{"title":"Regional international organizations in Africa as recipients of foreign aid: Why are some more attractive to donors than others?","authors":"S. Stapel, D. Panke, F. Söderbaum","doi":"10.1177/00108367221147791","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Foreign aid to regional international organizations (RIOs) has increased tremendously in recent decades. The vast differences between RIOs give rise to the question of why some RIOs attract considerable amounts of aid while others attract much less, or even nothing at all. To address that question, this article sets out and examines a set of hypotheses that focus on various characteristics of RIOs that allow donors to reduce transaction costs. Empirically, the analysis proceeds via two steps: the hypotheses are first subjected to an empirical plausibility probe based on quantitative methods and then illustrated based on case study of the Southern African Development Community. The findings reveal that RIOs are most attractive when they operate in a range of policy fields, involve many member-states and are engaged in long-lasting collaborations with donors. By contrast, there is little support for conventional explanations as to why RIOs attract funding – for instance, claims that being democratic, being most in need or providing donors with market access will lead to greater funding. The rather disturbing policy implication is that a small number of RIOs are likely to continue to attract the bulk of funding, whereas poorly funded RIOs are unlikely to attract significant amounts of aid.","PeriodicalId":47286,"journal":{"name":"Cooperation and Conflict","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.9000,"publicationDate":"2023-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Cooperation and Conflict","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00108367221147791","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Abstract
Foreign aid to regional international organizations (RIOs) has increased tremendously in recent decades. The vast differences between RIOs give rise to the question of why some RIOs attract considerable amounts of aid while others attract much less, or even nothing at all. To address that question, this article sets out and examines a set of hypotheses that focus on various characteristics of RIOs that allow donors to reduce transaction costs. Empirically, the analysis proceeds via two steps: the hypotheses are first subjected to an empirical plausibility probe based on quantitative methods and then illustrated based on case study of the Southern African Development Community. The findings reveal that RIOs are most attractive when they operate in a range of policy fields, involve many member-states and are engaged in long-lasting collaborations with donors. By contrast, there is little support for conventional explanations as to why RIOs attract funding – for instance, claims that being democratic, being most in need or providing donors with market access will lead to greater funding. The rather disturbing policy implication is that a small number of RIOs are likely to continue to attract the bulk of funding, whereas poorly funded RIOs are unlikely to attract significant amounts of aid.
期刊介绍:
Published for over 40 years, the aim of Cooperation and Conflict is to promote research on and understanding of international relations. It believes in the deeds of academic pluralism and thus does not represent any specific methodology, approach, tradition or school. The mission of the journal is to meet the demands of the scholarly community having an interest in international studies (for details, see the statement "From the Editors" in Vol. 40, No. 3, September 2005). The editors especially encourage submissions contributing new knowledge of the field and welcome innovative, theory-aware and critical approaches. First preference will continue to be given to articles that have a Nordic and European focus. Cooperation and Conflict strictly adheres to a double-blind reviewing policy.