Labor Unions and the Problem of Monopoly: Collective Bargaining and Market Governance, 1890 to the Present

IF 4.1 2区社会学 Q1 POLITICAL SCIENCE Politics & Society Pub Date : 2023-07-16 DOI:10.1177/00323292231183818

Brian Callaci

引用次数: 0

Abstract

The labor movement has long had an ambivalent relationship to antitrust policy in the United States. Trade unionists have considered concentrated markets to be more favorable environments for union power than decentralized markets: oligopoly demands fewer union resources for organizing and contract bargaining campaigns, and oligopolists can tame cutthroat competition and share product market rents with workers. This article takes a different view. Looking to the strategies employed by unions in decentralized industries, where unions rather than corporations took on the role of taming and regulating competition, it explains how unions have leveraged power over market governance into bargaining power over wages and working conditions. In the current age of vertical disintegration and fissured workplaces, union power over market governance is more important to shop-floor power than ever. Antitrust policy is one tool that can help restrain the power of corporations and make them more accountable to workers’ collective power.

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工会与垄断问题:集体谈判与市场治理，1890年至今

长期以来，劳工运动与美国的反垄断政策之间一直存在矛盾关系。工会主义者认为，集中市场比分散市场更适合工会权力：寡头垄断需要更少的工会资源来组织和合同谈判活动，寡头垄断者可以驯服残酷的竞争，并与工人分享产品市场租金。这篇文章持不同观点。从工会在分散行业中采用的策略来看，在分散行业，工会而不是公司承担着驯服和规范竞争的角色，它解释了工会如何利用市场治理的权力，将工资和工作条件的议价能力转化为议价能力。在当前垂直解体和工作场所分裂的时代，工会对市场治理的权力比以往任何时候都更重要。反垄断政策是一种有助于约束企业权力并使其对工人的集体权力更加负责的工具。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Politics & Society Multiple-

CiteScore

5.00

自引率

4.20%

发文量

期刊介绍： Politics & Society is a peer-reviewed journal. All submitted papers are read by a rotating editorial board member. If a paper is deemed potentially publishable, it is sent to another board member, who, if agreeing that it is potentially publishable, sends it to a third board member. If and only if all three agree, the paper is sent to the entire editorial board for consideration at board meetings. The editorial board meets three times a year, and the board members who are present (usually between 9 and 14) make decisions through a deliberative process that also considers written reports from absent members. Unlike many journals which rely on 1–3 individual blind referee reports and a single editor with final say, the peers who decide whether to accept submitted work are thus the full editorial board of the journal, comprised of scholars from various disciplines, who discuss papers openly, with author names known, at meetings. Editors are required to disclose potential conflicts of interest when evaluating manuscripts and to recuse themselves from voting if such a potential exists.

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