When Can Dictators Go It Alone? Personalization and Oversight in Authoritarian Regimes

IF 4.1 2区社会学 Q1 POLITICAL SCIENCE Politics & Society Pub Date : 2022-03-04 DOI:10.1177/00323292221078661

Andrew Leber, Christopher Carothers, M. Reichert

引用次数: 5

Abstract

Why are some autocrats able to personalize power within their regimes while others are not? Past studies have focused on the balance of power between the autocrat and his or her supporting coalition of peer or subordinate elites, but we find that often the crucial relationship is between the autocrat and the “old guard”—retired leaders, party elders, and other elites of the outgoing generation. Using an original data set of authoritarian leadership transitions, we argue that when members of the old guard retain oversight capacity over their incoming successor, he or she is less likely to overturn power-sharing arrangements and consolidate individual power. We illustrate this argument with a case study of three leadership transitions in China between 1989 and 2012. This study’s findings advance our understanding of elite politics and intergenerational conflict in authoritarian regimes.

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独裁者什么时候可以独当一面？威权体制中的个性化与监督

为什么一些独裁者能够在其政权内个性化权力，而另一些则不然？过去的研究集中在独裁者和他或她支持的同行或下属精英联盟之间的权力平衡上，但我们发现，关键的关系往往是独裁者和“老卫士”——退休领导人、党内元老和其他即将离任的一代精英之间的关系。使用威权领导层过渡的原始数据集，我们认为，当保守派成员保留对即将上任的继任者的监督能力时，他或她推翻权力分享安排和巩固个人权力的可能性较小。我们通过对1989年至2012年间中国三次领导层换届的案例研究来说明这一论点。这项研究的发现促进了我们对独裁政权中精英政治和代际冲突的理解。

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来源期刊

Politics & Society Multiple-

CiteScore

5.00

自引率

4.20%

发文量

期刊介绍： Politics & Society is a peer-reviewed journal. All submitted papers are read by a rotating editorial board member. If a paper is deemed potentially publishable, it is sent to another board member, who, if agreeing that it is potentially publishable, sends it to a third board member. If and only if all three agree, the paper is sent to the entire editorial board for consideration at board meetings. The editorial board meets three times a year, and the board members who are present (usually between 9 and 14) make decisions through a deliberative process that also considers written reports from absent members. Unlike many journals which rely on 1–3 individual blind referee reports and a single editor with final say, the peers who decide whether to accept submitted work are thus the full editorial board of the journal, comprised of scholars from various disciplines, who discuss papers openly, with author names known, at meetings. Editors are required to disclose potential conflicts of interest when evaluating manuscripts and to recuse themselves from voting if such a potential exists.

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