Pub Date : 2023-10-17DOI: 10.1177/00323292231201480
James D. G. Wood, Engelbert Stockhammer
This article makes a key contribution to the comparative political economy literature by accounting for the macroeconomic role of household finance. Based on post-Keynesian theories of finance and the financialization literature, we place house prices and mortgage credit squarely at the center of the macroeconomy, as speculative house price cycles can facilitate homeowner consumption via the use of equity release mortgages. Through an econometric evaluation of eighteen advanced economies from 1980 to 2019, we demonstrate that household debt is determined by house price inflation, and that rising household debt contributes to GDP growth, while business debt has negative growth effects. These results are consistent across countries with different growth models and financial systems. This suggests that the varieties of capitalism's focus on corporate finance is misplaced and that the growth models approach needs a theory of house prices, mortgage credit, and financial cycles to adequately conceptualize how debt-driven growth operates across advanced economies.
{"title":"Bringing Household Finance Back In: House Prices and the Missing Macroeconomics of Comparative Political Economy","authors":"James D. G. Wood, Engelbert Stockhammer","doi":"10.1177/00323292231201480","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00323292231201480","url":null,"abstract":"This article makes a key contribution to the comparative political economy literature by accounting for the macroeconomic role of household finance. Based on post-Keynesian theories of finance and the financialization literature, we place house prices and mortgage credit squarely at the center of the macroeconomy, as speculative house price cycles can facilitate homeowner consumption via the use of equity release mortgages. Through an econometric evaluation of eighteen advanced economies from 1980 to 2019, we demonstrate that household debt is determined by house price inflation, and that rising household debt contributes to GDP growth, while business debt has negative growth effects. These results are consistent across countries with different growth models and financial systems. This suggests that the varieties of capitalism's focus on corporate finance is misplaced and that the growth models approach needs a theory of house prices, mortgage credit, and financial cycles to adequately conceptualize how debt-driven growth operates across advanced economies.","PeriodicalId":47847,"journal":{"name":"Politics & Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135994113","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-11DOI: 10.1177/00323292231196635
Meixi Zhuang
This article examines the compatibility of authoritarianism and accountability through groundbreaking research on citizen supervision of local state agents, a novel form of accountability politics that has been underway in China for a decade. Based on an in-depth political ethnography of the Citizen Monitoring Organization in Wenzhou, this article examines how the authoritarian instrument that produces relations of domination can be turned into a bonanza for public accountability. The article demonstrates that local leaders may encourage citizens to help restrain the exercise of power in the lower state echelons when agent malfeasance is considered a threat to local leaders' career advancement. This opportunity structure leads to the mechanism of “state-backed supervision”: enlisted citizen participants draw on the delegated and entitled authority of the state to demand accountability from local state agents. Examining the logic, dynamics, limitations, and outcomes of state-backed supervision, this article identifies a novel pathway to accountability in authoritarianism.
{"title":"Supervising Local Cadres in China: The Quest for Authoritarian Accountability","authors":"Meixi Zhuang","doi":"10.1177/00323292231196635","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00323292231196635","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the compatibility of authoritarianism and accountability through groundbreaking research on citizen supervision of local state agents, a novel form of accountability politics that has been underway in China for a decade. Based on an in-depth political ethnography of the Citizen Monitoring Organization in Wenzhou, this article examines how the authoritarian instrument that produces relations of domination can be turned into a bonanza for public accountability. The article demonstrates that local leaders may encourage citizens to help restrain the exercise of power in the lower state echelons when agent malfeasance is considered a threat to local leaders' career advancement. This opportunity structure leads to the mechanism of “state-backed supervision”: enlisted citizen participants draw on the delegated and entitled authority of the state to demand accountability from local state agents. Examining the logic, dynamics, limitations, and outcomes of state-backed supervision, this article identifies a novel pathway to accountability in authoritarianism.","PeriodicalId":47847,"journal":{"name":"Politics & Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136024453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-11DOI: 10.1177/00323292231195184
Joshua A. Basseches
To what extent and through which means do private actors shape public policy? Research into these questions has been complicated by actors’ tendency to obscure or misrepresent their policy preferences and by the difficulty of operationalizing policy substance. This theory-building study uses qualitative methods and triangulation of multiple sources of evidence to mitigate these challenges. Confronted with puzzling patterns of variation in the design of state-level climate and renewable energy policies, I show how a two-dimensional framework attentive to the economically motivated preferences of business actors explains policy design. Drawing on policy texts, archival documents, and 111 policy-focused interviews, I find business preferences were fragmented, but that a single type of private actor, investor-owned utilities, ultimately prevailed in achieving their preferences in every case. I theorize the sources of their unmatched influence, and find that their distinctiveness is precisely what makes them powerful. My findings have implications for the study of business power and understanding obstacles to equitable climate policymaking.
