Pub Date : 2022-05-05eCollection Date: 2022-01-01DOI: 10.5114/hpr.2022.115690
Andrzej Piotrowski, Zahra Nikkhah-Farkhani
Background: Confidential personal data breaches are a serious problem for medical service providers. They may result in high financial costs for medical care facilities and unnecessary stress for patients. Research on information security (IS) in healthcare has been insufficient thus far. International studies may add a new perspective on this issue.
Participants and procedure: A quantitative approach was assumed to analyse relationships between IS climate and IS indicators in countries with different cultures (Iran and Poland). The Information Security Climate Index was used in the study. The software PLS3 and SPSS 22 was used for data analysis.
Results: The results showed that the predicted factors of nurses' IS participation were different in Iran and Poland. In both countries, nurses' perception of the importance of IS had an effect on IS participation, but in Poland, IS compliance had an additional positive effect. In addition, IS compliance moderated the relationship between IS motivation and IS participation.
Conclusions: Components of IS climate have a significant effect on nurses' IS participation in both Iran and Poland, though nationality can modify this relation. However, in both countries, by linking IS policies with human resource management activities such as performance appraisal and training, nurses' perception of IS importance can be increased and IS participation can be facilitated.
背景:个人机密数据泄露是医疗服务提供商面临的一个严重问题。它们可能会给医疗机构带来高昂的经济成本,给患者带来不必要的压力。迄今为止,有关医疗保健领域信息安全(IS)的研究还不够充分。国际研究可为这一问题增添新的视角:采用定量方法分析不同文化背景国家(伊朗和波兰)的信息安全环境与信息安全指标之间的关系。研究中使用了信息安全氛围指数。使用 PLS3 和 SPSS 22 软件进行数据分析:结果表明,伊朗和波兰护士参与信息安全系统的预测因素不同。在这两个国家,护士对信息系统重要性的认知对信息系统的参与有影响,但在波兰,信息系统的合规性对其有额外的积极影响。此外,对 IS 的遵从调节了 IS 动机与 IS 参与之间的关系:结论:在伊朗和波兰,IS氛围的组成部分对护士的IS参与有显著影响,尽管国籍会改变这种关系。不过,在这两个国家,通过将基础设施服务政策与人力资源管理活动(如绩效评估和培训)联系起来,可以提高护士对基础设施服务重要性的认识,促进其参与基础设施服务。
{"title":"Does nationality affect nurses' information security participation? A comparative study in Iran and Poland.","authors":"Andrzej Piotrowski, Zahra Nikkhah-Farkhani","doi":"10.5114/hpr.2022.115690","DOIUrl":"10.5114/hpr.2022.115690","url":null,"abstract":"<p><strong>Background: </strong>Confidential personal data breaches are a serious problem for medical service providers. They may result in high financial costs for medical care facilities and unnecessary stress for patients. Research on information security (IS) in healthcare has been insufficient thus far. International studies may add a new perspective on this issue.</p><p><strong>Participants and procedure: </strong>A quantitative approach was assumed to analyse relationships between IS climate and IS indicators in countries with different cultures (Iran and Poland). The Information Security Climate Index was used in the study. The software PLS3 and SPSS 22 was used for data analysis.</p><p><strong>Results: </strong>The results showed that the predicted factors of nurses' IS participation were different in Iran and Poland. In both countries, nurses' perception of the importance of IS had an effect on IS participation, but in Poland, IS compliance had an additional positive effect. In addition, IS compliance moderated the relationship between IS motivation and IS participation.</p><p><strong>Conclusions: </strong>Components of IS climate have a significant effect on nurses' IS participation in both Iran and Poland, though nationality can modify this relation. However, in both countries, by linking IS policies with human resource management activities such as performance appraisal and training, nurses' perception of IS importance can be increased and IS participation can be facilitated.</p>","PeriodicalId":51386,"journal":{"name":"Stanford Law Review","volume":"36 1","pages":"203-211"},"PeriodicalIF":2.0,"publicationDate":"2022-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10679914/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90247713","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Benjamin J McMichael, R Lawrence Van Horn, W Kip Viscusi
Based on case studies indicating that apologies from physicians to patients can promote healing, understanding, and dispute resolution, thirty-nine states (and the District of Columbia) have sought to reduce litigation and medical malpractice liability by enacting apology laws. Apology laws facilitate apologies by making them inadmissible as evidence in subsequent malpractice trials. The underlying assumption of these laws is that after receiving an apology, patients will be less likely to pursue malpractice claims and will be more likely to settle claims that are filed. However, once a patient has been made aware that the physician has committed a medical error, the patient’s incentive to pursue a claim may increase even though the apology itself cannot be introduced as evidence. Thus, apology laws could lead to either increases or decreases in overall medical malpractice liability risk. Despite apology laws' status as one of the most widespread tort reforms in the country, there is little evidence that they achieve their goal of reducing litigation. This Article provides critical new evidence on the role of apology laws by examining a dataset of malpractice claims obtained directly from a large national malpractice insurer. This dataset includes substantially more information than is publicly available, and thus presents a unique opportunity to understand the effect of apology laws on the entire litigation landscape in ways that are not possible using only publicly available data. Decomposing medical malpractice liability risk into the frequency of claims and the magnitude of those claims, we examine the malpractice claims against 90% of physicians in the country who practice within a particular specialty over an eight-year period.
