{"title":"Comparative statics in strategic form games","authors":"Juan F. Escobar","doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112247","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>This paper presents new comparative statics results for strategic form games. We introduce a dominance condition that ensures payoff shocks result in increased Nash equilibria, even in games without strategic complementarities. Our results are easy to apply and expand the range of games where lattice theoretic tools can be applied. We derive new comparative statics results for contests and Cournot games.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":11468,"journal":{"name":"Economics Letters","volume":"250 ","pages":"Article 112247"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1000,"publicationDate":"2025-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Economics Letters","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176525000849","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This paper presents new comparative statics results for strategic form games. We introduce a dominance condition that ensures payoff shocks result in increased Nash equilibria, even in games without strategic complementarities. Our results are easy to apply and expand the range of games where lattice theoretic tools can be applied. We derive new comparative statics results for contests and Cournot games.
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Many economists today are concerned by the proliferation of journals and the concomitant labyrinth of research to be conquered in order to reach the specific information they require. To combat this tendency, Economics Letters has been conceived and designed outside the realm of the traditional economics journal. As a Letters Journal, it consists of concise communications (letters) that provide a means of rapid and efficient dissemination of new results, models and methods in all fields of economic research.
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