Two Challenges for Neo-Brandeisian Antitrust

Abstract

Several scholars and policy-makers have proposed a “Neo-Brandeisian” reform of U.S. antitrust law, aimed at reviving “republican” antitrust. Republicanism conceives of domination as inherently detrimental to freedom. Republican antitrust considers antitrust law as an “institution of antipower,” aimed at dispersing economic power. This paper sets out two key challenges to the Neo-Brandeisian reform agenda and argues for legal formalism to address them. First, republicanism would alter the normative justification, but not necessarily the content of antitrust law. Neoclassical antitrust law does not broadly reflect a Schumpeterian endorsement of dominance. Rather, its epistemological priors and methodology entail skepticism about the mere presence of economic power. Thus, mainstream antitrust law and policy remain unfazed by the Neo-Brandeisian claim that antitrust should target domination instead of consumer welfare. Second, Neo-Brandeisian reform proposals are inherently polycentric. How Neo-Brandeisians aim to balance distinct values including the competitive process, the harm of concentrated power, and the protection of democracy and egalitarianism has remained unclear. This paper argues that both challenges demand for a formalistic approach to Neo-Brandeisian antitrust. Compared to a case-by-case approach, adopting general rules through legislative or administrative decision-making may legitimately overturn current precedent, incorporate alternate methods of measuring power and competitive harm, and pursue a variety of republican goals. Neo-Brandeisian formalism would essentially reinvigorate the Harvard school’s insight that multiple purposes—including both efficiency and republican liberty—can be attained by formalistic rules.