"Sorry” Is Never Enough: How State Apology Laws Fail to Reduce Medical Malpractice Liability Risk.

IF 4.9 1区 社会学 Q1 Social Sciences Stanford Law Review Pub Date : 2019-02-01
Benjamin J McMichael, R Lawrence Van Horn, W Kip Viscusi
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Abstract

Based on case studies indicating that apologies from physicians to patients can promote healing, understanding, and dispute resolution, thirty-nine states (and the District of Columbia) have sought to reduce litigation and medical malpractice liability by enacting apology laws. Apology laws facilitate apologies by making them inadmissible as evidence in subsequent malpractice trials. The underlying assumption of these laws is that after receiving an apology, patients will be less likely to pursue malpractice claims and will be more likely to settle claims that are filed. However, once a patient has been made aware that the physician has committed a medical error, the patient’s incentive to pursue a claim may increase even though the apology itself cannot be introduced as evidence. Thus, apology laws could lead to either increases or decreases in overall medical malpractice liability risk. Despite apology laws' status as one of the most widespread tort reforms in the country, there is little evidence that they achieve their goal of reducing litigation. This Article provides critical new evidence on the role of apology laws by examining a dataset of malpractice claims obtained directly from a large national malpractice insurer. This dataset includes substantially more information than is publicly available, and thus presents a unique opportunity to understand the effect of apology laws on the entire litigation landscape in ways that are not possible using only publicly available data. Decomposing medical malpractice liability risk into the frequency of claims and the magnitude of those claims, we examine the malpractice claims against 90% of physicians in the country who practice within a particular specialty over an eight-year period.

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“对不起”永远不够:国家道歉法如何未能降低医疗事故责任风险。
基于案例研究表明,医生向病人道歉可以促进康复、理解和解决纠纷,39个州(和哥伦比亚特区)已经通过制定道歉法来减少诉讼和医疗事故责任。道歉法使道歉在随后的医疗事故审判中不能作为证据,从而促进了道歉。这些法律的基本假设是,在收到道歉后,患者将不太可能追究医疗事故索赔,而更有可能解决已提交的索赔。然而,一旦病人意识到医生犯了医疗错误,病人追求索赔的动机可能会增加,即使道歉本身不能作为证据。因此,道歉法可能导致整体医疗事故责任风险的增加或减少。尽管道歉法是该国最广泛的侵权改革之一,但几乎没有证据表明它们实现了减少诉讼的目标。本文通过检查从一家大型国家医疗事故保险公司直接获得的医疗事故索赔数据集,为道歉法的作用提供了重要的新证据。该数据集包含的信息比公开的要多得多,因此提供了一个独特的机会来理解道歉法对整个诉讼领域的影响,而这是仅使用公开数据无法实现的。将医疗事故责任风险分解为索赔的频率和索赔的幅度,我们检查了国内90%的医生在特定专业执业超过八年的医疗事故索赔。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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