{"title":"Spillovers From Medicaid Contraceptive Use to Non-Medicaid Patients: Evidence From New York.","authors":"Kevin Callison, Marisa Carlos, Barton Willage","doi":"10.1002/hec.4945","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This study examines spillovers from a 2014 New York Medicaid policy change that increased reimbursement for immediate postpartum long-acting reversible contraceptive (LARC) insertion. Using administrative data on hospital deliveries from 2011 through 2019, we analyze whether physicians who inserted immediate postpartum LARCs for Medicaid patients following the policy change were more likely to subsequently perform the procedure on non-Medicaid patients. We find significant spillovers, as physicians who first perform an immediate postpartum Medicaid LARC insertion following the 2014 payment reform are 9.3 percentage points more likely to perform immediate postpartum non-Medicaid LARC insertions; an association that increases with the physician's share of Medicaid deliveries. To distinguish between physician-specific and hospital-specific factors driving spillovers, we compare physicians within the same hospital-year. Results indicate approximately half the spillover is due to physician-specific factors and half to hospital-specific factors. Our findings highlight how targeted reimbursement policies can have broader impacts beyond the intended population and demonstrate the influence of both individual physician behavior and institutional factors in shaping clinical practice patterns. Understanding these spillover dynamics is important for policymakers and healthcare providers aiming to promote effective and equitable contraceptive care across patient populations.</p>","PeriodicalId":12847,"journal":{"name":"Health economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.0000,"publicationDate":"2025-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Health economics","FirstCategoryId":"3","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.4945","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"医学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This study examines spillovers from a 2014 New York Medicaid policy change that increased reimbursement for immediate postpartum long-acting reversible contraceptive (LARC) insertion. Using administrative data on hospital deliveries from 2011 through 2019, we analyze whether physicians who inserted immediate postpartum LARCs for Medicaid patients following the policy change were more likely to subsequently perform the procedure on non-Medicaid patients. We find significant spillovers, as physicians who first perform an immediate postpartum Medicaid LARC insertion following the 2014 payment reform are 9.3 percentage points more likely to perform immediate postpartum non-Medicaid LARC insertions; an association that increases with the physician's share of Medicaid deliveries. To distinguish between physician-specific and hospital-specific factors driving spillovers, we compare physicians within the same hospital-year. Results indicate approximately half the spillover is due to physician-specific factors and half to hospital-specific factors. Our findings highlight how targeted reimbursement policies can have broader impacts beyond the intended population and demonstrate the influence of both individual physician behavior and institutional factors in shaping clinical practice patterns. Understanding these spillover dynamics is important for policymakers and healthcare providers aiming to promote effective and equitable contraceptive care across patient populations.
期刊介绍:
This Journal publishes articles on all aspects of health economics: theoretical contributions, empirical studies and analyses of health policy from the economic perspective. Its scope includes the determinants of health and its definition and valuation, as well as the demand for and supply of health care; planning and market mechanisms; micro-economic evaluation of individual procedures and treatments; and evaluation of the performance of health care systems.
Contributions should typically be original and innovative. As a rule, the Journal does not include routine applications of cost-effectiveness analysis, discrete choice experiments and costing analyses.
Editorials are regular features, these should be concise and topical. Occasionally commissioned reviews are published and special issues bring together contributions on a single topic. Health Economics Letters facilitate rapid exchange of views on topical issues. Contributions related to problems in both developed and developing countries are welcome.