Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.5325/critphilrace.11.2.0339
Siphiwe Ndlovu
Abstract:Some scholars tend to argue that Black marginality is due largely to the exclusion of Blacks from meaningful economic participation as well as generalized social exclusions. This, owing to the division of the world’s populations along a racial hierarchy on the one hand, and in geopolitical terms along the dichotomy of Metropoles and dependencies. While there have been some cosmetic changes, particularly in relation to the complexion of the ruling personnel in the aftermath of Independence, the view adopted here is that the colonial structure remains largely intact. This is because the material base of colonial countries or regions remains fundamentally predisposed toward satisfying the economic interest of industrialized Western powers, the former colonizers. The argument advanced here therefore, is that such marginality is due not from exclusions per se but rather from inclusion albeit only as junior, and therefore inferior, partners. So at the root of the problem is the problem of “white supremacy,” which establishes and maintains asymmetrical relations between the races. This system underlies as it underpins the standard contract and thus functions as a clandestine and unofficial political system. The article thus delves into the social contract theory, particularly the works of Charles Mills and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, with the view of ascertaining how their ideas help us understand the modern world in terms of race relations. Furthermore, Walter Rodney’s concept of “white power” is appropriated as it provides a useful framework within which to understand the white power complex.
{"title":"Rodney, Mills, and Rousseau: Revisiting the Social Contract Idea","authors":"Siphiwe Ndlovu","doi":"10.5325/critphilrace.11.2.0339","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5325/critphilrace.11.2.0339","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:Some scholars tend to argue that Black marginality is due largely to the exclusion of Blacks from meaningful economic participation as well as generalized social exclusions. This, owing to the division of the world’s populations along a racial hierarchy on the one hand, and in geopolitical terms along the dichotomy of Metropoles and dependencies. While there have been some cosmetic changes, particularly in relation to the complexion of the ruling personnel in the aftermath of Independence, the view adopted here is that the colonial structure remains largely intact. This is because the material base of colonial countries or regions remains fundamentally predisposed toward satisfying the economic interest of industrialized Western powers, the former colonizers. The argument advanced here therefore, is that such marginality is due not from exclusions per se but rather from inclusion albeit only as junior, and therefore inferior, partners. So at the root of the problem is the problem of “white supremacy,” which establishes and maintains asymmetrical relations between the races. This system underlies as it underpins the standard contract and thus functions as a clandestine and unofficial political system. The article thus delves into the social contract theory, particularly the works of Charles Mills and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, with the view of ascertaining how their ideas help us understand the modern world in terms of race relations. Furthermore, Walter Rodney’s concept of “white power” is appropriated as it provides a useful framework within which to understand the white power complex.","PeriodicalId":43337,"journal":{"name":"Critical Philosophy of Race","volume":"11 1","pages":"339 - 354"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43410890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.5325/critphilrace.11.2.0309
Edwin Etieyibo
Abstract:There are forms of discriminations that are not defensible, and unjustified discriminations manifest in different forms. One such manifestation is racism, which involves the use of morally arbitrary natural and moral constituents (characteristics, abilities, qualities) to demarcate racial or ethnic groups and consequently designate some groups as superior and others as inferior. In this article, I discuss one form of racism (intellectual racism), namely, racism in relation to color, as a way of highlighting how the notion of superiority and inferiority of racial or ethnic groups (Caucasian and Africans) play out in the intellectual landscape and discourse. Ultimately, my motivations are threefold: one, to signify and engage with some views of racial coloring and color eliminativism; two, to make and extend the position that color eliminativism is not defensible; and three, to highlight and emphasize the claim that given the notion of a “one-colored humanity,” racial groups ought not to be classified as superior or inferior.