{"title":"Who Pays for Environmental Policy? Business Power and the Design of State-Level Climate Policies*","authors":"Joshua A. Basseches","doi":"10.1177/00323292231195184","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00323292231195184","url":null,"abstract":"To what extent and through which means do private actors shape public policy? Research into these questions has been complicated by actors’ tendency to obscure or misrepresent their policy preferences and by the difficulty of operationalizing policy substance. This theory-building study uses qualitative methods and triangulation of multiple sources of evidence to mitigate these challenges. Confronted with puzzling patterns of variation in the design of state-level climate and renewable energy policies, I show how a two-dimensional framework attentive to the economically motivated preferences of business actors explains policy design. Drawing on policy texts, archival documents, and 111 policy-focused interviews, I find business preferences were fragmented, but that a single type of private actor, investor-owned utilities, ultimately prevailed in achieving their preferences in every case. I theorize the sources of their unmatched influence, and find that their distinctiveness is precisely what makes them powerful. My findings have implications for the study of business power and understanding obstacles to equitable climate policymaking.","PeriodicalId":47847,"journal":{"name":"Politics & Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136024446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-25DOI: 10.1177/00323292231183806
G. Berk, A. Saxenian
This article asks how antitrust can foster innovation by examining the development of infrastructure for data processing in the cloud. We contrast Amazon Web Services' centralized model with Google Cloud Platform's more decentralized, participatory ecosystem. We argue that rather than trying to reduce the power imbalance between platforms and independent database companies, antitrust should seek to channel platforms from the centralized model toward the decentralized ecosystem by (1) making partnership more attractive than mergers and (2) enlisting open-source foundations to help manage interoperability in the cloud. This requires breaking down the silos between competition, technology, and industrial policy.
{"title":"Rethinking Antitrust for the Cloud Era","authors":"G. Berk, A. Saxenian","doi":"10.1177/00323292231183806","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00323292231183806","url":null,"abstract":"This article asks how antitrust can foster innovation by examining the development of infrastructure for data processing in the cloud. We contrast Amazon Web Services' centralized model with Google Cloud Platform's more decentralized, participatory ecosystem. We argue that rather than trying to reduce the power imbalance between platforms and independent database companies, antitrust should seek to channel platforms from the centralized model toward the decentralized ecosystem by (1) making partnership more attractive than mergers and (2) enlisting open-source foundations to help manage interoperability in the cloud. This requires breaking down the silos between competition, technology, and industrial policy.","PeriodicalId":47847,"journal":{"name":"Politics & Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2023-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45911669","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-18DOI: 10.1177/00323292231183825
Kate Jackson
As Robert Bork once asserted, “Antitrust policy cannot be made rational until we are able to give a firm answer to one question: What is the point of the law—what are its goals? Everything else follows from the answer we give.” The appropriate answer, however, is not, as Bork suggested, consumer welfare. Instead, antitrust should serve the equal liberties that citizens give themselves when they engage in economic activity. Given the complexity and interconnectivity of the economy, however, the deliberations in which citizens and policymakers engage will produce a messy cacophony. While leaving the precise content and scope of citizens’ equal liberties open, this article provides a cognitive framework that should nevertheless prove useful as they make sense of the noise. It explains that while business can claim associational freedoms, those freedoms challenge the autonomy of rights of corporate insiders and outsiders alike and should be constrained accordingly. Indeed, this is how citizens have historically understood antitrust—and they can and should do so again.
{"title":"Antitrust and Equal Liberty","authors":"Kate Jackson","doi":"10.1177/00323292231183825","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00323292231183825","url":null,"abstract":"As Robert Bork once asserted, “Antitrust policy cannot be made rational until we are able to give a firm answer to one question: What is the point of the law—what are its goals? Everything else follows from the answer we give.” The appropriate answer, however, is not, as Bork suggested, consumer welfare. Instead, antitrust should serve the equal liberties that citizens give themselves when they engage in economic activity. Given the complexity and interconnectivity of the economy, however, the deliberations in which citizens and policymakers engage will produce a messy cacophony. While leaving the precise content and scope of citizens’ equal liberties open, this article provides a cognitive framework that should nevertheless prove useful as they make sense of the noise. It explains that while business can claim associational freedoms, those freedoms challenge the autonomy of rights of corporate insiders and outsiders alike and should be constrained accordingly. Indeed, this is how citizens have historically understood antitrust—and they can and should do so again.","PeriodicalId":47847,"journal":{"name":"Politics & Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2023-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43785898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-18DOI: 10.1177/00323292231183834
Steve Vogel
This essay conceptualizes market governance as a balance of power and discusses the implications for current debates over antitrust policy. This framework offers a way to interpret and evaluate the “neo-Brandeisian” school that views concentrated market power as a threat to democracy as well as to economic goals, such as productivity and innovation. It suggests that the government can deploy antitrust policy to alter the balance of power to promote the public welfare without necessarily impeding competition or otherwise distorting markets. And antitrust policies that constrain market power can have the double benefit of making both markets and politics more competitive.
