Katarzyna Byrka-Kita , Mateusz Czerwiński , Stephen P. Ferris , Agnieszka Preś-Perepeczo , Tomasz Wiśniewski
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Abstract
In this study we explore the effect of investor attention on trading volume around announcements of CEO appointments. Using hand-collected data on CEO turnovers for publicly traded Polish firms during 2000–2016, we find that investors generally neglect announcements of CEO reappointments. But when we introduce behavioural-based trading strategies focused on momentum, we discover that trading volume reacts to announcements of these appointments. Further, we observe that investors respond most strongly to CEO reappointments that are accompanied by recent stock price increases. This study offers the first volume-based evidence supporting the moderating role of CEO appointment announcements on investor trading.
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Global Finance Journal provides a forum for the exchange of ideas and techniques among academicians and practitioners and, thereby, advances applied research in global financial management. Global Finance Journal publishes original, creative, scholarly research that integrates theory and practice and addresses a readership in both business and academia. Articles reflecting pragmatic research are sought in areas such as financial management, investment, banking and financial services, accounting, and taxation. Global Finance Journal welcomes contributions from scholars in both the business and academic community and encourages collaborative research from this broad base worldwide.
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