Rule Breaking, Bending, and Workarounds: Police Officers and Chiefs’ Coercion-Discretion of Enforcing State Executive Orders

IF 2.2 3区 管理学 Q2 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION Public Performance & Management Review Pub Date : 2023-01-13 DOI:10.1080/15309576.2022.2162940
Étienne Charbonneau, Yves Boisvert, L. Bégin
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Abstract

Abstract This study examines rule non-compliance from police officers and managers who decide not to enforce certain public health edicts and decrees. It examines rule non-compliance from police officers and managers who decide not to enforce certain public health edicts and decrees. The locus of our study is the severity of the consequences for rule non-compliance for citizens. We test to see whether rules with severe punishments for citizens are broken, bent, or worked around by the police more often than expected in Bozeman observations. Thirty-seven police chiefs and managers were interviewed. Sixteen focus groups totaling 149 police officers were held in 15 municipalities in a Canadian province. Non-compliance related to police officers not enforcing 1556 Canadian dollars (US$1260; 1082€) fines was high. This study provides credence that workaround is a flexible concept explaining how discretion is used on the frontlines of public service.
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违反规则,弯曲和变通:警察和酋长的强制-执行国家行政命令的自由裁量权
摘要本研究调查了决定不执行某些公共卫生法令的警察和管理人员的违规行为。它审查了决定不执行某些公共卫生法令的警察和管理人员的违规行为。我们研究的重点是公民不遵守规则的后果的严重性。我们测试了对公民进行严厉惩罚的规则是否比Bozeman观察中预期的更频繁地被警察违反、扭曲或篡改。采访了37名警察局长和管理人员。加拿大一个省的15个市镇举行了16个焦点小组,共149名警察。与警察未执行1556加元(1260美元;1082欧元)罚款有关的违规行为很高。这项研究证明,变通办法是一个灵活的概念,解释了如何在公共服务的前线使用自由裁量权。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.50
自引率
16.10%
发文量
58
期刊介绍: Public Performance & Management Review (PPMR) is a leading peer-reviewed academic journal that addresses a broad array of influential factors on the performance of public and nonprofit organizations. Its objectives are to: Advance theories on public governance, public management, and public performance; Facilitate the development of innovative techniques and to encourage a wider application of those already established; Stimulate research and critical thinking about the relationship between public and private management theories; Present integrated analyses of theories, concepts, strategies, and techniques dealing with performance, measurement, and related questions of organizational efficacy; and Provide a forum for practitioner-academic exchange. Continuing themes include, but are not limited to: managing for results, measuring and evaluating performance, designing accountability systems, improving budget strategies, managing human resources, building partnerships, facilitating citizen participation, applying new technologies, and improving public sector services and outcomes. Published since 1975, Public Performance & Management Review is a highly respected journal, receiving international ranking. Scholars and practitioners recognize it as a leading journal in the field of public administration.
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