{"title":"Race, Intellectual Racism, and the Opened Door","authors":"Edwin Etieyibo","doi":"10.5325/critphilrace.11.2.0309","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5325/critphilrace.11.2.0309","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:There are forms of discriminations that are not defensible, and unjustified discriminations manifest in different forms. One such manifestation is racism, which involves the use of morally arbitrary natural and moral constituents (characteristics, abilities, qualities) to demarcate racial or ethnic groups and consequently designate some groups as superior and others as inferior. In this article, I discuss one form of racism (intellectual racism), namely, racism in relation to color, as a way of highlighting how the notion of superiority and inferiority of racial or ethnic groups (Caucasian and Africans) play out in the intellectual landscape and discourse. Ultimately, my motivations are threefold: one, to signify and engage with some views of racial coloring and color eliminativism; two, to make and extend the position that color eliminativism is not defensible; and three, to highlight and emphasize the claim that given the notion of a “one-colored humanity,” racial groups ought not to be classified as superior or inferior.","PeriodicalId":43337,"journal":{"name":"Critical Philosophy of Race","volume":"11 1","pages":"309 - 338"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42939737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.5325/critphilrace.11.2.0259
Siphiwe Ndlovu
This Special Issue comes at a time when African countries and the Global South in general are facing unprecedented crises in securing energy to power their economies. The crises are necessitated largely by the developed Western countries exerting enormous power and pressure upon the developing world to move away from fossil fuels, while at the same time the West is increasing its uptake on fossils. However, with critical self-reflection we are able to understand that a crisis of this nature is not without historical precedence, as it is preceded by a series of other forms of injustices meted out upon the formerly and still colonized peoples. And not long ago, the COVID-19 pandemic on the health front, and the handling thereof, showed just how skewed and divided the world still is and laid bare race-laden inequalities both at local and global levels. So to be sure, the current crises are part of the history of struggle against race-based social injustices and demonstrate Western desire to continue its stranglehold over its former colonies. And although the energy transition is dubbed the “Just Energy Transition,” for those in the developing world who are negatively affected, there is clearly nothing “Just” about it. So whereas we generally tend to speak of social or historical injustices such as the energy crises and COVID-19, at an epistemological front we find cognitive injustice. Accordingly, the articles in this issue contribute to a series of responses by the anticolonial movement (broadly defined) in relation to injustice, particularly its epistemological ramifications on knowledge and knowledge production in the relation between the colonizer and the colonized, the center and the periphery. Furthermore, the historical exclusion of African and other non-European peoples from participation in reason had the effect that Africans in particular were precluded from philosophy itself, a phenomenon that African philosophy and associated disciplines are today still grappling with in the academy. So in a word, the articles make an important contribution insofar as reckoning with the impact that race and the history of racism has had in philosophy in particular, both as a discipline and as a human mental activity.It should be remembered that the exclusion of Africans from reason and eventually from philosophy is preceded by an earlier one, the exclusion of Africans from recognition at a human level, qua rational beings. One can talk of a history of depersonalizations and dehumanizations; of massacres and deracination inflicted upon the oppressed owing to the colonial encounter. This is why for a scholar and a philosopher of the periphery, to use Enrique Dussel’s term, philosophical inquiry cannot and ought not be divorced from human reality. In fact, scholars of the periphery often stress the need for philosophy not to abstract too much from reality; and for philosophy to confine itself with liberatory human ends, among other things. There are a numbe
{"title":"Guest Editor’s Introduction","authors":"Siphiwe Ndlovu","doi":"10.5325/critphilrace.11.2.0259","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5325/critphilrace.11.2.0259","url":null,"abstract":"This Special Issue comes at a time when African countries and the Global South in general are facing unprecedented crises in securing energy to power their economies. The crises are necessitated largely by the developed Western countries exerting enormous power and pressure upon the developing world to move away from fossil fuels, while at the same time the West is increasing its uptake on fossils. However, with critical self-reflection we are able to understand that a crisis of this nature is not without historical precedence, as it is preceded by a series of other forms of injustices meted out upon the formerly and still colonized peoples. And not long ago, the COVID-19 pandemic on the health front, and the handling thereof, showed just how skewed and divided the world still is and laid bare race-laden inequalities both at local and global levels. So to be sure, the current crises are part of the history of struggle against race-based social injustices and demonstrate Western desire to continue its stranglehold over its former colonies. And although the energy transition is dubbed the “Just Energy Transition,” for those in the developing world who are negatively affected, there is clearly nothing “Just” about it. So whereas we generally tend to speak of social or historical injustices such as the energy crises and COVID-19, at an epistemological front we find cognitive injustice. Accordingly, the articles in this issue contribute to a series of responses by the anticolonial movement (broadly defined) in relation to injustice, particularly