Leaders: Privilege, Sacrifice, Opportunity, and Personnel Economics in the American Civil War.

IF 1.3 3区 社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS Journal of Law Economics & Organization Pub Date : 2014-08-01 DOI:10.1093/jleo/ewt005
Dora L Costa
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

US Civil War data allow examinations of theories of leadership. By observing both leaders and followers during the war and 40 years after it, I establish that the most able became wartime leaders, that leading by example from the front was an effective strategy in reducing desertion rates, and that leaders later migrated to the larger cities because this is where their superior skills would have had the highest payoffs. I find mixed evidence on whether leaders were created or born. I find that US cities were magnets for the most able and provided training opportunities for both leaders and followers: Men might start in a low social status occupation in a city but then move to a higher status occupation. (JEL M50, N31).

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领导人:美国内战中的特权、牺牲、机会和人事经济学。
美国内战的数据可以用来检验领导力理论。通过观察战争期间和战后40年的领导者和追随者,我确定最有能力的人成为战时领导者,在前线以身作则是降低逃兵率的有效策略,领导者后来迁移到大城市,因为在那里他们的卓越技能会产生最高的回报。关于领导者是后天培养的还是天生的,我找到了各种各样的证据。我发现美国的城市对最有能力的人具有吸引力,并为领导者和追随者提供培训机会:男性可能从城市中社会地位较低的职业开始,但随后会晋升到地位较高的职业。(凝胶m50, n31)。
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CiteScore
2.20
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0.00%
发文量
25
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