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The Affordable Care Act (ACA) offers a window into modern American federalism--and modern American nationalism--in action. The ACA's federalism is defined not by separation between state and federal, but rather by a national structure that invites state-led implementation. As it turns out, that structure was only a starting point for a remarkably dynamic and adaptive implementation process that has generated new state-federal arrangements. States move back and forth between different structural models vis-a-vis the federal government; internal state politics produce different state choices; states copy, compete, and cooperate with each other; and negotiation with federal counterparts is a near constant. These characteristics have endured through the change in presidential administration. This Article presents the results of a study that tracked the details of the ACA's federalism-related implementation from 2012 to 2017. Among the questions that motivated the project: Does the ACA actually effectuate "federalism," and what are federalism’s key attributes when entwined with national statutory implementation? A federal law on the scale of the ACA presented a rare opportunity to investigate implementation from a statute's very beginning and to provide the concrete detail often wanting in federalism scholarship. The findings deconstruct assumptions about federalism made by theorists of all stripes, from formalist to modern. Federalism’s commonly invoked attributes--including autonomy, cooperation, experimentation, and variation--have not been dependent on any particular architecture of either state-federal separation or entanglement, even though theorists typically call on "federalism" to produce them. Instead, these attributes have been generated in ACA implementation across virtually every kind of governance model--that is, regardless whether states expand Medicaid; get waivers; or operate their own insurance exchanges or let the federal government do it for them. This makes it extraordinarily challenging to measure which structural arrangements are most "federalist," especially because the various federalism attributes are not always present together. The study also uncovers major theoretical difficulties when it comes to healthcare: Without a clear conception of the U.S. healthcare system’s goals, how can we know which structural arrangements serve it best, much less whether they are working? If healthcare federalism is a mechanism to produce particular policy outcomes, we should determine whether locating a particular facet of healthcare design in the states versus the federal government positively affects, for example, healthcare cost, access, or quality. If, instead, healthcare federalism serves structural aims regardless of policy ends--for instance, reserving power to states in the interest of sovereignty or checks and balances--we should examine whether it does in fact accomplish those goals, and we should justify why those goals outw
《平价医疗法案》(Affordable Care Act, ACA)提供了一扇了解现代美国联邦制和现代美国民族主义的窗口。ACA的联邦制不是由州和联邦的分离来定义的,而是由一个国家结构来定义的,这个结构邀请各州主导实施。事实证明,这种结构只是一个起点,一个非常有活力和适应性的实施过程产生了新的州-联邦安排。与联邦政府相比,各州在不同的结构模式之间来回转换;国家内部政治产生不同的国家选择;国家之间相互模仿、竞争和合作;与联邦政府的谈判几乎是家常便饭。这些特点经历了总统政权的更迭。本文介绍了一项研究的结果,该研究追踪了2012年至2017年ACA联邦制相关实施的细节。在推动这个项目的问题中:ACA是否真的实现了“联邦制”,当联邦制与国家法律实施交织在一起时,联邦制的关键属性是什么?《平价医疗法案》这样规模的联邦法律提供了一个难得的机会,可以从法规的一开始就调查其实施情况,并提供联邦制奖学金中经常缺乏的具体细节。这些发现解构了从形式主义到现代的各种理论家对联邦制的假设。联邦制的常用属性——包括自治、合作、实验和变化——并不依赖于州-联邦分离或纠缠的任何特定架构,尽管理论家通常呼吁“联邦制”来产生它们。相反,在ACA的实施过程中,这些属性已经在几乎所有类型的治理模式中产生——也就是说,无论各州是否扩大医疗补助计划;获得豁免;或者经营他们自己的保险交易所,或者让联邦政府为他们做。这使得衡量哪种结构安排是最“联邦主义”的非常具有挑战性,特别是因为各种联邦主义属性并不总是同时出现。这项研究还揭示了医疗保健方面的主要理论难题:如果对美国医疗保健系统的目标没有明确的概念,我们如何知道哪种结构安排最能服务于它,更不用说它们是否有效了?如果医疗联邦制是一种产生特定政策结果的机制,我们应该确定将医疗保健设计的特定方面定位在州政府与联邦政府之间是否会产生积极影响,例如,医疗保健成本、访问或质量。相反,如果医疗联邦制服务于结构性目标,而不考虑政策目的——例如,为了主权或制衡的利益而将权力保留给各州——我们应该检查它是否实际上实现了这些目标,我们应该证明为什么这些目标超过了推动医疗政策的道德关切。ACA并没有造成这种概念上的混乱,但它保留并建立在一个支离破碎的医疗格局上,而这个格局已经充斥着结构性和道德上的妥协。这并不意味着联邦制是一个空洞的概念,也不意味着联邦制在ACA中不存在。联邦制学者倾向于主张基于先前目标和价值观的特定结构安排。ACA的架构挑战了这些目标和价值观是联邦制独有的,还是联邦制的任何特定表达。与此同时,ACA的实施显然是一个关于国家杠杆、州内民主和国家政策自主的故事,而不是脱离国家法定计划。它的实施说明了联邦制是如何代表许多想法的,并挑战我们问自己,当我们在医疗保健等领域援引这一概念时,我们真正在为什么而战,或在寻求什么。