its epistemological ramifications on knowledge and knowledge production in the relation between the colonizer and the colonized, the center and the periphery. Furthermore, the historical exclusion of African and other non-European peoples from participation in reason had the effect that Africans in particular were precluded from philosophy itself, a phenomenon that African philosophy and associated disciplines are today still grappling with in the academy. So in a word, the articles make an important contribution insofar as reckoning with the impact that race and the history of racism has had in philosophy in particular, both as a discipline and as a human mental activity.It should be remembered that the exclusion of Africans from reason and eventually from philosophy is preceded by an earlier one, the exclusion of Africans from recognition at a human level, qua rational beings. One can talk of a history of depersonalizations and dehumanizations; of massacres and deracination inflicted upon the oppressed owing to the colonial encounter. This is why for a scholar and a philosopher of the periphery, to use Enrique Dussel’s term, philosophical inquiry cannot and ought not be divorced from human reality. In fact, scholars of the periphery often stress the need for philosophy not to abstract too much from reality; and for philosophy to confine itself with liberatory human ends, among other things. There are a numbe","PeriodicalId":43337,"journal":{"name":"Critical Philosophy of Race","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135804624","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.5325/critphilrace.11.2.0293
Bernard Matolino
Abstract:While there is no proof that there are distinct races among humans, racial divisions remain alive and relevant. Discrimination feeds into racism and sponsors beliefs in differences among races. Race as a social issue and a topic of analysis is generally treated as if it were a concept that could be understood on its own terms and independently of some other issues. One of the most promising attempts at understanding race is its relation to perceptible differences between and among races. These differences have played out in numerous ways, including how philosophy has been used as a tool of exclusion. This exclusion necessitated the rise of African philosophy as an extension of the combat against racism. Yet racists and racist attitudes remain prevalent. While African philosophy’s emergence can be articulated in terms of race and racism, what is more difficult to articulate is why racist attitudes persist. In tracing the pervasiveness of race and racism in African philosophy’s emergence as a counter to Western views, I demonstrate how African philosophy could not avoid being implicated in the struggle against racism. As a representative of African thought systems, African philosophy had to define itself in contrast to Western philosophy to show the viability of the African thought processes. However, African philosophy neither ended racism nor caused African thought systems to be treated as equals to their Western rivals. On the contrary, racist thinking and practices remain rife. Hence, I attempt to show that the sponsors of these attitudes are insistent on making prominent, perceptible differences between humans.
{"title":"“Why Race Still Matters”","authors":"Bernard Matolino","doi":"10.5325/critphilrace.11.2.0293","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5325/critphilrace.11.2.0293","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:While there is no proof that there are distinct races among humans, racial divisions remain alive and relevant. Discrimination feeds into racism and sponsors beliefs in differences among races. Race as a social issue and a topic of analysis is generally treated as if it were a concept that could be understood on its own terms and independently of some other issues. One of the most promising attempts at understanding race is its relation to perceptible differences between and among races. These differences have played out in numerous ways, including how philosophy has been used as a tool of exclusion. This exclusion necessitated the rise of African philosophy as an extension of the combat against racism. Yet racists and racist attitudes remain prevalent. While African philosophy’s emergence can be articulated in terms of race and racism, what is more difficult to articulate is why racist attitudes persist. In tracing the pervasiveness of race and racism in African philosophy’s emergence as a counter to Western views, I demonstrate how African philosophy could not avoid being implicated in the struggle against racism. As a representative of African thought systems, African philosophy had to define itself in contrast to Western philosophy to show the viability of the African thought processes. However, African philosophy neither ended racism nor caused African thought systems to be treated as equals to their Western rivals. On the contrary, racist thinking and practices remain rife. Hence, I attempt to show that the sponsors of these attitudes are insistent on making prominent, perceptible differences between humans.","PeriodicalId":43337,"journal":{"name":"Critical Philosophy of Race","volume":"11 1","pages":"293 - 308"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45086876","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.5325/critphilrace.11.2.0355
Zinhle Manzini
Abstract:This article considers Anika Mann’s (aka Anika Simpson) arguments on race and feminist standpoint theory. Its intervention is to take up Mann’s claim that “being-in-situation is the ontological condition for achieving a standpoint.” Mann’s analysis is reformulated as an existential standpoint philosophy, rooted in experience, and aimed at the concrete, freedom, praxis, and achievement. The article uses the existential standpoint framework as a foundation to take up Mamphela Ramphele’s initial autobiography, Mamphela Ramphele: A Life (1995) to critically reflect on what the actions of nonsubservient Blackwomen reveal about the lived experience of being Black and a woman under Apartheid South Africa. It argues that Ramphele’s philosophical approach to unveiling “Apartheid racism as a system” integrates a standpoint theory with existential phenomenology.
