An Analysis of the Singapore and Hanoi Denuclearization Summits between the United States and North Korea from a Negotiation Theory Perspective

Abstract

This article analyzed the two summits between United States (U.S.) President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un at Singapore and Hanoi in 2018 and 2019 respectively, from a negotiation theory perspective. The results of the analysis showed that the goals and bottom lines of the negotiation between the U.S. and North Korea were quite opposite to reach a meaningful agreement because the former wanted to dismantle North Korean nuclear weapons while the latter did not. President Trump opted for a hard positional negotiation strategy at the Hanoi summit, unlike the soft positional negotiation strategy he opted at the Singapore summit. However, Kim Jong-un maintained a hard positional strategy throughout the whole process which led to the failure of these summits. When it comes to a “Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement” (BATNA), President Trump did not imply any BATNA before or during the Singapore summit, while Kim demonstrated a new BATNA, i.e. China. However, both leaders did not prepare any BATNA for the Hanoi summit, except for a collapse of the negotiation by the U.S. Both of them depended on a top-down decision-making style throughout the whole negotiations without the working-level officials in the decisions. By analyzing all these, the article found that President Trump did not follow the recommendations that negotiation theorists had suggested for a successful negotiation, failing to achieve any progress on the denuclearization of North Korea.