{"title":"What Is Federalism in Healthcare For?","authors":"Abbe R Gluck, Nicole Huberfeld","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>The Affordable Care Act (ACA) offers a window into modern American federalism--and modern American nationalism--in action. The ACA's federalism is defined not by separation between state and federal, but rather by a national structure that invites state-led implementation. As it turns out, that structure was only a starting point for a remarkably dynamic and adaptive implementation process that has generated new state-federal arrangements. States move back and forth between different structural models vis-a-vis the federal government; internal state politics produce different state choices; states copy, compete, and cooperate with each other; and negotiation with federal counterparts is a near constant. These characteristics have endured through the change in presidential administration. This Article presents the results of a study that tracked the details of the ACA's federalism-related implementation from 2012 to 2017. Among the questions that motivated the project: Does the ACA actually effectuate \"federalism,\" and what are federalism’s key attributes when entwined with national statutory implementation? A federal law on the scale of the ACA presented a rare opportunity to investigate implementation from a statute's very beginning and to provide the concrete detail often wanting in federalism scholarship. The findings deconstruct assumptions about federalism made by theorists of all stripes, from formalist to modern. Federalism’s commonly invoked attributes--including autonomy, cooperation, experimentation, and variation--have not been dependent on any particular architecture of either state-federal separation or entanglement, even though theorists typically call on \"federalism\" to produce them. Instead, these attributes have been generated in ACA implementation across virtually every kind of governance model--that is, regardless whether states expand Medicaid; get waivers; or operate their own insurance exchanges or let the federal government do it for them. This makes it extraordinarily challenging to measure which structural arrangements are most \"federalist,\" especially because the various federalism attributes are not always present together. The study also uncovers major theoretical difficulties when it comes to healthcare: Without a clear conception of the U.S. healthcare system’s goals, how can we know which structural arrangements serve it best, much less whether they are working? If healthcare federalism is a mechanism to produce particular policy outcomes, we should determine whether locating a particular facet of healthcare design in the states versus the federal government positively affects, for example, healthcare cost, access, or quality. If, instead, healthcare federalism serves structural aims regardless of policy ends--for instance, reserving power to states in the interest of sovereignty or checks and balances--we should examine whether it does in fact accomplish those goals, and we should justify why those goals outw","PeriodicalId":51386,"journal":{"name":"Stanford Law Review","volume":"70 6","pages":"1689-803"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2018-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"36479438","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Benjamin J. McMichael, R. Lawrence Van Horn, W. Viscusi
Based on case studies indicating that apologies from physicians to patients can promote healing, understanding, and dispute resolution, thirty-nine states (and the District of Columbia) have sought to reduce litigation and medical malpractice liability by enacting apology laws. Apology laws facilitate apologies by making them inadmissible as evidence in subsequent malpractice trials. The underlying assumption of these laws is that after receiving an apology, patients will be less likely to pursue malpractice claims and will be more likely to settle claims that are filed. However, once a patient has been made aware that the physician has committed a medical error, the patient’s incentive to pursue a claim may increase even though the apology itself cannot be introduced as evidence. Thus, apology laws could lead to either increases or decreases in overall medical malpractice liability risk. Despite apology laws' status as one of the most widespread tort reforms in the country, there is little evidence that they achieve their goal of reducing litigation. This Article provides critical new evidence on the role of apology laws by examining a dataset of malpractice claims obtained directly from a large national malpractice insurer. This dataset includes substantially more information than is publicly available, and thus presents a unique opportunity to understand the effect of apology laws on the entire litigation landscape in ways that are not possible using only publicly available data. Decomposing medical malpractice liability risk into the frequency of claims and the magnitude of those claims, we examine the malpractice claims against 90% of physicians in the country who practice within a particular specialty over an eight-year period.