{"title":"Being Black and Woman in a Racist and Sexist Society: Locating an Existential Standpoint Philosophy in Mamphela Ramphele’s Autobiography","authors":"Zinhle Manzini","doi":"10.5325/critphilrace.11.2.0355","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5325/critphilrace.11.2.0355","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:This article considers Anika Mann’s (aka Anika Simpson) arguments on race and feminist standpoint theory. Its intervention is to take up Mann’s claim that “being-in-situation is the ontological condition for achieving a standpoint.” Mann’s analysis is reformulated as an existential standpoint philosophy, rooted in experience, and aimed at the concrete, freedom, praxis, and achievement. The article uses the existential standpoint framework as a foundation to take up Mamphela Ramphele’s initial autobiography, Mamphela Ramphele: A Life (1995) to critically reflect on what the actions of nonsubservient Blackwomen reveal about the lived experience of being Black and a woman under Apartheid South Africa. It argues that Ramphele’s philosophical approach to unveiling “Apartheid racism as a system” integrates a standpoint theory with existential phenomenology.","PeriodicalId":43337,"journal":{"name":"Critical Philosophy of Race","volume":"11 1","pages":"355 - 377"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42884930","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.5325/critphilrace.11.2.0378
S. Kumalo
Abstract:In this article I think through the recognition of the “ontological legitimacy” of iqaba—a concept that is found in South Africa, owing to the ontological split among Blackness/Indigeneity that was promulgated by colonial incursion. I do so using the question: “How will black people, long accustomed to dispossession and deprivation, adjust to a new condition of not being racial victims,” which was initially posed by Zoë Wicomb in the early 1990s. It is a question inspired by the end of apartheid and the looming promise of democracy. I juxtapose this question with a close reading of Samuel Edward Krune Mqhayi’s “Intshayelelo: Imbali.” Simply, the thesis of this article holds that iqaba possesses ontological legitimacy, iff [sic] they take heed of the instructions outlined in Mqhayi’s propositions of the importance of historical self-knowledge. Moreover, ontological legitimacy and an inclusive national identity are two sides of the same coin of recognition.
{"title":"Can Iqaba Possess Ontological Legitimacy?","authors":"S. Kumalo","doi":"10.5325/critphilrace.11.2.0378","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5325/critphilrace.11.2.0378","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:In this article I think through the recognition of the “ontological legitimacy” of iqaba—a concept that is found in South Africa, owing to the ontological split among Blackness/Indigeneity that was promulgated by colonial incursion. I do so using the question: “How will black people, long accustomed to dispossession and deprivation, adjust to a new condition of not being racial victims,” which was initially posed by Zoë Wicomb in the early 1990s. It is a question inspired by the end of apartheid and the looming promise of democracy. I juxtapose this question with a close reading of Samuel Edward Krune Mqhayi’s “Intshayelelo: Imbali.” Simply, the thesis of this article holds that iqaba possesses ontological legitimacy, iff [sic] they take heed of the instructions outlined in Mqhayi’s propositions of the importance of historical self-knowledge. Moreover, ontological legitimacy and an inclusive national identity are two sides of the same coin of recognition.","PeriodicalId":43337,"journal":{"name":"Critical Philosophy of Race","volume":"11 1","pages":"378 - 407"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46120559","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.5325/critphilrace.11.2.0264
M. Ramose
Abstract:Morafe ke bongwe bjo bosa kgaoganego eupja setlwaedi se laetja kgaogano go ya ka merafeDinyakishisho di supa gore magareng ga batho, morafe ke yo tee fela; ke morafe wa batho. Ya go bitjwa DNA ka Sekgowa e laetja go sena pelaelo gore batho kamoka ke bana ba legoro le lelapa le tee. Ka bjalo, morafe wa batho ga o a tshwanela go kgaolwa dikgaokgao. Bophelong bja ka metlha re bona gore ba gona bao ba gananago le taba ye. Ba ema ka la gore go nale merafe ye mentshi. Go ya ka bona, merafe ye e a fapafapana ebile tlhago e laetja gore go nale merafe ya kua godimo le ya kua fase. Go nale merafe yewe e tlhabologilego le ye esa tlhabologang. Kgopolo ye e tloga ele ditjie badimo. Ke yona e tlholago dintwa. E ganana le phedisano yeo e ithekgilego godimo ga toka le khutjo magareng ga batho. Ka fao taodiso ye e shireletja maemo a gore go nale morafe yo tee fela; morafe yo ebego lelapa le tee fela la batho kamoka. [Race is an indivisible singular but practice insists it is a frangible pluralBiological anthropology suggests that there is only one human race. Studies of the DNA have confirmed that there is only one human family marked by a variety of differences such as the type of hair, the color of eyes and skin. Instead of accepting the scientific finding that the human race is one, humanity is involved in an absurd but deadly race to prove that there are many races arising from a preestablished ontological hierarchy. According to this imaginary hierarchy, races are graded on a scale of “superiority” and “inferiority,” “civilization” and “barbarism.” The thesis defended in this article is that the prevailing practice of fragmenting the human race into multiple bits and pieces is against the pursuit of justice and peace in human relations. The human race is an indivisible singular and not a frangible plural.]
