Suppression by Stealth: The Partisan Response to Protest in State Legislatures

IF 4.1 2区社会学 Q1 POLITICAL SCIENCE Politics & Society Pub Date : 2021-09-17 DOI:10.1177/00323292211039956

Chan S Suh, S. Tarrow

引用次数: 2

Abstract

Many scholars have investigated the relationship between protest and repression. Less often examined is the legislative suppression of protest by elites seeking to make protest more costly to protesters. Because state legislatures are largely invisible to the public, this “wholesale” suppression of protest is less likely to trigger public opposition than repression by the police. This study explains the sharp increase in the number and the severity of state legislative bills to repress the right to protest both before and after the election of Donald Trump. In particular, it examines whether these can be attributed either to Republican control of state legislatures or to protest threat. Contrary to the findings in much of the literature, bills aimed at suppressing protest are less closely related to threat than to the realignment of state politics. The article also finds that these proposals were influenced by diffusion through policy brokerage.

查看原文

微信好友朋友圈 QQ好友复制链接

本刊更多论文

秘密镇压：党派对州议会抗议的回应

许多学者研究了抗议和镇压之间的关系。较少被审查的是，精英们通过立法压制抗议，试图让抗议者付出更大的代价。由于州立法机构在很大程度上不为公众所知，这种对抗议的“大规模”镇压比警察的镇压更不可能引发公众的反对。这项研究解释了在唐纳德·特朗普当选前后，压制抗议权利的州立法法案数量和严重程度的急剧增加。特别是，它研究了这些是否可以归因于共和党控制州立法机构或抗议威胁。与许多文献的发现相反，旨在镇压抗议的法案与威胁的关系不如与国家政治的重组密切。本文还发现，这些建议受到政策中介扩散的影响。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

求助全文

约1分钟内获得全文去求助

来源期刊

Politics & Society Multiple-

CiteScore

5.00

自引率

4.20%

发文量

期刊介绍： Politics & Society is a peer-reviewed journal. All submitted papers are read by a rotating editorial board member. If a paper is deemed potentially publishable, it is sent to another board member, who, if agreeing that it is potentially publishable, sends it to a third board member. If and only if all three agree, the paper is sent to the entire editorial board for consideration at board meetings. The editorial board meets three times a year, and the board members who are present (usually between 9 and 14) make decisions through a deliberative process that also considers written reports from absent members. Unlike many journals which rely on 1–3 individual blind referee reports and a single editor with final say, the peers who decide whether to accept submitted work are thus the full editorial board of the journal, comprised of scholars from various disciplines, who discuss papers openly, with author names known, at meetings. Editors are required to disclose potential conflicts of interest when evaluating manuscripts and to recuse themselves from voting if such a potential exists.

期刊最新文献

Bringing Household Finance Back In: House Prices and the Missing Macroeconomics of Comparative Political Economy Who Pays for Environmental Policy? Business Power and the Design of State-Level Climate Policies* Supervising Local Cadres in China: The Quest for Authoritarian Accountability Rethinking Antitrust for the Cloud Era Antitrust and Equal Liberty