is good for their country, they might face a conflict between the country's short-term and long-term interests. We suggest that resolving this conflict depends on people's form of national identification and future time perspective. Across four studies (N = 4,274), we showed that constructive patriotism, but not conventional patriotism or glorification, was positively associated with future time perspective. Moreover, we showed that this further translated into people's responses to intertemporal conflicts. Specifically, constructive patriotism was indirectly linked to higher support for national policies with long-term advantages (despite short-term disadvantages) and lower support for national policies with long-term disadvantages (despite short-term advantages), and these links were mediated by future time perspective. Overall, our results demonstrate that distinct forms of national identification are differently linked to future time perspective. Likewise, this helps explain differences in how much people care about their country's present and future.

We investigate why individuals commonly perceive time as passing quickly when reflecting on past periods of their lives. A traditional cognitive account proposes that routine experienced during a period decreases the number of memorable events, making that period appear short in retrospect. A motivational account derived from self-determination theory proposes that a period remembered as lacking self-determined growth feels unsatisfying or wasted, and thus seems to pass quickly. Two exploratory studies (N = 999) did not consistently support these accounts, although in Study 2 remembered routine predicted faster perceived pace, as hypothesized. Contrary to our motivational account, remembered growth positively, rather than negatively, predicted pace. Interpreting this unexpected finding, we conducted two pre-registered studies (N = 965) exploring how satisfaction with, and nostalgic longing for, periods of growth contribute to the perception of time passing quickly. Our findings have implications for encouraging productive responses to the subjective pace of life.

Although there is a tendency to think all forms of essentialism-the belief that characteristics are inherent and unchangeable-are similar, some theories suggest different foundations and outcomes. We investigated if belief systems about the stability of political ideology (trait essentialism) and the fundamental nature of partisans (social essentialism) predict prejudice in opposite ways and if they do so via differential relations with blame. Across six studies (N = 2,231), we found that the more people believe the trait of political ideology is fixed (trait essentialism), the more they think that Republicans and Democrats are inherently different (social essentialism). Crucially, despite this positive correlation, trait essentialism was negatively linked to partisan prejudice and social essentialism was positively linked. The essentialism to prejudice links were driven, in part, by differential associations with blame attributions. Media messaging robustly influenced both types of essentialist thinking, with implications for prejudice.

What environmental factors are associated with individual differences in political ideology, and do such associations change over time? We examine whether reductions in pathogen prevalence in U.S. states over the past 60 years are associated with reduced associations between parasite stress and conservatism. We report a positive association between infection levels and conservative ideology in the United States during the 1960s and 1970s. However, this correlation reduces from the 1980s onwards. These results suggest that the ecological influence of infectious diseases may be larger for older people who grew up (or whose parents grew up) during earlier time periods. We test this hypothesis by analyzing the political affiliation of 45,000 Facebook users, and find a positive association between self-reported political affiliation and regional pathogen stress for older (>40 years) but not younger individuals. It is concluded that the influence of environmental pathogen stress on ideology may have reduced over time.

Cultural tightness is characterized by strong norms and harsh punishments for deviant behaviors. We hypothesized that followers in tight (vs. loose) cultures would more strongly prefer muscular leaders. This hypothesis was confirmed across seven studies (N = 1,615) employing samples from the United States, the United Kingdom, and China. Using actual political leaders, we demonstrated that the tighter the state's culture was, the more muscular the elected governor was (Study 1). Temporarily situating participants in a tight (vs. loose) culture made them select a leader higher on muscularity but not on body fat, and the effects obtained occurred for both male and female leaders (Studies 2-3B). In addition, we demonstrated the mediating role of authoritarianism and a preference for a dominant leadership in this process (Studies 4-5B). These results demonstrate the importance of considering the interface between culture and the physical appearance of leaders.