{"title":"Market Governance as a Balance of Power","authors":"Steve Vogel","doi":"10.1177/00323292231183834","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00323292231183834","url":null,"abstract":"This essay conceptualizes market governance as a balance of power and discusses the implications for current debates over antitrust policy. This framework offers a way to interpret and evaluate the “neo-Brandeisian” school that views concentrated market power as a threat to democracy as well as to economic goals, such as productivity and innovation. It suggests that the government can deploy antitrust policy to alter the balance of power to promote the public welfare without necessarily impeding competition or otherwise distorting markets. And antitrust policies that constrain market power can have the double benefit of making both markets and politics more competitive.","PeriodicalId":47847,"journal":{"name":"Politics & Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2023-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49622927","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-16DOI: 10.1177/00323292231183818
Brian Callaci
The labor movement has long had an ambivalent relationship to antitrust policy in the United States. Trade unionists have considered concentrated markets to be more favorable environments for union power than decentralized markets: oligopoly demands fewer union resources for organizing and contract bargaining campaigns, and oligopolists can tame cutthroat competition and share product market rents with workers. This article takes a different view. Looking to the strategies employed by unions in decentralized industries, where unions rather than corporations took on the role of taming and regulating competition, it explains how unions have leveraged power over market governance into bargaining power over wages and working conditions. In the current age of vertical disintegration and fissured workplaces, union power over market governance is more important to shop-floor power than ever. Antitrust policy is one tool that can help restrain the power of corporations and make them more accountable to workers’ collective power.
{"title":"Labor Unions and the Problem of Monopoly: Collective Bargaining and Market Governance, 1890 to the Present","authors":"Brian Callaci","doi":"10.1177/00323292231183818","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00323292231183818","url":null,"abstract":"The labor movement has long had an ambivalent relationship to antitrust policy in the United States. Trade unionists have considered concentrated markets to be more favorable environments for union power than decentralized markets: oligopoly demands fewer union resources for organizing and contract bargaining campaigns, and oligopolists can tame cutthroat competition and share product market rents with workers. This article takes a different view. Looking to the strategies employed by unions in decentralized industries, where unions rather than corporations took on the role of taming and regulating competition, it explains how unions have leveraged power over market governance into bargaining power over wages and working conditions. In the current age of vertical disintegration and fissured workplaces, union power over market governance is more important to shop-floor power than ever. Antitrust policy is one tool that can help restrain the power of corporations and make them more accountable to workers’ collective power.","PeriodicalId":47847,"journal":{"name":"Politics & Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2023-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48003259","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-04DOI: 10.1177/00323292231183805
Samuel Bagg
The growing movement seeking to revive an aggressive, “neo-Brandeisian” approach to antitrust policy sees it partly as a way of protecting democracy against concentrated economic power. Yet on closer inspection, prevailing theories of democracy as collective decision making offer weak support, at best, for a neo-Brandeisian approach. Rather than abandoning the insight that an aggressive approach to antitrust can help protect democracy, however, this essay argues that we should adjust our theories of democracy to accommodate it. I first show why prevailing accounts are ill suited to explaining the democratic virtues of a neo-Brandeisian approach. I then outline an alternative ideal of democracy—defended in greater detail elsewhere—and draw out its implications for antitrust. While vindicating the intuition that aggressive antitrust policy serves democratic goals, my account also incorporates genuine worries about such an approach, and thus enables neo-Brandeisians to reformulate their democratic ambitions in more precise and promising terms.
