A Note on the Existence of the Competitive Equilibrium in

IF 0.3 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS B E Journal of Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2021-08-25 DOI:10.1515/bejte-2021-0013
Anthony Creane
{"title":"A Note on the Existence of the Competitive Equilibrium in","authors":"Anthony Creane","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2021-0013","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In their seminal paper, Grossman, G. M., and C. Shapiro. 1984. “Informative Advertising with Differentiated Products.” The Review of Economic Studies 51: 63–81 assume that it is not profitable for a firm to deviate to the supercompetitive price of Salop, S. C. 1979. “Monopolistic Competition with outside Goods.” The Bell Journal of Economics 10: 141–56. In this note, it is shown that this assumption is violated if, roughly, each firm reaches less than half of all consumers unless it is a duopoly. This implies that most of the simulations in Grossman, G. M., and C. Shapiro. 1984. “Informative Advertising with Differentiated Products.” The Review of Economic Studies 51: 63–81 are not actually equilibria. More importantly, this implies that for their equilibrium to exist nearly all consumers must receive at least one ad. For example, with just four firms in the market, at least 96% of the consumers must receive at least one ad, and this percentage increases with the number of firms in the market.","PeriodicalId":44773,"journal":{"name":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":"22 1","pages":"629 - 647"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2021-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2021-0013","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

Abstract In their seminal paper, Grossman, G. M., and C. Shapiro. 1984. “Informative Advertising with Differentiated Products.” The Review of Economic Studies 51: 63–81 assume that it is not profitable for a firm to deviate to the supercompetitive price of Salop, S. C. 1979. “Monopolistic Competition with outside Goods.” The Bell Journal of Economics 10: 141–56. In this note, it is shown that this assumption is violated if, roughly, each firm reaches less than half of all consumers unless it is a duopoly. This implies that most of the simulations in Grossman, G. M., and C. Shapiro. 1984. “Informative Advertising with Differentiated Products.” The Review of Economic Studies 51: 63–81 are not actually equilibria. More importantly, this implies that for their equilibrium to exist nearly all consumers must receive at least one ad. For example, with just four firms in the market, at least 96% of the consumers must receive at least one ad, and this percentage increases with the number of firms in the market.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
论竞争均衡的存在性
格罗斯曼,G. M.和C.夏皮罗在他们的开创性论文中。“差异化产品的信息性广告。”《经济研究评论》第51期:63-81期假设企业偏离Salop, s.c. 1979年的超竞争性价格是无利可图的。"与外部商品的垄断竞争"《贝尔经济学杂志》10:141-56。在这篇文章中,我们发现,除非是双寡头垄断,否则如果每个公司的服务不到所有消费者的一半,这个假设就被违反了。这意味着格罗斯曼,g.m.和C.夏皮罗1984年的大多数模拟。“差异化产品的信息性广告。”经济研究评论51:63-81实际上并不是均衡。更重要的是,这意味着他们的均衡存在,几乎所有的消费者必须至少收到一个广告。例如,市场上只有四家公司,至少96%的消费者必须至少收到一个广告,这个比例随着市场上公司的数量而增加。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
0.80
自引率
25.00%
发文量
25
期刊介绍: We welcome submissions in all areas of economic theory, both applied theory and \"pure\" theory. Contributions can be either innovations in economic theory or rigorous new applications of existing theory. Pure theory papers include, but are by no means limited to, those in behavioral economics and decision theory, game theory, general equilibrium theory, and the theory of economic mechanisms. Applications could encompass, but are by no means limited to, contract theory, public finance, financial economics, industrial organization, law and economics, and labor economics.
期刊最新文献
Financial and Operational Creditors in Bankruptcy Resolution: A General Equilibrium Approach Under Three Game-Theoretic Division Rules with an Application to India A Note on a Moment Inequality A Note on a Moment Inequality Technology Adoption under Negative External Effects Management Centrality in Sequential Bargaining: Implications for Strategic Delegation, Welfare, and Stakeholder Conflict
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1