Schaffer, Sherlock and Shaddai

IF 1.1 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Pub Date : 2023-04-19 DOI:10.1093/pq/pqad044
Hezki Symonds
{"title":"Schaffer, Sherlock and Shaddai","authors":"Hezki Symonds","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad044","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n According to Schaffer, most of the controversial entities that ontologists debate exist. Schaffer calls this view permissivism and he defends it by appealing to easy arguments for the existence of the entities in question. Schaffer presents several easy arguments, but his easy argument for fictional characters and his easy argument for God play a crucial role in his defence of permissivism. In this paper, I argue that Schaffer doesn’t have the resources to defend his easy argument for fictional characters or his easy argument for God. So, his defence of permissivism fails.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1000,"publicationDate":"2023-04-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad044","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

According to Schaffer, most of the controversial entities that ontologists debate exist. Schaffer calls this view permissivism and he defends it by appealing to easy arguments for the existence of the entities in question. Schaffer presents several easy arguments, but his easy argument for fictional characters and his easy argument for God play a crucial role in his defence of permissivism. In this paper, I argue that Schaffer doesn’t have the resources to defend his easy argument for fictional characters or his easy argument for God. So, his defence of permissivism fails.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
谢弗,夏洛克和莎黛
根据Schaffer的说法,本体论家争论的大多数有争议的实体都存在。Schaffer称这种观点为许可主义,他通过诉诸简单的论据来证明所讨论的实体的存在来为其辩护。谢弗提出了几个简单的论点,但他对虚构人物的简单论点和对上帝的简单论点在他为放纵主义辩护中发挥了至关重要的作用。在这篇论文中,我认为Schaffer没有足够的资源来为他对虚构人物的简单论证或对上帝的简单论证辩护。因此,他对放任主义的辩护是失败的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
1.70
自引率
0.00%
发文量
73
期刊介绍: The Philosophical Quarterly is one of the most highly regarded and established academic journals in philosophy. In an age of increasing specialism, it remains committed to publishing high-quality articles from leading international scholars across the range of philosophical study. Accessibility of its content for all philosophers - including students - is an editorial priority. The Philosophical Quarterly regularly publishes articles, discussions and reviews, and runs an annual Essay Prize. Its distinguished international contributors engage with both the established and the new, for example, through reflection on cognitive psychology, decision theory, quantum mechanics.
期刊最新文献
The Unity of Perceptual Content Talking About: An Intentionalist Theory of Reference A Fitting Definition of Epistemic Emotions Group Responsibility and Historicism Self-Effacing Reasons and Epistemic Constraints: Some Lessons from the Knowability Paradox
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1