{"title":"\"Sorry” Is Never Enough: How State Apology Laws Fail to Reduce Medical Malpractice Liability Risk.","authors":"Benjamin J. McMichael, R. Lawrence Van Horn, W. Viscusi","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2883693","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2883693","url":null,"abstract":"Based on case studies indicating that apologies from physicians to patients can promote healing, understanding, and dispute resolution, thirty-nine states (and the District of Columbia) have sought to reduce litigation and medical malpractice liability by enacting apology laws. Apology laws facilitate apologies by making them inadmissible as evidence in subsequent malpractice trials. The underlying assumption of these laws is that after receiving an apology, patients will be less likely to pursue malpractice claims and will be more likely to settle claims that are filed. However, once a patient has been made aware that the physician has committed a medical error, the patient’s incentive to pursue a claim may increase even though the apology itself cannot be introduced as evidence. Thus, apology laws could lead to either increases or decreases in overall medical malpractice liability risk. Despite apology laws' status as one of the most widespread tort reforms in the country, there is little evidence that they achieve their goal of reducing litigation. This Article provides critical new evidence on the role of apology laws by examining a dataset of malpractice claims obtained directly from a large national malpractice insurer. This dataset includes substantially more information than is publicly available, and thus presents a unique opportunity to understand the effect of apology laws on the entire litigation landscape in ways that are not possible using only publicly available data. Decomposing medical malpractice liability risk into the frequency of claims and the magnitude of those claims, we examine the malpractice claims against 90% of physicians in the country who practice within a particular specialty over an eight-year period.","PeriodicalId":51386,"journal":{"name":"Stanford Law Review","volume":"71 2 1","pages":"341-409"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2018-02-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2139/SSRN.2883693","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42701000","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
False confessions happen. At least 245 people have been exonerated from convictions in cases featuring confessions that were simply not true. Confessions offer a narrative that allows law enforcement, and society in general, to neatly resolve cases with apparent clarity and closure. And yet the pressures officers place on suspects to provide that closure weigh disproportionately on the vulnerable, including individuals with intellectual disabilities. These individuals are disadvantaged at every step of the custodial interrogation, and they face heightened risks of falsely confessing. Moreover, the principal judicial safeguards against false confessions--assessing a suspect's Miranda waiver and determining whether a confession was voluntarily given within the bounds of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause--provide little protection for the innocent with intellectual disabilities. Few pieces of scholarship focus specifically on the heightened risks faced by individuals with intellectual disabilities throughout the process of police interrogation. This Note describes the various ways these individuals are disadvantaged. And it offers an additional data point illustrating the vulnerability of people with intellectual disabilities. This Note analyzes the 245 individuals (as of June 2, 2017) on the National Registry of Exonerations who have falsely confessed. Over one-quarter of them display indicia of intellectual disability. This percentage dwarfs the prevalence of people with intellectual disabilities in the general population and even exceeds most estimates of the proportion of the prison population suffering from intellectual disabilities. This Note concludes with several policy and doctrinal suggestions to better protect individuals with intellectual disabilities from the risks of false confession.
{"title":"Interrogated with Intellectual Disabilities: The Risks of False Confession.","authors":"Samson J Schatz","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>False confessions happen. At least 245 people have been exonerated from convictions in cases featuring confessions that were simply not true. Confessions offer a narrative that allows law enforcement, and society in general, to neatly resolve cases with apparent clarity and closure. And yet the pressures officers place on suspects to provide that closure weigh disproportionately on the vulnerable, including individuals with intellectual disabilities. These individuals are disadvantaged at every step of the custodial interrogation, and they face heightened risks of falsely confessing. Moreover, the principal judicial safeguards against false confessions--assessing a suspect's Miranda waiver and determining whether a confession was voluntarily given within the bounds of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause--provide little protection for the innocent with intellectual disabilities. Few pieces of scholarship focus specifically on the heightened risks faced by individuals with intellectual disabilities throughout the process of police interrogation. This Note describes the various ways these individuals are disadvantaged. And it offers an additional data point illustrating the vulnerability of people with intellectual disabilities. This Note analyzes the 245 individuals (as of June 2, 2017) on the National Registry of Exonerations who have falsely confessed. Over one-quarter of them display indicia of intellectual disability. This percentage dwarfs the prevalence of people with intellectual disabilities in the general population and even exceeds most estimates of the proportion of the prison population suffering from intellectual disabilities. This Note concludes with several policy and doctrinal suggestions to better protect individuals with intellectual disabilities from the risks of false confession.