Perceptual Content and the Unity of Perception

Abstract

In recent work, Scott Soames (2010, 2013, 2015, 2019) and Peter Hanks (2011, 2013, 2015) have developed a theory of propositions on which these are constituted by complexes of intellectual acts. In this article, I adapt this type of theory to provide an account of perceptual content. After introducing terminology in section 1, I detail the approach proffered by Soames and Hanks in section 2, focusing on Hanks’s version. In section 3, I introduce a problem that these theories face, namely, how to account for the unity among the relevant intellectual acts. Section 4 provides an answer to this problem of unity, while section 5 explicates the relation to Soames and Hanks. In section 6, I extend the model to a theory of the unity of experiential consciousness. Finally, in section 7, I apply the preceding considerations to debates about the nature of perceptual representation. The upshot will be that experiential unity is not simply a phenomenal feature of consciousness, but central to an account of the role perceptual representation plays in perceptual cognition. As we perceive something, we rouse ourselves, so to speak, as though from a sleep with respect to the object. We grasp [it], comprehend it, we grasp ourselves with respect to it, [and] reflect upon ourselves. — J. N. Tetens (1913, 284) A concept should thus be understood as consciousness of an act, and more precisely of an act of combining and grasping together. — Béatrice Longuenesse (1998, 46) David de Bruijn is a lecturer in philosophy at Auburn University. He completed his PhD at the University of Pittsburgh. His primary research interests are the philosophy of perception and modern philosophy, specifically rationalist and Kantian themes in contemporary perceptual epistemology. 206962, 222, 4, D ow nladed from https:/inelibrary.w il.com /doi/101/sjp.12458 by A uurn U niersity L ibries, W ley O nline L irary on [04//2023]. ee he T rm s nd C onitions (https:linelibrary.w il.com /erm s-andnditions) on W ley O nline L irary or rles of use; O A aricles re goerned by he apicable C retive C om m ns L icnse 541 PERCEPTUAL CONTENT AND THE UNITY OF PERCEPTION In recent years there has been an increased interest in Kant’s theory of perception, and specifically Kant’s view of the nature of “intuitions” (Anschauungen): immediate confrontations with objects. Questions of interest include Kant’s distinctive thoughts on the relation between perceptual awareness and selfawareness: the question of whether or not intuitions have representational content in the contemporary sense of the term, and if so, whether this content should be considered to be conceptual or nonconceptual. However, one difficulty in approaching these issues from a contemporary point of view is that Kant appears to start from a very different mental metaphysics than is the contemporary standard. Specifically, Kant starts from a metaphysics of mind on which there is a critical place in cognition for certain mental acts associated with the mind’s faculties. This model was standard for the early modern period, but contrasts with the contemporary model of understanding mental states in terms of attitudes or relations to propositions. Consequently, it is not entirely clear how to map a position in Kant’s thinking to a position in twentyfirst century philosophy of mind or perception. In this article, I will bring Kant’s thinking about perception into contact with an important recent reappraisal of “activist” mental metaphysics. In recent work, Scott Soames (2010, 2013, 2015, 2019) and Peter Hanks (2011, 2013, 2015) have argued that we should reject actobject conceptions of propositional attitudes, and have developed instead a view broadly in the early modern mold, on which subjects constitute propositions through mental acts— acts like predication and referring to objects. As I will argue, focusing on this contemporary development of the early 1 References to the Critique of Pure Reason (Kant 1998) use standard A/B notation. Further Kant references: R = (‘Reflexionen’; Kant 1882 Kant handschriftlicher Nachlaß AA (‘Akademieausgabe’) 14– 19; Prol. = Prolegomena for Any Future Metaphysics (2001). 2 There is a distinction between “pure” and “empirical” intuitions, only the latter of which have a perceptual character. I will only be concerned with empirical intuitions. 3 For nonconceptualist readings, see Hanna (2005, 2008, 2011); Allais (2009); Tolley (2013); McLear (2014, 2015, 2016a, 2016b); Schulting and Onof (2015). For conceptualist readings, see Ginsborg (2006, 2008); Wenzel (2005); Griffith (2012); Van Mazijk (2014a, 2014b); Gomes (2014, 2017); McDowell (2009); Engstrom (2006); Connolly (2014). 4 Strictly speaking, the work on which I will focus is in semantics, as it focuses on the nature of propositions. However, I will be focusing on the mental acts that, per these accounts, are involved in propositional representation. 5 For the connection between perceptual content and mental acts, see also Susanna Schellenberg’s recent work, on which: “perceptual consciousness is constituted by a mental activity . . . this view is in fact a version of representationalism” (Schellenberg 2019, 530). For Schellenberg, perceptual representation is constituted by the preconceptual exercise of “basic” or “simple” discriminatory capacities. By contrast, on the present account, the relevant capacities will have a more intellectual character. 206962, 222, 4, D ow nladed from https:/inelibrary.w il.com /doi/101/sjp.12458 by A uurn U niersity L ibries, W ley O nline L irary on [04//2023]. ee he T rm s nd C onitions (https:linelibrary.w il.com /erm s-andnditions) on W ley O nline L irary or rles of use; O A aricles re goerned by he apicable C retive C om m ns L icnse