The Dead Hand of Cellophane and the Federal Google and Facebook Antitrust Cases: Market Delineation Will Be Crucial

Q2 Social Sciences Antitrust Bulletin Pub Date : 2022-03-01 DOI:10.1177/0003603X211067709
L. White
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) monopolization cases against Google and Facebook, respectively, represent the most important federal nonmerger antitrust initiatives since (at least) the 1990s. As in any monopolization case, market delineation will be a central feature of both cases—as it was in the du Pont Cellophane case of sixty-five years ago. Without a delineated market, how can one determine whether a company has engaged in monopolization? Unfortunately, there is currently no accepted market delineation paradigm that can help the courts address this issue for monopolization cases. And this void generally cannot be filled by the market delineation paradigm that is embedded in the DOJ-FTC “Horizontal Merger Guidelines”: although this paradigm has had almost forty years of usage and is now well established and well accepted for merger analysis, this paradigm generally has no applicability for market delineation in monopolization cases. This article expands on this argument and shows the potential difficulties that are likely to arise in this area of market delineation and the consequent problems for both cases. This article also points the way toward a paradigm that offers a sensible approach to dealing with these difficulties.
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玻璃纸的死亡之手和联邦bbb和Facebook反垄断案:市场划分将至关重要
美国司法部(DOJ)和联邦贸易委员会(FTC)分别针对谷歌和Facebook的垄断案,代表了(至少)自上世纪90年代以来最重要的联邦非合并反垄断举措。在任何垄断案件中,市场划分都将是这两个案件的核心特征——就像65年前的杜邦玻璃纸案一样。没有一个明确的市场,如何判断一个公司是否从事垄断?不幸的是,目前没有公认的市场界定范式可以帮助法院解决垄断案件中的这一问题。这一空白通常不能被嵌入在司法部和联邦贸易委员会“横向合并指南”中的市场描述范式所填补:尽管这种范式已经使用了近四十年,现在已经很好地建立并被广泛接受用于合并分析,但这种范式通常不适用于垄断案例中的市场描述。本文对这一论点进行了扩展,并展示了在这一市场划分领域可能出现的潜在困难,以及两种情况下随之而来的问题。本文还指出了一个范例的方向,该范例提供了处理这些困难的明智方法。
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来源期刊
Antitrust Bulletin
Antitrust Bulletin Social Sciences-Law
CiteScore
1.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
34
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