{"title":"On knowledge in action","authors":"G. Ferretti, Silvano Zipoli Caiani","doi":"10.1177/09593543231170854","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"What mental states guide the execution of our actions? It is generally agreed that the execution of an action is guided by the relevant knowledge state concerning how to perform that action. However, not all agree on which mental states underlie such a knowledge. Some suggest that knowing how to perform an action has mainly to do with the propositional representation about the way to execute that action. Those opposing this view stress the role of the motor, non-propositional representation as the mental state responsible for action performance. The aim of this article is to overcome this dichotomy by showing that an explanation of the cognitive processes underlying knowing how to perform an action needs both propositional and motor states. We defend this view by providing an account of the way in which our propositional knowledge about an action is constituted by the motor representation that guides the execution of that action.","PeriodicalId":47640,"journal":{"name":"Theory & Psychology","volume":"33 1","pages":"622 - 641"},"PeriodicalIF":1.1000,"publicationDate":"2023-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Theory & Psychology","FirstCategoryId":"102","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09593543231170854","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"心理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"PSYCHOLOGY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
What mental states guide the execution of our actions? It is generally agreed that the execution of an action is guided by the relevant knowledge state concerning how to perform that action. However, not all agree on which mental states underlie such a knowledge. Some suggest that knowing how to perform an action has mainly to do with the propositional representation about the way to execute that action. Those opposing this view stress the role of the motor, non-propositional representation as the mental state responsible for action performance. The aim of this article is to overcome this dichotomy by showing that an explanation of the cognitive processes underlying knowing how to perform an action needs both propositional and motor states. We defend this view by providing an account of the way in which our propositional knowledge about an action is constituted by the motor representation that guides the execution of that action.
期刊介绍：
Theory & Psychology is a fully peer reviewed forum for theoretical and meta-theoretical analysis in psychology. It focuses on the emergent themes at the centre of contemporary psychological debate. Its principal aim is to foster theoretical dialogue and innovation within the discipline, serving an integrative role for a wide psychological audience. Theory & Psychology publishes scholarly and expository papers which explore significant theoretical developments within and across such specific sub-areas as: cognitive, social, personality, developmental, clinical, perceptual or biological psychology.
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