Insurance as an Analogue of the Candidates Selection for Sacrifice in the Context of the Problem of Human Sacrifice Universality

Abstract

The problem of human sacrifice universality can be formulated as follows: is a human sacrifice a sociocultural universal and, if so, how can this be proved? One possible approach to solving this problem is to show how human sacrifice is realized in modern societies. The main purpose of this research is to substantiate the assumption that there are contemporary analogues of the candidate’s selection for the role of a human sacrifice. If they exist, this will be an additional argument in favor of the opinion that human sacrifice is universal. The elements of human sacrifice can be spread out in time and space, and also be implemented in a different order than in traditional rituals. The hypothesis was that the selection of candidates for the role of victims in such distributed sacrifice is implemented by life and health insurance. As a research method we used the analysis of possible statistical relationships between mortality and life expectancy of people, on the one hand, and the availability of different types of life and health insurance policies, on the other. Since the mortality rate among the military in active service is higher than among civilians, compulsory life and health insurance for military personnel can be viewed as an analogue of the selection of victims. In the case of civilian victims, the availability of voluntary life and health insurance policies for people is positively correlated with life expectancy, which is presumably associated with better medical care in cases of illness or accident. Voluntary insurance can be viewed as an analogue of negative selection: those not insured have a higher chance of becoming a victim.