Ohad Dan , Maya Leshkowitz , Ohad Livnat , Ran R. Hassin
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引用次数: 0
Abstract
More information today is becoming more accessible to more people at an ever-growing rate. How does epistemic curiosity operate in this expanding informational landscape? We test a novel theory which postulates that experienced curiosity is a function of two psychological factors: Interest, which is cognitive, “cool” and relatively stable in time, and Urge that is “hot” and quick to rise and decay. These factors determine one's experienced curiosity at any given point in time. Interestingly, these temporal dynamics may lead to time-dependent changes in epistemic choices. In a series of forced-choice experiments (n = 702), participants chose between receiving answers to either high-Urge or high-Interest questions. Consistent with predictions derived from our theory, we found a present-bias in preference for Urge. Our theory explains why, in stark contrast to individual interest and with the potential to derail public discourse, a competition for our attention inherently incentivizes the use of inciting and sensational information. We present and test a theory-based behavioral nudge that partially ameliorates these effects.
Statement of relevance
Understanding the fundamentals of epistemic choices has important individual, societal, and economic implications. We develop and test a two-factor model, which captures cognitive and motivational determinants of curiosity. The model accounts for a modern-day paradox: how we chronically defer the consumption of information we find interesting (e.g., works of art and science), by succumbing to epistemic urges (e.g., finding the whereabouts of celebrities). From a societal perspective, an abundance of information in an environment that monetizes attention motivates the engineering of information for immediate engagement. We provide a novel psychological framework to describe the information attraction governing our daily lives. We also show how our theory may be used to allow people to consume more of the information they actually want, rather than the information they are tempted to consume.
期刊介绍:
Cognition is an international journal that publishes theoretical and experimental papers on the study of the mind. It covers a wide variety of subjects concerning all the different aspects of cognition, ranging from biological and experimental studies to formal analysis. Contributions from the fields of psychology, neuroscience, linguistics, computer science, mathematics, ethology and philosophy are welcome in this journal provided that they have some bearing on the functioning of the mind. In addition, the journal serves as a forum for discussion of social and political aspects of cognitive science.