Whose Coordination? Which Democracy? On Antitrust as a Democratic Demand

IF 4.1 2区社会学 Q1 POLITICAL SCIENCE Politics & Society Pub Date : 2023-07-04 DOI:10.1177/00323292231183805

Samuel Bagg

引用次数: 0

Abstract

The growing movement seeking to revive an aggressive, “neo-Brandeisian” approach to antitrust policy sees it partly as a way of protecting democracy against concentrated economic power. Yet on closer inspection, prevailing theories of democracy as collective decision making offer weak support, at best, for a neo-Brandeisian approach. Rather than abandoning the insight that an aggressive approach to antitrust can help protect democracy, however, this essay argues that we should adjust our theories of democracy to accommodate it. I first show why prevailing accounts are ill suited to explaining the democratic virtues of a neo-Brandeisian approach. I then outline an alternative ideal of democracy—defended in greater detail elsewhere—and draw out its implications for antitrust. While vindicating the intuition that aggressive antitrust policy serves democratic goals, my account also incorporates genuine worries about such an approach, and thus enables neo-Brandeisians to reformulate their democratic ambitions in more precise and promising terms.

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谁的协调?民主?论反垄断作为民主的要求

越来越多的运动试图恢复一种激进的、“新布兰代斯主义”的反垄断政策，并将其部分视为保护民主免受集中经济力量侵害的一种方式。然而，仔细观察就会发现，将民主视为集体决策的主流理论至多只能为新布兰代斯主义的方法提供微弱的支持。然而，本文认为，我们应该调整我们的民主理论，以适应它，而不是放弃激进的反垄断方法有助于保护民主的见解。我首先说明，为什么主流的说法不适合解释新布兰代斯主义方法的民主美德。然后，我概述了民主的另一种理想——在其他地方得到了更详细的捍卫——并引出了它对反垄断的影响。在证明激进的反垄断政策有利于民主目标的直觉是正确的同时，我的描述也包含了对这种方法的真正担忧，从而使新布兰代斯主义者能够以更精确和更有希望的方式重新制定他们的民主抱负。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Politics & Society Multiple-

CiteScore

5.00

自引率

4.20%

发文量

期刊介绍： Politics & Society is a peer-reviewed journal. All submitted papers are read by a rotating editorial board member. If a paper is deemed potentially publishable, it is sent to another board member, who, if agreeing that it is potentially publishable, sends it to a third board member. If and only if all three agree, the paper is sent to the entire editorial board for consideration at board meetings. The editorial board meets three times a year, and the board members who are present (usually between 9 and 14) make decisions through a deliberative process that also considers written reports from absent members. Unlike many journals which rely on 1–3 individual blind referee reports and a single editor with final say, the peers who decide whether to accept submitted work are thus the full editorial board of the journal, comprised of scholars from various disciplines, who discuss papers openly, with author names known, at meetings. Editors are required to disclose potential conflicts of interest when evaluating manuscripts and to recuse themselves from voting if such a potential exists.

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