Domestic Bank Reform and the Contingent Nature of the Structural Power of Finance in Emerging Markets

IF 4.1 2区社会学 Q1 POLITICAL SCIENCE Politics & Society Pub Date : 2022-09-28 DOI:10.1177/00323292221125567

Florence Dafe, Lena Rethel

引用次数: 1

Abstract

This article examines the structural power of domestic finance in developing and emerging economies (DEEs) in the context of a shift toward increasingly activist financial development planning and financial sector reform. Focusing on efforts to create large, internationally competitive banks in Malaysia and Nigeria dating to the late 1990s and early 2000s, it highlights that banks have not played their envisaged role in financing structural transformation via industrial growth and economic development. Nonetheless, (large) banks in DEEs have attained considerable structural power over financial policy, supporting their ability to shape growth and investment strategies. Therefore, the article proposes a revised model of the structural power of finance, recognizing its contingent nature. States pursue various forms of financialization both as a substitute to, or in conjunction with, industrial policy. Financialized development strategies enhance the structural power of large banks in DEEs, notwithstanding their limited role in meeting the investment/development imperative.

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国内银行改革与新兴市场金融结构力量的偶然性

本文考察了发展中国家和新兴经济体在金融发展规划和金融部门改革日益积极的背景下国内金融的结构性力量。报告聚焦于马来西亚和尼日利亚自上世纪90年代末和本世纪初以来创建具有国际竞争力的大型银行的努力，强调银行在通过工业增长和经济发展为结构转型融资方面没有发挥其设想的作用。尽管如此，德国的(大型)银行在金融政策方面已经获得了相当大的结构性权力，这支持了它们塑造增长和投资战略的能力。因此，本文提出了一个修正的金融结构权力模型，承认其偶然性。各国追求各种形式的金融化，既可以替代产业政策，也可以与产业政策相结合。金融化发展战略增强了发展中国家大型银行的结构性力量，尽管它们在满足投资/发展需要方面的作用有限。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Politics & Society Multiple-

CiteScore

5.00

自引率

4.20%

发文量

期刊介绍： Politics & Society is a peer-reviewed journal. All submitted papers are read by a rotating editorial board member. If a paper is deemed potentially publishable, it is sent to another board member, who, if agreeing that it is potentially publishable, sends it to a third board member. If and only if all three agree, the paper is sent to the entire editorial board for consideration at board meetings. The editorial board meets three times a year, and the board members who are present (usually between 9 and 14) make decisions through a deliberative process that also considers written reports from absent members. Unlike many journals which rely on 1–3 individual blind referee reports and a single editor with final say, the peers who decide whether to accept submitted work are thus the full editorial board of the journal, comprised of scholars from various disciplines, who discuss papers openly, with author names known, at meetings. Editors are required to disclose potential conflicts of interest when evaluating manuscripts and to recuse themselves from voting if such a potential exists.

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