Potential Games on Cubic Splines for Self-Interested Multi-Agent Motion Planning

IF 2.4 Q2 AUTOMATION & CONTROL SYSTEMS IEEE Control Systems Letters Pub Date : 2024-11-04 DOI:10.1109/LCSYS.2024.3491052
Samuel Williams;Jyotirmoy Deshmukh
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Abstract

Existing multi-agent motion planners face scalability challenges with the number of agents and route plans that span long time horizons. We tackle these issues by introducing additional abstraction by interpolating agent trajectories with natural cubic splines and leveraging existing results that under some natural assumptions, the resulting game has the structure of a potential game. We prove a simultaneous gradient descent method using independent per-agent step sizes is guaranteed to converge to a local Nash equilibrium. Compared with recent iLQR-based potential game solvers, our method solves for local Nash equilibrium trajectories faster in games with up to 52 agents, and we demonstrate scalability to long horizons.
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立方样条上的势能博弈,用于自利式多代理运动规划
现有的多代理运动规划器面临着代理数量和路线计划跨度长的可扩展性挑战。为了解决这些问题,我们引入了额外的抽象方法,用自然立方样条插值代理轨迹,并利用现有结果,即在某些自然假设下,所产生的博弈具有潜在博弈的结构。我们证明了一种使用独立的每个代理步长的同步梯度下降方法可以保证收敛到局部纳什均衡。与最近基于 iLQR 的潜在博弈求解器相比,我们的方法能在多达 52 个代理的博弈中更快地求解出局部纳什均衡轨迹,而且我们还证明了该方法在长时间内的可扩展性。
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来源期刊
IEEE Control Systems Letters
IEEE Control Systems Letters Mathematics-Control and Optimization
CiteScore
4.40
自引率
13.30%
发文量
471
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