A Dynamic Graph Model of Strategy Learning for Predicting Human Behavior in Repeated Games

IF 0.3 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS B E Journal of Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2022-06-06 DOI:10.1515/bejte-2021-0015
Afrooz Vazifedan, M. Izadi
{"title":"A Dynamic Graph Model of Strategy Learning for Predicting Human Behavior in Repeated Games","authors":"Afrooz Vazifedan, M. Izadi","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2021-0015","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We present a model that explains the process of strategy learning by the players in repeated normal-form games. The proposed model is based on a directed weighted graph, which we define and call as the game’s dynamic graph. This graph is used as a framework by a learning algorithm that predicts which actions will be chosen by the players during the game and how the players are acting based on their gained experiences and behavioral characteristics. We evaluate the model’s performance by applying it to some human-subject datasets and measure the rate of correctly predicted actions. The results show that our model obtains a better average hit-rate compared to that of respective models. We also measure the model’s descriptive power (its ability to describe human behavior in the self-play mode) to show that our model, in contrast to the other behavioral models, is able to describe the alternation strategy in the Battle of the sexes game and the cooperating strategy in the Prisoners’ dilemma game.","PeriodicalId":44773,"journal":{"name":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":"23 1","pages":"371 - 403"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2022-06-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2021-0015","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

Abstract We present a model that explains the process of strategy learning by the players in repeated normal-form games. The proposed model is based on a directed weighted graph, which we define and call as the game’s dynamic graph. This graph is used as a framework by a learning algorithm that predicts which actions will be chosen by the players during the game and how the players are acting based on their gained experiences and behavioral characteristics. We evaluate the model’s performance by applying it to some human-subject datasets and measure the rate of correctly predicted actions. The results show that our model obtains a better average hit-rate compared to that of respective models. We also measure the model’s descriptive power (its ability to describe human behavior in the self-play mode) to show that our model, in contrast to the other behavioral models, is able to describe the alternation strategy in the Battle of the sexes game and the cooperating strategy in the Prisoners’ dilemma game.
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
预测重复博弈中人类行为的策略学习动态图模型
摘要本文提出了一个模型来解释在重复正态博弈中参与者的策略学习过程。该模型基于一个有向加权图,我们将其定义为博弈的动态图。这张图被用作学习算法的框架,用于预测玩家在游戏中会选择哪些行动,以及玩家如何根据他们获得的经验和行为特征采取行动。我们通过将模型应用于一些人类主体数据集来评估模型的性能,并测量正确预测动作的比率。结果表明,与其他模型相比,我们的模型获得了更好的平均命中率。我们还测量了模型的描述能力(描述自我博弈模式下人类行为的能力),以表明与其他行为模型相比,我们的模型能够描述性别博弈中的交替策略和囚徒困境博弈中的合作策略。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
0.80
自引率
25.00%
发文量
25
期刊介绍: We welcome submissions in all areas of economic theory, both applied theory and \"pure\" theory. Contributions can be either innovations in economic theory or rigorous new applications of existing theory. Pure theory papers include, but are by no means limited to, those in behavioral economics and decision theory, game theory, general equilibrium theory, and the theory of economic mechanisms. Applications could encompass, but are by no means limited to, contract theory, public finance, financial economics, industrial organization, law and economics, and labor economics.
期刊最新文献
Financial and Operational Creditors in Bankruptcy Resolution: A General Equilibrium Approach Under Three Game-Theoretic Division Rules with an Application to India A Note on a Moment Inequality A Note on a Moment Inequality Technology Adoption under Negative External Effects Management Centrality in Sequential Bargaining: Implications for Strategic Delegation, Welfare, and Stakeholder Conflict
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1