A novel bias in managers' allocation of bonuses to teams: Emphasis on team size instead of team contribution

IF 1.8 3区 心理学 Q3 PSYCHOLOGY, APPLIED Journal of Behavioral Decision Making Pub Date : 2023-06-08 DOI:10.1002/bdm.2336
Yun Bai, Zhiyu Feng, Jonathan Pinto, Krishna Savani
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Abstract

How should managers supervising multiple teams allocate bonuses—based on each team's size or based on each team's contribution? According to the commonly accepted equity norm for allocating rewards, managers should distribute bonuses based on the relative contributions of the team. In contrast, we propose that managers are instead distracted by the number of employees in each team and neglect team contribution highlighted in the equity norm. Pilot Studies 1 and 2 confirmed that in both individual- and team-based bonus allocation situations, people preferred and actually allocated rewards according to the equity norm rather than the equality norm or the need norm when only contribution was manipulated. However, Study 1, a laboratory experiment, revealed that individuals assigned to the role of a manager allocated more bonuses to the larger team even though the two teams' actual work output (in terms of the number of units of work completed) was nearly identical. Study 2 replicated the key findings of Study 1 using a sample of managers supervising teams in organizations. Study 3 developed an information nudge—highlighting the team contribution—that reduced this bias. Together, these studies indicate a novel team-size bias that creeps in when managers allocate rewards to multiple teams and document an information nudge to reduce this bias.

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管理者对团队奖金分配的新偏见:强调团队规模而不是团队贡献
管理多个团队的经理应该如何分配奖金——基于每个团队的规模还是基于每个团队的贡献?根据普遍接受的公平分配奖励准则,管理者应该根据团队的相对贡献来分配奖金。相反,我们认为管理者被每个团队的员工数量分散了注意力,而忽视了公平规范中强调的团队贡献。试点研究1和2证实,在基于个人和团队的奖金分配情况下,当只操纵贡献时,人们更倾向于并实际根据公平规范而不是平等规范或需求规范分配奖励。然而,研究1(一项实验室实验)显示,被分配到经理角色的个人给更大的团队分配了更多的奖金,即使两个团队的实际工作产出(就完成的工作单位数量而言)几乎相同。研究2使用组织中管理团队的经理样本复制了研究1的主要发现。研究3开发了一种信息推动——突出团队的贡献——来减少这种偏见。总之,这些研究表明,当管理者将奖励分配给多个团队并记录信息以减少这种偏见时,一种新的团队规模偏见就会悄然出现。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.40
自引率
5.00%
发文量
40
期刊介绍: The Journal of Behavioral Decision Making is a multidisciplinary journal with a broad base of content and style. It publishes original empirical reports, critical review papers, theoretical analyses and methodological contributions. The Journal also features book, software and decision aiding technique reviews, abstracts of important articles published elsewhere and teaching suggestions. The objective of the Journal is to present and stimulate behavioral research on decision making and to provide a forum for the evaluation of complementary, contrasting and conflicting perspectives. These perspectives include psychology, management science, sociology, political science and economics. Studies of behavioral decision making in naturalistic and applied settings are encouraged.
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