</p>","PeriodicalId":51386,"journal":{"name":"Stanford Law Review","volume":"70 2","pages":"643-90"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2018-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"35867936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Civics class teaches the traditional mode of law enforcement: the legislature adopts a regulatory statute and the executive enforces it in the courts. But in an increasingly interconnected world, a nontraditional form of regulatory litigation is possible in which public enforcers from one government enforce laws adopted by a second government in the second government’s courts. One government provides the executive, while a different government provides the legislature and judiciary. I call this unusual form of interstate relations “diagonal public enforcement.” Although diagonal public enforcement has escaped systematic study, one can find examples in American courts going back more than a century. Foreign governments have used American courts to enforce federal antitrust laws, state environmental laws, and civil rights statutes, among others. Just last term, the Supreme Court heard a case in which the European Commission sued American tobacco companies in a New York federal court under the federal RICO statute. Diagonal public enforcement occurs within the U.S. system as well. States routinely enforce federal laws in federal courts, and opportunities exist for states to enforce sister-state laws, especially with respect to climate change and other cross-border issues. Despite these examples, diagonal public enforcement appears to some as a category error: why would legislatures ever rely on foreign governments to enforce domestic law, and why would foreign executives take up the offer? In light of these questions, this Article attempts to demystify diagonal public enforcement by exploring when it would be consistent with the rational pursuit of legislative and executive interests. Legislatures are likely to authorize diagonal public enforcement in order to increase deterrence or influence global regulation. Executives are likely to “forum shop” for diagonal options in order to achieve better outcomes in foreign courts. These predictions explain existing patterns of enforcement, and they are suggestive of a larger role for diagonal public enforcement in the coming years. Finally, this Article critically evaluates the costs and benefits of diagonal public enforcement at the inter-state, intra-state, and individual levels. At first glance, diagonal public enforcement may seem to raise common concerns about the diffusion of regulatory authority, the extraterritorial reach of domestic law, and the interference in foreign sovereign relationships. However, upon closer scrutiny, diagonal public enforcement turns out to have the capacity to improve enforcement efficacy, promote the public interest, protect foreign and minority interests, and nudge gridlocked institutions. Though, of course, this will depend on conscientious institutional design.
{"title":"Diagonal Public Enforcement","authors":"Z. Clopton","doi":"10.31228/osf.io/tfwpx","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31228/osf.io/tfwpx","url":null,"abstract":"Civics class teaches the traditional mode of law enforcement: the legislature adopts a regulatory statute and the executive enforces it in the courts. But in an increasingly interconnected world, a nontraditional form of regulatory litigation is possible in which public enforcers from one government enforce laws adopted by a second government in the second government’s courts. One government provides the executive, while a different government provides the legislature and judiciary. I call this unusual form of interstate relations “diagonal public enforcement.” \u0000Although diagonal public enforcement has escaped systematic study, one can find examples in American courts going back more than a century. Foreign governments have used American courts to enforce federal antitrust laws, state environmental laws, and civil rights statutes, among others. Just last term, the Supreme Court heard a case in which the European Commission sued American tobacco companies in a New York federal court under the federal RICO statute. Diagonal public enforcement occurs within the U.S. system as well. States routinely enforce federal laws in federal courts, and opportunities exist for states to enforce sister-state laws, especially with respect to climate change and other cross-border issues. \u0000Despite these examples, diagonal public enforcement appears to some as a category error: why would legislatures ever rely on foreign governments to enforce domestic law, and why would foreign executives take up the offer? In light of these questions, this Article attempts to demystify diagonal public enforcement by exploring when it would be consistent with the rational pursuit of legislative and executive interests. Legislatures are likely to authorize diagonal public enforcement in order to increase deterrence or influence global regulation. Executives are likely to “forum shop” for diagonal options in order to achieve better outcomes in foreign courts. These predictions explain existing patterns of enforcement, and they are suggestive of a larger role for diagonal public enforcement in the coming years. \u0000Finally, this Article critically evaluates the costs and benefits of diagonal public enforcement at the inter-state, intra-state, and individual levels. At first glance, diagonal public enforcement may seem to raise common concerns about the diffusion of regulatory authority, the extraterritorial reach of domestic law, and the interference in foreign sovereign relationships. However, upon closer scrutiny, diagonal public enforcement turns out to have the capacity to improve enforcement efficacy, promote the public interest, protect foreign and minority interests, and nudge gridlocked institutions. Though, of course, this will depend on conscientious institutional design.","PeriodicalId":51386,"journal":{"name":"Stanford Law Review","volume":"70 1","pages":"1077-1130"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2017-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47169303","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The criminal justice system is becoming automated. At every stage, from policing to evidence to parole, machine learning and other computer systems guide outcomes. Widespread debates over the pros and cons of these technologies have overlooked a crucial issue: ownership. Developers often claim that details about how their tools work are trade secrets and refuse to disclose that information to criminal defendants or their attorneys. The introduction of intellectual property claims into the criminal justice system raises under-theorized tensions between life, liberty, and property interests. This Article offers the first wide-ranging account of trade secret evidence in criminal cases, and develops a framework to address the problems that result. In sharp contrast to the general view among trial courts, legislatures, and scholars alike, the Article argues that trade secrets should not be privileged in criminal proceedings. A criminal trade secret privilege is ahistorical; harmful to defendants; and unnecessary to protect the interests of the secret holder. Meanwhile, compared to substantive trade secret law, the privilege overprotects intellectual property. Further, privileging trade secrets in criminal proceedings fails to serve the theoretical purpose of either trade secret law or privilege law. The trade secret inquiry sheds new light on how evidence rules do, and should, function differently in civil and criminal cases.