{"title":"Whose Coordination? Which Democracy? On Antitrust as a Democratic Demand","authors":"Samuel Bagg","doi":"10.1177/00323292231183805","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00323292231183805","url":null,"abstract":"The growing movement seeking to revive an aggressive, “neo-Brandeisian” approach to antitrust policy sees it partly as a way of protecting democracy against concentrated economic power. Yet on closer inspection, prevailing theories of democracy as collective decision making offer weak support, at best, for a neo-Brandeisian approach. Rather than abandoning the insight that an aggressive approach to antitrust can help protect democracy, however, this essay argues that we should adjust our theories of democracy to accommodate it. I first show why prevailing accounts are ill suited to explaining the democratic virtues of a neo-Brandeisian approach. I then outline an alternative ideal of democracy—defended in greater detail elsewhere—and draw out its implications for antitrust. While vindicating the intuition that aggressive antitrust policy serves democratic goals, my account also incorporates genuine worries about such an approach, and thus enables neo-Brandeisians to reformulate their democratic ambitions in more precise and promising terms.","PeriodicalId":47847,"journal":{"name":"Politics & Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2023-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46307145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-29DOI: 10.1177/00323292231168708
Isabelle Ferreras
In the context of capitalist democracies, the contradiction between people's expectations of equality and the subordination they experience at work is intense. I argue that it is the defining experience of the contradiction between capitalism and democracy. Capitalism grants political rights to property owners, while democracy grants political rights to the citizens recognized as equals. They are thus regimes of government that distribute rights in dramatically different ways. This essay is grounded in the understanding that firms are best analyzed as “political entities,” and workers as “labor investors,” and have thus a legitimate right to bear on the government of their work life. Examining the history of how political entities have become democratic through the innovation of bicameralism provides a “real utopia”: economic bicameralism, that is, a set of patterns that may be applied to democratize and transition the corporate firm beyond capitalism.
{"title":"Democratizing the Corporation: The Bicameral Firm as Real Utopia","authors":"Isabelle Ferreras","doi":"10.1177/00323292231168708","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00323292231168708","url":null,"abstract":"In the context of capitalist democracies, the contradiction between people's expectations of equality and the subordination they experience at work is intense. I argue that it is the defining experience of the contradiction between capitalism and democracy. Capitalism grants political rights to property owners, while democracy grants political rights to the citizens recognized as equals. They are thus regimes of government that distribute rights in dramatically different ways. This essay is grounded in the understanding that firms are best analyzed as “political entities,” and workers as “labor investors,” and have thus a legitimate right to bear on the government of their work life. Examining the history of how political entities have become democratic through the innovation of bicameralism provides a “real utopia”: economic bicameralism, that is, a set of patterns that may be applied to democratize and transition the corporate firm beyond capitalism.","PeriodicalId":47847,"journal":{"name":"Politics & Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2023-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46743866","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-25DOI: 10.1177/00323292231164247
S. Pinto
In conversation with Ferreras’s proposal for economic bicameralism, the current article makes the case for a more direct confrontation between conceptions of economic democracy and the realities of racial capitalism. In particular, it considers how efforts to expand power and voice for workers must contend with the racial hierarchy that marks the socioeconomic division of labor and the related use of racial distinctions to thwart labor solidarity. Focusing on the American context, the argument draws inspiration from the work and vision of two key figures in the unfinished struggle for Black liberation, W. E. B. Du Bois and Fannie Lou Hamer. After recapping core elements of Ferreras’s proposal, the article briefly examines the historical evolution of racial capitalism, starting with its roots in slavery and conquest. It then considers how movements agitating for greater worker power have intervened within this landscape. Against this backdrop, it draws lessons for how economic bicameralism might fit within a broader set of struggles that challenge racial capitalism as it exists today.
{"title":"Economic Democracy against Racial Capitalism: Seeding Freedom","authors":"S. Pinto","doi":"10.1177/00323292231164247","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00323292231164247","url":null,"abstract":"In conversation with Ferreras’s proposal for economic bicameralism, the current article makes the case for a more direct confrontation between conceptions of economic democracy and the realities of racial capitalism. In particular, it considers how efforts to expand power and voice for workers must contend with the racial hierarchy that marks the socioeconomic division of labor and the related use of racial distinctions to thwart labor solidarity. Focusing on the American context, the argument draws inspiration from the work and vision of two key figures in the unfinished struggle for Black liberation, W. E. B. Du Bois and Fannie Lou Hamer. After recapping core elements of Ferreras’s proposal, the article briefly examines the historical evolution of racial capitalism, starting with its roots in slavery and conquest. It then considers how movements agitating for greater worker power have intervened within this landscape. Against this backdrop, it draws lessons for how economic bicameralism might fit within a broader set of struggles that challenge racial capitalism as it exists today.","PeriodicalId":47847,"journal":{"name":"Politics & Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2023-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41626707","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：