摘要：Morafe ke bongwe bjo bosa kgaoganego eupja setlwaedi se laetja kgaogano go ya ka merafeDinyakishisho di supa gore magareng ga batho，Morafe ke yo tee fela；kemorafewabato。你的DNA卡Sekgowa和laetja去了一个叫pelaelo gore的浴缸，去了卡莫卡和bana ba legoro le lelapa le tee。Ka bjalo，morafe wa batho ga o a tshwanela go kgaolwa dikgaokgao。Bophelong bja ka metlha re bonagore ba gona bao gananago le taba ye。ba ema ka la gore go nale merafe ye mentshi。加油，加油，加油。去吧，你是一个很好的人。Kgopolo ye e tloga ele ditjie badimo。你知道吗。这是一个很好的例子。卡法奥·陶迪索·叶·谢莱特加·马埃莫是一名黑人；莫拉菲·尤埃贝戈·莱拉帕和卡莫卡的球座。[种族是一个不可分割的单数，但实践坚持认为它是一个脆弱的复数。生物人类学认为只有一个人类。对DNA的研究已经证实，只有一个具有各种差异的人类家族，如头发类型、眼睛和皮肤的颜色n一个荒谬但致命的种族，以证明有许多种族源于预先建立的本体论等级制度。根据这种想象中的等级制度，种族是按“优越”和“自卑”、“文明”和“野蛮”来划分的。本文中的论点是，将人类分割成多个碎片的普遍做法违背了对人类关系中正义与和平的追求。人类是不可分割的单数，而不是脆弱的复数。]
{"title":"Race Is an Indivisible Singular but Practice Insists It Is a Frangible Plural","authors":"M. Ramose","doi":"10.5325/critphilrace.11.2.0264","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5325/critphilrace.11.2.0264","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract:Morafe ke bongwe bjo bosa kgaoganego eupja setlwaedi se laetja kgaogano go ya ka merafeDinyakishisho di supa gore magareng ga batho, morafe ke yo tee fela; ke morafe wa batho. Ya go bitjwa DNA ka Sekgowa e laetja go sena pelaelo gore batho kamoka ke bana ba legoro le lelapa le tee. Ka bjalo, morafe wa batho ga o a tshwanela go kgaolwa dikgaokgao. Bophelong bja ka metlha re bona gore ba gona bao ba gananago le taba ye. Ba ema ka la gore go nale merafe ye mentshi. Go ya ka bona, merafe ye e a fapafapana ebile tlhago e laetja gore go nale merafe ya kua godimo le ya kua fase. Go nale merafe yewe e tlhabologilego le ye esa tlhabologang. Kgopolo ye e tloga ele ditjie badimo. Ke yona e tlholago dintwa. E ganana le phedisano yeo e ithekgilego godimo ga toka le khutjo magareng ga batho. Ka fao taodiso ye e shireletja maemo a gore go nale morafe yo tee fela; morafe yo ebego lelapa le tee fela la batho kamoka. [Race is an indivisible singular but practice insists it is a frangible pluralBiological anthropology suggests that there is only one human race. Studies of the DNA have confirmed that there is only one human family marked by a variety of differences such as the type of hair, the color of eyes and skin. Instead of accepting the scientific finding that the human race is one, humanity is involved in an absurd but deadly race to prove that there are many races arising from a preestablished ontological hierarchy. According to this imaginary hierarchy, races are graded on a scale of “superiority” and “inferiority,” “civilization” and “barbarism.” The thesis defended in this article is that the prevailing practice of fragmenting the human race into multiple bits and pieces is against the pursuit of justice and peace in human relations. The human race is an indivisible singular and not a frangible plural.]","PeriodicalId":43337,"journal":{"name":"Critical Philosophy of Race","volume":"11 1","pages":"264 - 292"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47255001","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5325/critphilrace.11.1.0175
Umesh Bagade
Umesh Bagade’s historic critique of the caste blindness of the Subaltern Studies project retraces its emergence as a criticism of the Nationalist and Marxist schools of Indian history. He shows how the subaltern historians borrowed Antonio Gramsci’s concept of “subaltern” in order to retain a broadly Marxist framework without “class” but discarded the crucial Gramscian emphasis on oppression and economic exploitation. They grievously misread, confused, or omitted caste as a “system” when they constructed their model of the subaltern as subordinate but autonomous. The caste system functioned as a graded inequality with close links to patriarchy in which the lower castes were oppressed, exploited, and subordinated rather than autonomous. A homogenized “subaltern” status thus lumped the oppressed lower-caste peasants and the tribal peasantry with upper-caste peasantry. It was not acknowledged that the “solidarity” that expanded the base of subaltern revolt was achieved through coercion of the lower castes and women. The subaltern cultural “consciousness” of caste Panchayats, which was central to the project’s epistemology, was governed by Brahmanical religion and culture. The kinship relations that comprised peasant solidarities were built on endogamous caste practices. Predictably, the Subaltern Studies project found a close affinity with postmodernism and eschewed the question of emancipatory politics. The project therefore excluded anticaste mobilizations from the purview of “subaltern revolts” and simultaneously rejected the need for a comprehensive historical interpretation in which the caste system and patriarchy could be analyzed and opposed. In exposing the biases and lacunae of subaltern historiography, Bagade provides a clinical observation of history with an eye on history’s ability to influence reality. He shows the path that was not taken, which anticaste scholarship is now forging.
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Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5325/critphilrace.11.1.0094
D. Leonard
Abstract:This article studies the proposal of the twentieth-century anticaste scholar and writer Iyothee Thass of a millennial anticaste communitas (community) in creative opposition to caste immunitas (immunity). It argues that Thass's casteless community makes an appeal as it withdraws from caste and Brahminism by differentiating itself from enclosure. Thass's works sought to conceive and construct a community against caste in the vernacular both in the global and local context by way of a highly scholarly as well as creative engagement with Buddhism and the Tamil literary archive. In the colonial and nationalist context of the nineteenth century in the Indian subcontinent, his interpretative imaginaire of the history of India—Indhira Dhesa Sarithiram—was a pedagogy that establishes a belonging to world community and, at the same time, to one's own vernacular communities.
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Pub Date : 2023-01-01DOI: 10.5325/critphilrace.11.1.0209
D. Dwivedi
Abstract:In the fight against racism, philosophy has to interrogate caste in its own histories and current decolonial consensus. Caste has been evading its interrogation as the oldest race theory and racist practice, which continue to oppress the lower-caste peoples who constitute the majority population of the Indian subcontinent. Caste and race are species of the hypophysics of man, which consecrates scaled intrinsic value in human nature through the notion of "being born as" by "being born to." They are analogues in having the same denigrate-dominate function of exploiting by including as born inferior. However, caste and race are also homologues since the hypophysics of caste has been at the origins of the hypophysics of race from at least the eighteenth century, culminating in the "Aryan doctrine" of the Nazis, now being revived. Caste was the empirical, conceptual, and textual resource for Europeans as it showed that large groups could be dominated as well as excluded through the self-designated superiority, supplied by the Brahminical texts, of the oppressing group. Rather than a colonial construct, caste is the oldest racism, which in colonial times devised new calypsologies—ways to mask itself against rising anticaste thought and politics. Postcolonial and subaltern theories disguise caste's racism as "religion," "culture," and subaltern subjectivity, while some sociologists have denigrated Dalit scholarship as unacademic and emotional. The homologies of caste are still dangerously regnant today.
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