How Digitized Strategy Impacts Movement Outcomes: Social Media, Mobilizing, and Organizing in the 2018 Teachers’ Strikes

IF 4.1 2区社会学 Q1 POLITICAL SCIENCE Politics & Society Pub Date : 2021-09-17 DOI:10.1177/00323292211039953

Eric Blanc

引用次数: 3

Abstract

Explaining digital impacts on social movements requires moving beyond technological determinism by addressing two underdeveloped questions: How does political strategy shape the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs)? And how do divergent uses of ICTs influence movement outcomes? This study addresses these questions by examining the 2018 educator walkouts in Oklahoma and Arizona—statewide actions initiated through rank-and-file Facebook groups. To explain why the strike in Arizona was more effective than in Oklahoma, despite more auspicious conditions for success in the latter, this study shows that the impact of ICTs is mediated by leaders’ strategic choices. Whereas Oklahoma’s strike was marked by mobilization without organization—scaling up protest without an organizational foundation—Arizona used digital tools to build, rather than eschew, organization. Digital impacts further depend on the nature of the contentious performance itself, since the efficacy limitations of relying solely on ICTs are particularly pronounced for actions like strikes.

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数字化战略如何影响运动成果：2018年教师罢工中的社交媒体、动员和组织

解释数字对社会运动的影响需要超越技术决定论，解决两个尚未发展的问题：政治战略如何影响信息和通信技术的使用？信息和通信技术的不同用途如何影响运动结果？这项研究通过调查2018年俄克拉荷马州和亚利桑那州的教育工作者罢工来解决这些问题，这些罢工是通过普通Facebook群组发起的全州范围的行动。为了解释为什么亚利桑那州的罢工比俄克拉荷马州的罢工更有效，尽管后者的成功条件更为有利，这项研究表明，信通技术的影响是由领导人的战略选择介导的。俄克拉荷马州的罢工以没有组织的动员为标志，在没有组织基础的情况下扩大抗议活动，而亚利桑那州则使用数字工具来建立而不是回避组织。数字影响进一步取决于有争议的表现本身的性质，因为仅仅依靠信通技术的效力限制在罢工等行动中尤为明显。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Politics & Society Multiple-

CiteScore

5.00

自引率

4.20%

发文量

期刊介绍： Politics & Society is a peer-reviewed journal. All submitted papers are read by a rotating editorial board member. If a paper is deemed potentially publishable, it is sent to another board member, who, if agreeing that it is potentially publishable, sends it to a third board member. If and only if all three agree, the paper is sent to the entire editorial board for consideration at board meetings. The editorial board meets three times a year, and the board members who are present (usually between 9 and 14) make decisions through a deliberative process that also considers written reports from absent members. Unlike many journals which rely on 1–3 individual blind referee reports and a single editor with final say, the peers who decide whether to accept submitted work are thus the full editorial board of the journal, comprised of scholars from various disciplines, who discuss papers openly, with author names known, at meetings. Editors are required to disclose potential conflicts of interest when evaluating manuscripts and to recuse themselves from voting if such a potential exists.

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