The Weak Hybrid Equilibria of an Exchange Economy with a Continuum of Agents and Externalities

Abstract

Abstract Inspired by Zhao, J. 1996. “The Hybrid Equilibria and Core Selection in Exchange Economies with Externalities.” Journal of Mathematical Economics 26 (4): 387–407, Askoura, Y. 2011. “The Weak-Core of a Game in Normal Form with a Continuum of Players.” Journal of Mathematical Economics 47: 43–7, Askoura, Y. 2017. “On the Core of Normal Form Games with a Continuum of Players.” Mathematical Social Sciences 89: 32–42, Yang, Z. 2020. “The Weak α-core of Exchange Economies with a Continuum of Players and Pseudo-utilities.” Journal of Mathematical Economies 91: 43–50 and Yang, Z., and X. Zhang. 2021. “A Weak α-core Existence Theorem of Games with Nonordered Preferences and a Continuum of Agents.” Journal of Mathematical Economics 94: 102464, we establish an exchange economy with externalities and a continuum of agents. We define the weak hybrid equilibrium in this model and prove the existence theorem under the regular conditions. Furthermore, we analyze the relation between the set of hybrid equilibria and the set of competitive equilibria in an exchange economy without externalities and with a continuum of agents.