{"title":"Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System","authors":"Rebecca Wexler","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2920883","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2920883","url":null,"abstract":"The criminal justice system is becoming automated. At every stage, from policing to evidence to parole, machine learning and other computer systems guide outcomes. Widespread debates over the pros and cons of these technologies have overlooked a crucial issue: ownership. Developers often claim that details about how their tools work are trade secrets and refuse to disclose that information to criminal defendants or their attorneys. The introduction of intellectual property claims into the criminal justice system raises under-theorized tensions between life, liberty, and property interests. This Article offers the first wide-ranging account of trade secret evidence in criminal cases, and develops a framework to address the problems that result. In sharp contrast to the general view among trial courts, legislatures, and scholars alike, the Article argues that trade secrets should not be privileged in criminal proceedings. A criminal trade secret privilege is ahistorical; harmful to defendants; and unnecessary to protect the interests of the secret holder. Meanwhile, compared to substantive trade secret law, the privilege overprotects intellectual property. Further, privileging trade secrets in criminal proceedings fails to serve the theoretical purpose of either trade secret law or privilege law. The trade secret inquiry sheds new light on how evidence rules do, and should, function differently in civil and criminal cases.","PeriodicalId":51386,"journal":{"name":"Stanford Law Review","volume":"70 1","pages":"1343"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2017-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2139/SSRN.2920883","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46192663","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
For decades courts have believed that only officials with “significant authority” are “Officers of the United States” subject to the Constitution’s Article II Appointments Clause requirements. But this standard has proved difficult to apply to major categories of officials. This Article examines whether “significant authority” is even the proper standard, at least as that standard has been applied in modern practice. To uncover whether the modern understanding of the term “officer” is consistent with the term’s original public meaning, this Article uses two distinctive tools: (i) corpus linguistics-style analysis of Founding-era documents and (ii) examination of appointment practices during the First Congress following constitutional ratification. Both suggest that the original public meaning of “officer” is much broader than modern doctrine assumes— encompassing any government official with responsibility for an ongoing governmental duty. This historic meaning of “officer” would likely extend to thousands of officials not currently appointed as Article II officers, such as tax collectors, disaster relief officials, customs officials, and administrative judges. This conclusion might at first seem destructive to the civil service structure because it would involve redesignating these officials as Article II officers—not employees outside the scope of Article II’s requirements. But this Article suggests that core components of the current federal hiring system might fairly readily be brought into compliance with Article II by amending who exercises final approval to rank and hire candidates. These feasible but significant changes would restore * Assistant Professor of Law, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University. Earlier drafts of this article were written as an Olin-Searle Fellow in Law affiliated with Georgetown University Law Center and the George Washington University Law School. This article benefited from feedback received during presentations at Northwestern’s Public Law Colloquium; the Administrative Law New Scholarship Roundtable hosted by the Ohio State University Moritz College of Law; the Center for the Study of Constitutional Originalism at the University of San Diego School of Law; the George Washington University Law School’s faculty lunch workshop series; the Federalist Society’s Junior Scholars Colloquium; and the Georgetown Law Fellows Collaborative. Particular thanks for helpful comments and conversations are due to Aditya Bamzai, Randy Barnett, Will Baude, Bill Buzbee, Jud Campbell, Shon Hopwood, Greg Maggs, Dina Mishra, Jonathan Mitchell, Stephen Mouritsen, Eloise Pasachoff, James Phillips, Richard Re, Matt Shapiro, Ryan Scoville, Jonathan Siegel, Larry Solum, Seth Barrett Tillman, and Robin West. I am also grateful for excellent research assistance from Daniel Shapiro. Who Are “Officers of the United States”? 70 STAN. L. REV. 443 (2018) 444 a critical mechanism for democratic accountability and transparency inherent
{"title":"Who are 'Officers of the United States'?","authors":"Jennifer L. Mascott","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2918952","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2918952","url":null,"abstract":"For decades courts have believed that only officials with “significant authority” are “Officers of the United States” subject to the Constitution’s Article II Appointments Clause requirements. But this standard has proved difficult to apply to major categories of officials. This Article examines whether “significant authority” is even the proper standard, at least as that standard has been applied in modern practice. To uncover whether the modern understanding of the term “officer” is consistent with the term’s original public meaning, this Article uses two distinctive tools: (i) corpus linguistics-style analysis of Founding-era documents and (ii) examination