{"title":"Can Iqaba Possess Ontological Legitimacy?","authors":"S. Kumalo","doi":"10.5325/critphilrace.11.2.0378","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:In this article I think through the recognition of the “ontological legitimacy” of iqaba—a concept that is found in South Africa, owing to the ontological split among Blackness/Indigeneity that was promulgated by colonial incursion. I do so using the question: “How will black people, long accustomed to dispossession and deprivation, adjust to a new condition of not being racial victims,” which was initially posed by Zoë Wicomb in the early 1990s. It is a question inspired by the end of apartheid and the looming promise of democracy. I juxtapose this question with a close reading of Samuel Edward Krune Mqhayi’s “Intshayelelo: Imbali.” Simply, the thesis of this article holds that iqaba possesses ontological legitimacy, iff [sic] they take heed of the instructions outlined in Mqhayi’s propositions of the importance of historical self-knowledge. Moreover, ontological legitimacy and an inclusive national identity are two sides of the same coin of recognition.","PeriodicalId":43337,"journal":{"name":"Critical Philosophy of Race","volume":"11 1","pages":"378 - 407"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3000,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Critical Philosophy of Race","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5325/critphilrace.11.2.0378","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ETHNIC STUDIES","Score":null,"Total":0}
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Abstract
Abstract:In this article I think through the recognition of the “ontological legitimacy” of iqaba—a concept that is found in South Africa, owing to the ontological split among Blackness/Indigeneity that was promulgated by colonial incursion. I do so using the question: “How will black people, long accustomed to dispossession and deprivation, adjust to a new condition of not being racial victims,” which was initially posed by Zoë Wicomb in the early 1990s. It is a question inspired by the end of apartheid and the looming promise of democracy. I juxtapose this question with a close reading of Samuel Edward Krune Mqhayi’s “Intshayelelo: Imbali.” Simply, the thesis of this article holds that iqaba possesses ontological legitimacy, iff [sic] they take heed of the instructions outlined in Mqhayi’s propositions of the importance of historical self-knowledge. Moreover, ontological legitimacy and an inclusive national identity are two sides of the same coin of recognition.
期刊介绍：
The critical philosophy of race consists in the philosophical examination of issues raised by the concept of race, the practices and mechanisms of racialization, and the persistence of various forms of racism across the world. Critical philosophy of race is a critical enterprise in three respects: it opposes racism in all its forms; it rejects the pseudosciences of old-fashioned biological racialism; and it denies that anti-racism and anti-racialism summarily eliminate race as a meaningful category of analysis. Critical philosophy of race is a philosophical enterprise because of its engagement with traditional philosophical questions and in its readiness to engage critically some of the traditional answers.
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