Uncertain Outcomes and Climate Change Policy Using an Expo-Power Utility Function

IF 0.3 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS B E Journal of Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2020-11-17 DOI:10.1515/bejte-2020-0009
Jules Sadefo Kamdem, David Akame
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Abstract

Abstract This paper extends the work of Pindyck, R. S. 2012. “Uncertain Outcomes and Climate Change Policy.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 63 (3): 289–303. by taking into consideration a large class of different utility functions of economic agents. As in Pindyck, R. S. 2012. “Uncertain Outcomes and Climate Change Policy.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 63 (3): 289–303, instead of considering a social utility function that is characterized by constant relative risk aversion (C.R.R.A), we use the expo-power utility function of Saha, A. 1993. “Expo-power Utility: A ‘Flexible’ Form for Absolute and Relative Risk Aversion.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 75 (4): 905–13. In fact, depending on the choice of the expo-power utility function parameters, we cover a diverse range of utility functions. Apart from covering the other utility functions that a C.R.R.A omits, the Expo-power utility function permits us to discern if under the other utility-regimes of economic agents, the willingness to pay remains more affected by uncertain outcomes than certain outcomes when we vary the expectation and standard deviation of the temperature’s probability distribution. Our paper has maintained the small-tailed gamma distributions of temperature and economic impact of Pindyck, R. S. 2012. “Uncertain Outcomes and Climate Change Policy.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 63 (3): 289–303. not only because they hinder infinite future welfare losses (for an exponential utility function), but because it is easy to change some moments of the distribution (jointly or holding the others fixed) while studying how uncertainty influences the willingness to pay as explained in Pindyck, R. S. 2012. “Uncertain Outcomes and Climate Change Policy.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 63 (3): 289–303.
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利用世博会电力效用函数的不确定结果和气候变化政策
本文扩展了Pindyck,R.S.2012的工作。“不确定的结果与气候变化政策”,《环境经济学与管理杂志》63(3):289–303。通过考虑经济主体的一大类不同效用函数。如Pindyck,R.S.2012。“不确定结果与气候变化政策”,《环境经济学与管理杂志》63(3):289–303,我们没有考虑以恒定相对风险厌恶为特征的社会效用函数,而是使用了Saha,a.1993的expo功率效用函数。“世博电力效用:绝对和相对风险规避的‘灵活’形式”,《美国农业经济学杂志》75(4):905-13。事实上,根据世博会电力效用函数参数的选择,我们涵盖了各种各样的效用函数。除了涵盖C.R.R.a遗漏的其他效用函数外,世博会电力效用函数还允许我们辨别,在经济主体的其他效用机制下,当我们改变温度概率分布的预期和标准差时,支付意愿是否仍然比某些结果更受不确定结果的影响。我们的论文保持了Pindyck,R.S.2012的温度和经济影响的小尾伽马分布。“不确定的结果与气候变化政策”,《环境经济学与管理杂志》63(3):289–303。这不仅是因为它们阻碍了无限的未来福利损失(对于指数效用函数),还因为在研究不确定性如何影响支付意愿时,很容易改变分布的某些时刻(联合或固定其他时刻),正如Pindyck,R.S.2012中所解释的那样。“不确定的结果与气候变化政策”,《环境经济学与管理杂志》63(3):289–303。
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