of appointment practices during the First Congress following constitutional ratification. Both suggest that the original public meaning of “officer” is much broader than modern doctrine assumes— encompassing any government official with responsibility for an ongoing governmental duty. This historic meaning of “officer” would likely extend to thousands of officials not currently appointed as Article II officers, such as tax collectors, disaster relief officials, customs officials, and administrative judges. This conclusion might at first seem destructive to the civil service structure because it would involve redesignating these officials as Article II officers—not employees outside the scope of Article II’s requirements. But this Article suggests that core components of the current federal hiring system might fairly readily be brought into compliance with Article II by amending who exercises final approval to rank and hire candidates. These feasible but significant changes would restore * Assistant Professor of Law, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University. Earlier drafts of this article were written as an Olin-Searle Fellow in Law affiliated with Georgetown University Law Center and the George Washington University Law School. This article benefited from feedback received during presentations at Northwestern’s Public Law Colloquium; the Administrative Law New Scholarship Roundtable hosted by the Ohio State University Moritz College of Law; the Center for the Study of Constitutional Originalism at the University of San Diego School of Law; the George Washington University Law School’s faculty lunch workshop series; the Federalist Society’s Junior Scholars Colloquium; and the Georgetown Law Fellows Collaborative. Particular thanks for helpful comments and conversations are due to Aditya Bamzai, Randy Barnett, Will Baude, Bill Buzbee, Jud Campbell, Shon Hopwood, Greg Maggs, Dina Mishra, Jonathan Mitchell, Stephen Mouritsen, Eloise Pasachoff, James Phillips, Richard Re, Matt Shapiro, Ryan Scoville, Jonathan Siegel, Larry Solum, Seth Barrett Tillman, and Robin West. I am also grateful for excellent research assistance from Daniel Shapiro. Who Are “Officers of the United States”? 70 STAN. L. REV. 443 (2018) 444 a critical mechanism for democratic accountability and transparency inherent","PeriodicalId":51386,"journal":{"name":"Stanford Law Review","volume":"70 1","pages":"443"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2017-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2139/SSRN.2918952","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41971091","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Understanding the precedential significance of Supreme Court plurality decisions is a task that has long confounded the judges of the lower courts. Surprisingly, the Supreme Court has offered little direct guidance on this question apart from a single sentence in Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977), which instructed that where the Justices fail to converge on a single majority rationale, “the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.” But this single, cryptic directive from a decision handed down nearly four decades ago offers little meaningful guidance to lower courts struggling to apply the “narrowest-grounds” rule to the Court’s fractured majority opinions.This Article suggests a new approach to plurality precedent that focuses on connecting the lower courts’ precedential obligations to the actual majority agreements among the Justices from which plurality decisions result. The defining feature of a plurality decision is the agreement among a majority of Justices on the appropriate judgment in a particular case without corresponding majority agreement on the reasons why that judgment was correct. As such, the judgment provides the natural focal point for determining the lower courts’ precedential obligations. By focusing on the precedent Court’s judgment and the respective rationales for that judgment endorsed by the various factions of concurring Justices, lower courts can identify a universe of subsequent cases that are sufficiently “like” the precedent case to demand consistent treatment — namely, those cases in which each of the judgment-supportive rationales would compel the same result. This approach identifies a class of future results that lower courts will be bound to reach in future cases without constraining them to follow a rationale that was endorsed by only a minority faction on the Court. The approach thus promises to constrain lower courts’ decision-making to some extent while identifying a domain of bounded discretion in which such courts remain free to continue working through for themselves the complicated legal questions that the Court was unable to answer definitively in the original plurality decision.
理解最高法院多数裁决的先例意义是一项长期困扰下级法院法官的任务。令人惊讶的是,最高法院在这个问题上几乎没有提供任何直接指导,除了在Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188(1977)一案中的一句话,该句指出,如果法官们未能在单一的多数理由上达成一致,“最高法院的裁决可以被视为那些以最狭隘的理由同意判决的法官所采取的立场。”但是,这一来自近40年前的一项判决的单一的、含糊的指令,对努力将“最窄理由”规则应用于法院分裂的多数意见的下级法院来说,几乎没有提供任何有意义的指导。本文提出了一种新的“多数判例”方法,其重点是将下级法院的判例义务与大法官之间的实际多数协议联系起来,从而产生“多数裁决”。多数裁决的决定性特征是,多数法官就某一特定案件的适当判决达成一致意见,而没有就该判决正确的理由达成相应的多数一致意见。因此,该判决为确定下级法院的判例义务提供了自然的焦点。通过关注最高法院的判决以及各派持相同意见的法官所支持的判决的各自理由,下级法院可以确定一系列与最高法院判例足够“相似”的后续案件,从而要求一致的处理——也就是说,在这些案件中,每一个支持判决的理由都会导致相同的结果。这种方法确定了下级法院在未来的案件中必然会得出的一类未来结果,而不会限制它们遵循只有最高法院少数派系支持的理由。因此,这种做法有望在一定程度上限制下级法院的决策,同时确定一个有限自由裁量权的领域,在这个领域中,这些法院仍然可以自由地继续自己解决法院在最初的多数决定中无法明确回答的复杂法律问题。
