Knowledge, Awareness and Probabilistic Beliefs

IF 0.3 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS B E Journal of Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2021-02-17 DOI:10.1515/BEJTE-2019-0014
Tomasz Sadzik
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

Abstract Bayesian game theory investigates strategic interaction of players with full awareness but incomplete information about their environment. We extend the analysis to players with incomplete awareness, who might not be able to reason about all contingencies in the first place. We develop three logical systems for knowledge, probabilistic beliefs and awareness, and characterize their axiom systems. Bayesian equilibrium is extended to games with incomplete awareness and we show that it is consistent with common prior and speculative trade, when common knowledge of rationality is violated.
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知识、意识和概率信念
摘要贝叶斯博弈论研究了对环境有充分认识但信息不完整的玩家的战略互动。我们将分析扩展到意识不完全的玩家,他们可能一开始就无法对所有突发事件进行推理。我们为知识、概率信念和意识开发了三个逻辑系统,并描述了它们的公理系统。将贝叶斯均衡扩展到具有不完全意识的博弈,我们证明了当理性的常识被违反时,它与一般先验和投机交易是一致的。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.80
自引率
25.00%
发文量
25
期刊介绍: We welcome submissions in all areas of economic theory, both applied theory and \"pure\" theory. Contributions can be either innovations in economic theory or rigorous new applications of existing theory. Pure theory papers include, but are by no means limited to, those in behavioral economics and decision theory, game theory, general equilibrium theory, and the theory of economic mechanisms. Applications could encompass, but are by no means limited to, contract theory, public finance, financial economics, industrial organization, law and economics, and labor economics.
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