{"title":"Questioning Marks: Plurality Decisions and Precedential Constraint","authors":"Ryan C. Williams","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2798738","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2798738","url":null,"abstract":"Understanding the precedential significance of Supreme Court plurality decisions is a task that has long confounded the judges of the lower courts. Surprisingly, the Supreme Court has offered little direct guidance on this question apart from a single sentence in Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977), which instructed that where the Justices fail to converge on a single majority rationale, “the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.” But this single, cryptic directive from a decision handed down nearly four decades ago offers little meaningful guidance to lower courts struggling to apply the “narrowest-grounds” rule to the Court’s fractured majority opinions.This Article suggests a new approach to plurality precedent that focuses on connecting the lower courts’ precedential obligations to the actual majority agreements among the Justices from which plurality decisions result. The defining feature of a plurality decision is the agreement among a majority of Justices on the appropriate judgment in a particular case without corresponding majority agreement on the reasons why that judgment was correct. As such, the judgment provides the natural focal point for determining the lower courts’ precedential obligations. By focusing on the precedent Court’s judgment and the respective rationales for that judgment endorsed by the various factions of concurring Justices, lower courts can identify a universe of subsequent cases that are sufficiently “like” the precedent case to demand consistent treatment — namely, those cases in which each of the judgment-supportive rationales would compel the same result. This approach identifies a class of future results that lower courts will be bound to reach in future cases without constraining them to follow a rationale that was endorsed by only a minority faction on the Court. The approach thus promises to constrain lower courts’ decision-making to some extent while identifying a domain of bounded discretion in which such courts remain free to continue working through for themselves the complicated legal questions that the Court was unable to answer definitively in the original plurality decision.","PeriodicalId":51386,"journal":{"name":"Stanford Law Review","volume":"10 1","pages":"795"},"PeriodicalIF":4.9,"publicationDate":"2016-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68333256","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2016-05-20Epub Date: 2016-04-05DOI: 10.1074/jbc.M116.726968
Swati Dey, Agnieszka Sidor, Brian O'Rourke
Oxidative stress arises from an imbalance in the production and scavenging rates of reactive oxygen species (ROS) and is a key factor in the pathophysiology of cardiovascular disease and aging. The presence of parallel pathways and multiple intracellular compartments, each having its own ROS sources and antioxidant enzymes, complicates the determination of the most important regulatory nodes of the redox network. Here we quantified ROS dynamics within specific intracellular compartments in the cytosol and mitochondria and determined which scavenging enzymes exert the most control over antioxidant fluxes in H9c2 cardiac myoblasts. We used novel targeted viral gene transfer vectors expressing redox-sensitive GFP fused to sensor domains to measure H2O2 or oxidized glutathione. Using genetic manipulation in heart-derived H9c2 cells, we explored the contribution of specific antioxidant enzymes to ROS scavenging and glutathione redox potential within each intracellular compartment. Our findings reveal that antioxidant flux is strongly dependent on mitochondrial substrate catabolism, with availability of NADPH as a major rate-controlling step. Moreover, ROS scavenging by mitochondria significantly contributes to cytoplasmic ROS handling. The findings provide fundamental information about the control of ROS scavenging by the redox network and suggest novel interventions for circumventing oxidative stress in cardiac cells.
{"title":"Compartment-specific Control of Reactive Oxygen Species Scavenging by Antioxidant Pathway Enzymes.","authors":"Swati Dey, Agnieszka Sidor, Brian O'Rourke","doi":"10.1074/jbc.M116.726968","DOIUrl":"10.1074/jbc.M116.726968","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Oxidative stress arises from an imbalance in the production and scavenging rates of reactive oxygen species (ROS) and is a key factor in the pathophysiology of cardiovascular disease and aging. The presence of parallel pathways and multiple intracellular compartments, each having its own ROS sources and antioxidant enzymes, complicates the determination of the most important regulatory nodes of the redox network. Here we quantified ROS dynamics within specific intracellular compartments in the cytosol and mitochondria and determined which scavenging enzymes exert the most control over antioxidant fluxes in H9c2 cardiac myoblasts. We used novel targeted viral gene transfer vectors expressing redox-sensitive GFP fused to sensor domains to measure H2O2 or oxidized glutathione. Using genetic manipulation in heart-derived H9c2 cells, we explored the contribution of specific antioxidant enzymes to ROS scavenging and glutathione redox potential within each intracellular compartment. Our findings reveal that antioxidant flux is strongly dependent on mitochondrial substrate catabolism, with availability of NADPH as a major rate-controlling step. Moreover, ROS scavenging by mitochondria significantly contributes to cytoplasmic ROS handling. The findings provide fundamental information about the control of ROS scavenging by the redox network and suggest novel interventions for circumventing oxidative stress in cardiac cells. </p>","PeriodicalId":51386,"journal":{"name":"Stanford Law Review","volume":"22 1","pages":"11185-97"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2016-05-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4900267/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90212267","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}